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ABSTRACT 
 
Institutions and Cross-border Mergers & Acquisitions (M&A) Value Creation. 
(December 2008) 
Hong Zhu, B.S., Xiamen University; 
M.S., Hong Kong University of Science & Technology 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Michael A. Hitt 
 
Cross-border Merger and Acquisitions (M&As) are an increasingly important 
strategy adopted by firms in order to create value in fiercely competitive global markets. 
Cross-border M&A value creation, that is, wealth creation for shareholders from cross-
border M&As, is therefore of considerable theoretical and practical importance. 
However, our understanding of the sources of cross-border M&A value creation remains 
limited. Researchers have found that the most commonly researched variables have little 
effect on cross-border M&A value creation. We therefore still do not understand the 
processes behind cross-border M&As.  
In this dissertation I examine the main effects of host country regulatory, economic 
and physical infrastructure institutions on cross-border M&A value creation. I further 
examine the moderating effects of host country political institutions on the relationship 
between host country regulatory institutions and cross-border M&A value creation. 
Moreover, I investigate the effects of institutional distance between host and home 
country on cross-border M&A value creation. I argue that the effects of institutional 
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distance (regulatory and economic distance) on cross-border M&A value creation are not 
symmetric, but rather the effects are contingent upon the direction of the distance. My 
hypotheses are tested on a sample of 6141 cross-border M&As between 1995 and 2003. 
Results of this analysis show that acquirers are more likely to create value by 
acquiring targets in countries with less advanced regulatory institutions. Further, my 
results indicate that host country political institutions positively moderate the 
relationship between host country regulatory institutions and cross-border M&A value 
creation. Host country economic institutions have an inverted U-shaped relationship with 
cross-border M&A value creation, and host country physical infrastructure institutions 
have a positive relationship with cross-border M&A value creation.  
Additionally, results show that there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
institutional distance and cross-border M&A value creation. The findings suggest that 
the effects of regulatory and economic institutional distance on cross-border M&A value 
creation are not symmetric. The effects are contingent upon the direction of the distance. 
That is whether the level of host country institutions is higher or lower than that of home 
country institutions. Implications for management and public policy are discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Given that cross-border M&As represent an increasingly important strategy adopted 
by firms in the fiercely competitive global market, cross-border M&A value creation is 
of considerable theoretical and practical importance (Hitt, Franklin, & Zhu, 2006a; 
Shimizu, Hitt, Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). Evidence suggests that the ratio of the value 
of cross-border M&A transactions to world foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 
increased from 52 percent in 1987 to over 78 percent in 2006 (World Investment Report, 
2006). The value of cross-border M&A transactions reach record level of $3.79 trillion 
in 2006 (Thomson Financial, 2007). Since then, cross-border M&As have continued 
growing at an exponential rate, and been perceived as one of the fundamental drivers of 
FDI (Shimizu, et al., 2004).  
Despite their importance, our understanding of the sources of acquirers’ cross-
border M&A value creation remains limited (King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). 
M&A theorists have emphasized that acquirers need to be prudent in selecting their 
targets (Hitt, Ireland & Harrison, 2001a). 
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Further, M&A researchers have devoted huge efforts to examining how the acquirer 
and target firms can integrate with each other and achieve the synergy between them 
(e.g., Cording, Christmann, & King, 2008; Hitt et al., 2001a). However, King, et al.’s 
(2004) meta-analysis found that the most commonly researched variables such as 
acquirers’ M&A experiences, managerial hubris, and resource complementarities 
between the acquirer and the target, have little effect on cross-border M&A value 
creation. 
Strategic management research has long suggested that value creation is context 
dependent. Yet, it is surprising that researchers have paid little attention to the external 
environments in which the acquirer and target firms are embedded. One exception is 
McNamara, Haleblian and Dykes (2008) who investigated and found that acquisition 
waves and industry environments influence acquirers’ value creation. Institutional 
theorists suggest that country institutions provide incentives and constraints, and thus 
determine the existence of certain types of firms (North, 1991; North, 2005; Scott, 2001). 
Extending M&A theorists’ suggestion that acquirers need to search prudently and 
identify the right target, I advocate that it is necessary for acquirers to search prudently 
and identify the right host country in which the right target is likely to be created.  
Institutional theorists also suggest that a country’s institutional environment shapes 
its embedded firms’ strategic behavior and thus affects their value creation (North, 1990; 
Scott, 2001). Certainly, home and host country’s institutional environment influences the 
acquirer and the target’s strategic behavior. The difference between host country and 
home country institutional environment causes the acquirer and the target behave 
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differently, and thus increases the difficulties of integrating between the acquirer and the 
target (e.g., Kostova, 1996; Kostova, & Zaheer, 1999; Hitt, et al., 2006a; Shimizu, Hitt, 
Vaidyanath, & Pisano, 2004). For example, Bhagat, Kedia, Harveston and Triandis 
(2002) suggested that institutional difference may negatively affect knowledge transfer 
between the acquirer and the target in post-acquisition processes, and thus negatively 
affect cross-border M&A value creation.  
However, little research on the effects of country institutions on cross-border M&A 
value creation has been completed (e.g., King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004; Shimizu. 
et al., 2004). This oversight in the literature indeed explains the ambiguity in cross-
border M&A value creation as shown in the King, et al. (2004) meta-analysis.  
In this dissertation, I show how neglected, and yet important institutional forces 
affect acquirers’ cross-border M&A value creation. Specifically, I examine how host 
country institutions, and institutional distance (defined as the difference between home 
and host country institutional environments) influence cross-border M&A value creation.  
Overview of the Dissertation Research 
Institutional scholars from multiple disciplines (e.g., economics, international 
strategy, political science, sociology) provide diverse perspectives regarding the 
meaning of institutions and place emphasis on different aspects of institutions. On the 
basis of their understanding of country institutions, scholars explain distinct firm 
behaviors such as firm legitimacy, transaction costs, and new geographic market entry 
and entry strategies. For example, institutional sociologists underscore regulatory, 
normative and cognitive pillars that contribute to the foundation of legitimacy claims 
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(Scott, 2001). International strategy scholars emphasize political risks that influence 
firms’ foreign investment decision and entry strategies (Henisz, 2000a; Henisz & Delios, 
2001; Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, & Eden, 2005). Institutional economists conceptualize 
institutions as rules of the game that decrease firms’ transaction costs (North, 1990). 
Previous institutional work from multiple disciplines advances our understanding of 
multifaceted country institutions. Like a double-edged sword, previous institutional work 
also adds challenges and complexities that may hinder institutional research.  
These numerous and diverse institutional dimensions that scholars propose are based 
on their own discipline’s assumptions. Different discipline’s assumptions not only result 
in different conceptualizations of institutions, but also lead to varying, and even 
inconsistent hypotheses about how institutions can influence social actors and social 
activities (Scott, 2001). While a unified analytic framework of institutions is needed to 
advance institutional research, juxaposing the above mentioned diverse institutional 
dimensions representing different discipline assumptions underlying them might lead to 
theoretical fragmentation rather than theoretical integration. We are well short of a 
unified analytic institutional framework. 
In this work, I first extend theoretical efforts to better understand a country’s 
institutional environment. The theoretical perspective of this work begins with the 
premise that the government makes choices that give rise to markedly different 
institutional arrangements regulating social and economic activities within a country and 
related to other countries (North & Thomas, 1973; Scott, 2001; Searle, 1995). For 
example, Rugman (2002) found that Irish government implemented new policies to 
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create a stable macroeconomic and financial environment that fosters Irish adaptation to 
and participation in the global economy.  
On the basis of this underlying assumption, I propose the concept of institutional 
control defined as the government’s attempts to influence social and economic activities. 
While several researchers have proposed institutional control, the definition of 
institutional control in this work differs from previous ones (e.g, Goodstein, 1994; Hall, 
1988; Steven, 1993). Goodstein (1994) referred institutional control that firms are 
enforced to conform to particular norms when many other firms have adopted them (i.e., 
normative institutional pressures to conform). On the basis of the underlying assumption 
of a country’s institutional environment in this work, normative institutional pressures to 
conform are beyond the definition of institutional control here. Further, Hall (1988) 
defines institutional control as industry associations’ managerial control techniques (i.e., 
health care institutions’ managerial control techniques to monitor physicians’ treatment 
behavior). Steven (1993) refers institutional control as governments’ direct involvement 
in firms’ management (e.g., providing direction and evaluating the performance of 
Crown corporations). This differs from institutional control in this work that the 
governments use country institutions to regulate social and economic activities within a 
country and related to other countries directly and indirectly.  
According to previous institutional research, I advocate four institutions that the 
government uses to influence social and economic activities (i.e., institutional control) 
including regulatory, economic, physical infrastructure, and political institutions (Ayres, 
1944; Ghemawat, 2001; Henisz, 2000a; Hitt, Holmes, Miller, & Salmador, 2008; North, 
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1990; Scott, 2001). Regulatory institutions refer to laws, regulations and government 
policies, such as trade policies and property rights (Hitt, et al., 2008; North, 1990; Scott, 
2001). Economic institutions measure the impediments to cash flow within a country. 
Physical infrastructure institutions regard the level and quality of physical support 
systems that facilitate business communication and operations in a country (Ghemawat, 
2001; Hitt, et al., 2008). Political institutions represent the level of discretion and power 
a government maintains over its citizenry (Henisz, 2000a; Hitt, et al., 2008). These four 
institutions form a configuration of institutional control for the government. Further, it is 
important to note that these four institutions evolve by entirely different mechanisms, yet 
they are not independent. Moreover, these four institutions are indeed coordinating 
mechanisms between social actors and social processes of value creation. Like 
production and strategic factors, these four institutions are important in explaining 
economic activities and their value creation (Potts, 2007).  
Secondly, as acquirers attempt to locate the right target and secure valuable assets at 
favorable prices in foreign countries, they are constrained by large information 
asymmetries and thus face the risk of adverse selection. As a result, they are likely to 
pay too high premiums for foreign targets they acquire (Krishnan, Hitt, & Park, 2007). 
As mentioned earlier, a country’s institutional environment determines the existence of 
certain types of firms. Thus, acquirers need to search prudently the right host country 
that the right target is likely to be created. Country institutions endogenously chosen by 
the government over the long run are also observable and salient to foreign acquirers 
(Hitt et al., 2008). These observable and salient host country institutions are able to 
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provide valuable information for foreign acquirers and thus lessen information 
asymmetries (Ragozzino & Reuer, 2006).  
Moreover, one prominent theme of institutional research is that a country’s 
institutional environment affects its embedded firms’ strategic behavior and thus value 
creation (North, 1990; Scott, 2001). As cross-border M&As involve long-term direct 
investments rather than short-term capital movements (Carr, Markusen, Maskus, 2002), 
host country institutions exert an additional, important and yet potentially unfamiliar 
institutional force affecting acquirers’ cross-border M&A value creation. I unpack main 
effects of four host country institutions on cross-border M&A value creation in this work. 
While four institutions represent different aspects of a country’s institutional 
environment, they are interdependent with each other in affecting embedded firms’ 
strategic behavior and value creation (North, 1990; Henisz, 2000a). For example, 
institutional economists conceptualize institutions as rules of the game that provide 
predictability and security for exchange. Thus, institutions (i.e., regulatory institutions) 
decrease firms’ transaction costs (North, 1990). Yet, international strategy scholars 
emphasize that political hazards (i.e., political institutions), defined as the feasibility of 
policy changes by the host country government, increase firms’ transaction costs and 
thus decrease the likelihood of FDI (e.g., Henisz, 2000a). Given that regulatory and 
political institutions interact with each other to enable or constrain firms’ strategic 
behaviors and thereby affect value creation (Franzese, 1999), I examine the interaction 
between host country regulatory and political institutions on cross-border M&A value 
creation.  
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 Third, in addition to host country institutions, extant research suggests that 
institutional distance, defined as the institutional difference between the host country and 
the home country, affects cross-border M&A value creation (Bhagat, et al., 2002; 
Morosini, et al., 1998; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). On the one hand, institutional 
distance may negatively affect knowledge transfer between the acquirer and the target in 
the post-acquisition processes, and thus decrease cross-border M&A value creation 
(Bhagat, et al., 2002). Ghemawat (2001) posited that it is costly for firms to operate in a 
distant institutional market. On the other hand, institutional distance can positively affect 
knowledge creation as acquirers are likely to access different and valuable knowledge 
stocks in new institutional environments (Morosini, et al., 1998; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 
1998). Ghemawat (2003) also suggested that firms may adopt an arbitrage strategy and 
thus are able to benefit from institutional distance. Hence, understanding of the effects of 
institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation remains a challenge.  
In this work I propose the concept of institutional distance asymmetry. Institutional 
distance asymmetry suggests that the effects of institutional distance on cross-border 
M&A value creation are not symmetric. That is, these effects are conditional on the 
direction of the distance. For example, the institutional distance from the United States 
to China is the same as institutional distance from China to the United States, using 
existing measures for institutional distance. However, the effects of institutional distance 
for U.S. acquirers acquiring Chinese targets, and Chinese acquirers acquiring U.S. 
targets may be different. U.S. acquirers with rich resources and strong capabilities are 
able to deal with the distance, and even can capitalize on the institutional distance (i.e., 
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different and valuable resources in China). Yet, Chinese acquirers with much less 
resources and weak capabilities may not be able to do so (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, 
& Borza, 2000). I expect that asymmetric institutional distance may help to clarify the 
effects of institutional distance on acquirers’ cross-border M&A value creation.   
Finally, the effects of institutions on cross-border M&A value creation are more 
salient in certain industries. In this work I examine cross-border M&As in industries that 
are technologically driven and/or have technological components such as 
telecommunication, semiconductor, internet, software, computer, disk drives, and lasers. 
Indeed, complex technologies are often cited as an inducement for internalization (i.e., 
M&A). Further, in addition to diverse institutional forces that cross-border M&As 
generally encounter, knowledge transfer, integration, and creation involved in cross-
border M&As in technology industries are significantly affected by home and host 
country institutions in which the acquirer and the target are embedded. Recent M&A 
research suggested that obtaining technological know-how and developing technical 
capabilities are increasingly important motives for M&As (Ahuja & Katila, 2001).  
Contributions of the Dissertation Research 
This work makes contributions to the M&A, institutional theory and strategic 
management literatures. The first primary contribution is to cross-border M&A research. 
By showing that host country institutions and institutional distance between the home 
and the host country affect cross-border M&A value creation, this work helps open the 
black box of cross-border M&A value creation.  
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Strategic management and international business scholars have long examined the 
factors that affect firms to choose cross-border M&A as their foreign entry strategy 
(Hennart & Reddy, 1997; Shimizu, et al., 2004). Hennart and Reddy (1997) found that 
equity international joint ventures (IJV) are preferred over cross-border M&As when the 
desired assets are linked to nondesired assets; when the Japanese investor has little 
previous experience of the American market; when the Japanese investor and the U.S. 
partner manufacture the same product; and when the industry entered is growing neither 
very rapidly nor very slowly. Reuer (2001) found that firms’ abnormal returns from IJV 
partner buyouts are positively related to the firm’s R&D intensity.  
Recently scholars have started to investigate host country institutions that influence 
firms to choose cross-border M&A as entry mode (Brouthers, 2002; Hitt et al., 2008). 
Brouthers (2002) found that firms entering countries with few legal restrictions tend to 
use wholly owned entry mode while firms entering countries with many legal 
restrictions tend to use joint venture. Researchers also found that the level of corruption 
in the host country influence firms to choose cross-border M&A as their entry mode 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006). However, we 
have limited understanding of the effects of country institutions on cross-border M&A 
value creation. I attempt to fill this research gap in this work. 
To advance our understanding of the impacts of country institutions (i.e., institutions 
in the host country, and institutional distance) on cross-border M&A value creation, this 
work makes a second major contribution that builds upon previous institutional work. 
This work goes beyond the typical way in which institutional environment has been 
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defined and thus institutional theory has been used in international management 
(Westney, 1993). Existing institutional research from multiple disciplines has examined 
diverse dimensions of a country’s institutional environment and their effects on firms’ 
behaviors thereby advancing our understanding of a country’s institutional environment. 
However, as the underlying assumptions of these various institutional dimensions differ, 
these numerous institutional dimensions indeed cause theoretical fragmentation, 
hindering the further and integrated understanding of a country’s institutional 
environment, and the consequences of the institutional environment. On the basis of the 
assumption that the government makes choices that give rise to markedly different 
institutional arrangements regulating social and economic activities within a country and 
related to other countries, I contribute by proposing the concept of institutional control. 
Further, I propose four institutions that the government uses to control social and 
economic activities. These four institutions are regulatory, economic, physical 
infrastructure, and political institutions.  
Each of these four institutions with its own “rules of the game” defines a distinct 
space of economic opportunities (Potts, 2007). In this work I show that it is important to 
differentiate the effects of each institution on cross-border M&A value creation from 
others. Four institutions are also interdependent with each other and form an integrated 
institutional control within a country. Accordingly, I examine the effects of interaction 
between these institutions on cross-border M&A value creation.  
Third, this work contributes to institutional distance research stream by proposing 
and investigating the effects of asymmetric institutional distance on cross-border M&A 
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value creation in this work. Researchers have recently started to examine institutional 
distance and its effects on entry modes and firm survival. For example, researchers have 
examined the effects of the difference of the corruption levels between the host and the 
home country on entry mode decisions (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Perkins (2006) 
examined firms’ prior experiences in other foreign countries (measured as the similarity 
of regulatory institutions between the parent country and previously entered foreign 
countries) on their survival in Brazil. Researchers suggested that institutional distance 
may have both positive and negative effects on firms’ value creation. When examining 
the effects of institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation, I highlight the 
importance of considering the direction of institutional distance simultaneously. Taking 
into account the direction of institutional distance helps to clarify the effects of 
institutional distance on firms’ value creation. 
Fourth, highlighting the impacts of country institutions on cross-border M&A value 
creation, I make an important contribution to the strategic management literature. 
Because strategic management is partly based in economics, strategic management 
theories have emphasized the effects of the market (e.g., market failure) on firms’ 
behavior and value creation. While market forces are influential in developed countries, 
they are rather weak in most less developed countries. Previous research has suggested 
that institutions-non-market factors tend to affect firms’ strategy (e.g., Hitt et al., 2004; 
Zhu, Hitt, & Tihanyi, 2006). Boddewyn and Brewer (1994) suggested that non-market 
forces affect multinational firms’ political behavior. Rugman (2002) suggested that 
institutional environments in Ireland have indirect effects on firms domiciling in Ireland, 
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affecting not only the resources allocated to particular types of firms but also firm vision. 
Spencer, Murtha, & Lenway (2005) suggested that political institutional structures may 
influence firms’ tendencies to engage in entrepreneurship. Institutional non-market 
forces are the underlying and influential forces on firms’ value creation in the global 
market. Indeed, markets are embedded in institutions and thus affected by them in 
significant ways (North, 1990).  
Finally, as called by North (2005) to improve the predictive ability of institutions, 
this work relies on Hitt, et al.’s (2008) extensive institutional environment dataset, and 
demonstrates the effects of four institutions and institutional distance on acquirers’ 
cross-border M&A value creation, using cross-border M&A data collected from SDC 
Thomson’s International M&As Database. Lastly, I discuss practical implications for 
managers, and public policy implications for governments. 
Organization of Dissertation 
 
This dissertation is organized in the following manner: Chapter II – Theory and 
Hypotheses starts with theoretical base section. In this section, I review the extant 
literature including cross-border M&As, institutions and cross-border M&A value 
creation, and institutional distance, thus providing theoretical groundwork for the 
proposed new concepts (i.e., institutional control, institutions and asymmetric 
institutional distances), and theoretical models. Then the hypotheses are developed and 
presented in next two sections including institutional control and cross-border M&A 
value creation, and institutional distance.  
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Chapter III – Methods details the methodologies that were used to test hypotheses. 
Specifically, I discuss sample selection, measures, and statistical models in this chapter. 
Chapter IV – Results presents the results of statistical tests. Chapter V – Discussion 
presents an overview of this dissertation research, discusses the theoretical implications, 
practical implications for management and public policy implications for the 
government. The chapter closes with the discussion of the limitation, the direction of 
future research and the conclusion.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Chapter II includes four sections: (1) theoretical base, (2) institutional control and 
cross-border M&A value creation, (3) institutional distance, and (4) summary. The 
primary purpose of section one is to use the extant cross-border M&A and institution 
literature to build the theoretical base for the new concepts and hypotheses. Further, new 
concepts of institutional control, institutions and asymmetric institutional distance are 
proposed in this section. These new concepts provide theoretical building blocks leading 
to the hypotheses development. In section two, hypotheses pertaining institutional 
control and cross-border M&A value creation are developed. In section three, 
institutional distance and cross-border M&A value creation are developed. Finally, 
section four provides a summary for this chapter.  
Theoretical Base 
Cross-border M&A and Value Creation 
M&A has long been and continues to be one of the key strategies for firms to grow, 
manifesting as five M&A waves since 1880s (e.g., Goergen & Reneboog, 2004; Hitt et 
al., 1990). In the most recent M&A wave, predominant numbers of M&As occur across 
borders (Shimizu, et al., 2004). Cross-border M&A is an extremely prevalent strategy 
for firms to compete in the global market. M&A has been representing an important 
topic of repeated scholarly inquiry (e.g., Graebner & Eisenhardt, 2004; Haleblian, Kim, 
& Rajagopalan, 2006; Hitt, Harrison, & Ireland, 2001b; Hitt, Ireland, & Harrison, 2001a; 
Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, & Best, 1998; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1990; Hitt, Hoskisson, 
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Ireland, & Harrison, 1991; Hitt, Hoskisson, Johnson, & Moesel, 1996; Shimizu, et al., 
2004; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 2006). Cross-border M&A highlights its own 
importance in the increasingly integrated global market, and has received much 
scholarly attention in recent years (e.g., Hitt et al., 2001a; Hitt, et al., 2001b).  
Prior M&A research has advanced our knowledge about this key strategy – cross-
border M&A. Three research streams have been dominating in M&A research (Barkema 
& Vermeulen, 1998; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Hennart & Reddy, 1997; Schweizer, 
2005; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001; Zollo & Singh, 2004). First, researchers have 
examined the factors that influence firms to merge or acquire other firms (Hennart, & 
Reddy, 1997; Hitt et al., 2006). Previous work emphasizes that market failure for 
intangible assets (e.g., competences are irreducible) is one of the important reasons for 
M&As, in addition to economic efficiency and market power (Capron, 1999; 
Uhlenbruck, Hitt, & Semadeni, 2006). However, market failure is not an uncommon 
phenomenon across countries. Markets are not well developed in many emerging 
economies and developing countries (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Second, researchers have 
investigated that firms choose M&A as the entry strategy, particularly cross-border 
M&A as the foreign entry strategy. Foreign entry strategies include cross-border M&As, 
international joint ventures, international strategic alliance, Greenfield, and export (Hitt, 
et al., 2006a; Hitt, M.A., Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, & Borza, 2000; Isobe, Makino, & 
Montgomery, 2000; Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt, 2000). For example, Hennart and Reddy 
(1997) suggested that firms prefer international joint ventures rather than cross-border 
M&As because managers perceive less synergy with firms from distant markets.  
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Third, M&A researchers have devoted tremendous efforts in understanding how 
acquirers can create value from M&As. Cross-border M&A value creation is the creation 
of wealth from cross-border M&As for shareholders (Krishnan, et al., 2007; Shimizu, et 
al., 2004). Researchers have primarily adopted a synergy perspective, suggesting that 
M&A allows the acquirer (the combined firm) to create more value than the sum of 
values that the independent acquirer and target create (Hitt et al., 2001a). This line of 
research includes studies of post-acquisition integration processes, resource 
complementarities between the acquirer and the target, new geographic market and new 
product market entry, acquirers’ M&A experiences, and managerial hubris, among 
others (Barkema & Vermeulen, 1998; Hayward & Hambrick, 1997; Hennart & Reddy, 
1997; Schweizer, 2005; Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001; Zollo & Singh, 2004).  
As mentioned earlier, King et al. (2004) meta-analysis found that these commonly 
researched variables have little effect on M&A value creation. Cross-border M&A adds 
more challenges and complexity for management practice and scholarly research 
because different country institutions in which targets are embedded exert an additional, 
important yet unfamiliar influence on acquirers’ cross-border M&A value creation (Hitt, 
et al., 2006; North, 1990; Rossi & Volpin, 2004; Scott, 2001). These host country 
institutions and institutional difference between the home and the host country need to 
be examined. Indeed, even domestic M&As are significantly affected by their 
surrounding institutions such as anti-trust regulation in the 1910s and deregulation in the 
1990s that triggered M&A waves (Goergen & Renneboog, 2004). I suggest that some of 
the difficulty in explaining cross-border M&A value creation occurs because of failure 
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to recognize the underlying and influential forces (i.e., country institutions). Accordingly, 
I examine how country institutions affect cross-border M&A value creation in this work.  
There are two additional important reasons to focus on cross-border M&A value 
creation in this work. One is that the effects of country institutions on cross-border M&A 
value creation are more salient than on domestic ones. The other important reason is that 
cross-border M&A is an increasingly important strategy that firms adopt to participate in 
the fiercely competitive global market (Bettis & Hitt, 1995; Hitt et al., 2006; World 
Investment Report, 2000).  
Institutions and Cross-border M&A Value Creation 
One central theme of institutional theory is that a country’s institutional 
environment imposes both constraints and incentives on social actors and social 
activities embedded within this institutional environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
North, 1990; Scott, 2001). For example, as the agent endowed with a monopoly on the 
use of force, the government designs “the rules of the game” within the country and with 
other countries including laws, industry regulation polices, foreign trade policies and 
FDI policies (e.g., cross-border M&A regulation) among others (Weber, Lassman, & 
Speirs 1994; Mahmood & Rufin, 2005). These constraints and incentives indeed define 
possible and productive opportunity sets, which in turn determine the kinds of firms that 
come into existence through defining relative price (investment and pay-off) to firms. 
Because of inevitable competition derived from resource scarcity, firms tend to enable 
strategies to achieve the competitive advantage relative to their rivals in exploiting these 
opportunities.   
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A country’s institutional environments facilitate and encourage the integration of 
dispersed knowledge and thus the growth of knowledge stock. As a result, institutions 
affect knowledge stock including technology, beliefs, and strategic decision making, 
among others within the country (North, 2005). However, firms within a country may be 
cognitively constrained by their path-dependent knowledge accumulation and thus are 
not able to identify new value-creating opportunities that exist beyond their accumulated 
knowledge stock (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). They are not able to break from their path-
dependent growth pattern dictated by their surrounding institutional environment (North, 
2005). Thus, firms are less likely to exploit these new value-creating opportunities, 
which are however critical for firms to survive in the dynamic competitive global 
marketplace.  
Because institutions across countries are different and provide distinct opportunity 
sets, firms investing in other countries tend to identify new value-creating opportunities 
and thus generate new revenue streams (North, 2005; Scott, 2001). Vigorous 
competition in the domestic and global market further provides incentives for firms to 
learn new knowledge and explore new value-creating opportunities in foreign countries. 
So, they are able to increase efficiency and innovation relative to those of rivals (North, 
2005). Cross-border M&A is an important value creation strategy for firms to compete 
in the fiercely competitive global market (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001).  
In addition to bringing new value-creating opportunities, cross-border M&As are 
external and influential forces that help firms to break from their current development 
paths to new and valuable ones (Vermeulen & Barkema, 2001). Institutions in which 
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managers are embedded shape managers’ thinking of organizations and market 
competition, often manifesting as deeply ingrained cognition, and thus shape managers’ 
strategic actions. Institutions further influence organizational ideology, organizational 
practices, organizational resource arrangement, customers’ demands and preferences, 
and industry networks within the country (Kogut, 1991; Ingram & Simons, 2000; 
Simons & Ingram, 1997, 2003).  
Institutional influences accumulate over time along a historically path dependent 
trajectory. An example is the strong R&D cooperation between universities and business 
organizations in Germany (Kogut, 1991). Thus, it is difficult for firms embedded in their 
institutional environments to initiate a path-breaking change even when these changes 
are indeed necessary in the dynamic global competitive landscape (Bettis & Hitt, 1995). 
Fortunately, cross-border M&A can be an influential force that helps to decouple the 
inertia and direct firms to new value-creating paths. 
However, there is a void in scholars’ understanding of the effects of institutions on 
cross-border M&A value creation. Conceptual and empirical research in this area is 
underdeveloped. Fulfilling this research gap, I examine how institutions in the host 
country and institutional distance between home and host country affect acquirers’ cross-
border M&A value creation. Governments inheriting previous institutions (e.g., 
regulatory institutions, physical infrastructure institutions) and designing new ones are 
indeed active players in cross-border M&A transactions, particularly in the increasingly 
global competitive marketplace.  
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Institutional Control 
 As economies are increasingly integrated with each other, there is significant 
competition for survival, position and supremacy in the global economy (Polillo & 
Guillen, 2005). Research has also shown that FDI is likely to produce positive spillovers 
on host country economy development in the long run (Moran, 2001; Spencer, 2008). It 
has been witnessed that many developing countries’ governments have been decreasing 
regulatory restrictions in order to attract FDI. Many governments have also been 
amending diverse institutions regulatory social and economic activities within the 
country and with other countries in order to adapt to and to compete in the global 
economy (Polillo & Guillen, 2005). The increasingly global competition highlights the 
importance of the government. The theoretical premise of this work is that the 
government makes choices that give rise to markedly different institutional arrangements 
regulating social and economic activities within the country and with other countries 
(North & Thomas, 1973; Scott, 2001; Searle, 1995). Accordingly, I propose institutional 
control concept suggesting that the government designs and utilizes diverse institutions 
as instruments to regulate social actors and social activities. Institutional control and 
diverse institutions that the government utilizes to regulate social actors and social 
activities are indeed humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic, and 
social interactions (North, 1991). 
Institutional researchers have suggested that institutions consist of both informal 
constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct) and formal 
rules (constitutions, laws, property rights) (North, 1991; Scott, 1995). Most institutional 
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research has utilized three institutional profiles including regulatory, normative and 
cognitive to theorize institutional environments (Busenitz, Gomez, and Spencer, 2000; 
Kostova, 1999; Scott, 2001). Busenitz, et al (2000) empirically validated a measure of 
three entrepreneurship institutional profiles. Research in cognitive psychology has 
shown that cognitive and normative institutions are domain specific (e.g., 
entrepreneurship institutional profile) (Abelson & Black, 1986; Busenitz, et al., 2000; 
Walsh, 1995). Further, different groups in a society do not necessarily share the same 
values (Colclough, 2005). For example, agency theory suggests that the owners (the 
principal) of the firms may have different value from managers (the agency) (Jensen, & 
Meckling, 1976). Even different owners may have varying values (Tihanyi, Johnson, 
Hoskisson, & Hitt, 2003). While professional funds investors have short term orientation, 
pension funds investors have long term orientation (Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson, & 
Hitt., 2003).  
As can be seen, normative and cognitive two informal institutions orient toward the 
collective value within an industry, a professional group and a certain domain. The 
government’s institutional control in this work is collective and yet nationally oriented 
man-made formal institutions. Like tangible and intangible resources, formal institutions 
are more visible and informal institutions are less visible (Hitt, Ireland & Hoskisson, 
2007). These formal institutions functioning as “isolating mechanisms” and/or “incentive 
structures” are able to control social actors and social activities within the country and 
related to other countries (North, 1990; 2005). 
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Formal Institutions 
 Drawing upon previous institutional literature, I propose four institutions that form 
the institutional control within the country. These four institutions are regulatory, 
economic, physical infrastructure and political institutions (Ghemawat, 2001; Henisz, 
2000a; Hitt, et al., 2008; North, 1990; Scott, 2001). These four institutions represent 
humanly devised constraints to structure political, economic and social interactions 
within a country and related to other countries (North, 1991). As discussed earlier, these 
four institutions are formal institutions within a country. On the basis of the assumption 
that governments use institutions to control social and economic activities, this 
dissertation focuses on examining these formal institutions. At the same time, this 
dissertation does not de-emphasize the important effects of informal institutions such as 
culture. Yet, as formal institutions are the underlying basis of business systems within a 
country (Jackson & Deeg, 2008), they are expected to affect cross-border M&A value 
creation directly and considerably.  
Regulatory institutions refer to laws (legislative), regulations and government 
policies (policies) such as trade policies and property rights (La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silances, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Scott, 2001). Policies are the course of action 
adopted by the government; regulations are rule or other order prescribed by the 
government; law is a rule of conduct or procedure established by the government. These 
consist of regulatory institutions within a country and related to other countries. The 
government utilizes regulatory institutions as an institutional instrument to explicitly 
describe the rules, and require social actors to conform them. The government also uses 
 
24 
 
the coercive power to enforce regulatory institutions and other institutions, and make 
sure that social actors conform to these rules. Based on the use or threat of sanctions, the 
government supports and/or constrains certain social and economic activities within the 
country.  
Political institutions are also one of the important institutions that the government 
utilizes to regulate social and economic activities. Differing from regulatory institutions, 
political institutions function as the enforcement of other institutions including 
regulatory institutions. Political institutions also reflect the level of discretion and power 
a government maintains over its citizenry, which is undergirded by the political 
institutional structure (Henisz, 2000a; Hitt et al., 2008). Political institutional structure 
refers to collections of rules of behavior, norms, roles, physical arrangements, buildings 
and archives that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals, and 
relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals 
(Spencer, Murtha, & Lenway, 2005).  
Political institutions include democratic-oriented and authoritarian-oriented political 
institutions. A democratic political institutions guarantee the full legal protection of 
basic political and civil rights of the citizenry in a given polity, and establishes the rules 
that “define and restrict the powers of governmental authorities” (Landman, 1999). 
Citizen rights are further protected by the underlying political institutional structure, 
under which the authority is not able to change policies including citizen political rights 
and regulatory governance easily. By contrast, individuals’ civil rights and activities are 
constrained within authoritarian political institutions. And, citizens need to strictly obey 
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the authority of the government under authoritarian political institutions. Authoritarians 
also tend to impose their will on the citizens, and control their will and activities. Hence, 
political institutions are an important institution of controlling social actors and social 
activities within the country.  
The effects of economic factors on firms’ FDI have long been a major focus in 
international business and international management literature (e.g., Hymer, 1976). The 
government utilizes economic institutions such as the inflation rate and interest rates to 
control economic activities within a country and with other countries (Beck, Demirguc-
Kunt, & Maksimovie, 2005; Fontana & Palacio-vera, 2002). As such, economic 
institutions are included as one of four important institutions in this work.  
Physical infrastructure involves transportation structures that facilitate or constrain 
moving of strategic and factor resources including products, service, and people within a 
country (Hitt, et al., 2008). Physical infrastructure institutions represent important man-
made physical facilities that structure economic, and social interactions and activities 
within a country (Ghemawat, 2001). As such, physical infrastructure institutions 
compose the fourth important institution (Ghemawat, 2001; Hitt et al., 2008). Showing 
its importance, Ghemawat (2001) stressed that information networks and transportation 
infrastructures in host countries significantly influence FDI. Isobe, Makino and 
Montgomery (2000) found that physical infrastructure in host countries affects foreign 
firm entry timing and technology strategies. There is also evidence that physical 
infrastructure explains much of the variance in e-commerce activities across countries 
(Oxley & Yeung, 2001).  
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Therefore, regulatory, economic and physical infrastructures, and political 
institutions are the four institutions that the government can use to control social and 
economic activities within a country and with other countries. In the most recent large 
empirical institutional study, Hitt and his colleagues found these four important 
institutions (Hitt, et al., 2008).  
These four different institutions may involve different incentive structures and thus 
encourage different social and economic activities (e.g., knowledge accumulation). For 
example, political institutions may have their agenda, which is not same as economic 
institutions. Yet, physical infrastructure may in part represent current political 
institutions’ agenda. For example, the Korean government establishes priorities 
regarding the development of high-tech industries and thus invests heavily in 
technological infrastructures such as the internet within the country (Lee, 2003). 
Therefore, examining the effects of each of these four institutions contributes to an 
integrated and systematic understanding of the government’s institutional control and its 
impact on acquirers’ cross-border M&A value creation. For example, Rossi and Volpin 
(2004) found that some institutions (e.g., stronger shareholder protection) have stronger 
effects on firms’ M&A activities than other institutions such as accounting standards.  
Because firms are embedded in the government’s institutional control consisting of 
these four institutions, these four institutions tend to affect acquirers’ cross-border M&A 
value creation simultaneously. As such, I examine the effects of interaction among these 
four institutions in the host country on acquirers’ cross-border M&A value creation. 
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Institutional Distance 
In addition to institutional control in the host country, I contend that institutional 
distance between the home and the host country also significantly affects acquirers’ 
cross-border M&A value creation. There is evidence that that many firms operate in 
specific regions of the world rather than in the global market because many firms trying 
to globalize eventually suffer performance declines (Hitt, et al., 2006a; Maitland, Rose 
& Nicholas, 2005; Rugman, 2005; Rugman & Collinson, 2005). Frankel and Rose (2000) 
found that a 1% increase in physical distance leads to a 1.1% decrease in international 
trade; while colony-colonizer relationship such as Spain’s ties with Latin America raises 
international trade about 900%. Firms appear to encounter higher liability of foreignness 
(LOF) and thus increase costs when operating in distant markets (Eden & Miller, 2004; 
Zaheer, 1995). 
Distance may motivate firms to invest in distant markets and thus to gain arbitrage 
rents (Ghemawat, 2003). Cross-border M&As combining firms in different institutional 
environments allow firms to access different and valuable resources, diverse ways that 
resources are managed, and thus brings new value to acquirers (post-acquisition 
combined firm). Cross-border M&As expand the scope of value-creating opportunities 
and include more opportunities that are not recognized and exploited in domestic 
markets. Some resources that are currently managed in the host (home) country are made 
available for utilization under a different set of motivating conditions - the home (host) 
country. As mentioned earlier, cross-border M&As involving firms from different 
institutional environments may help to overcome inertia and generate new and even 
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path-breaking value (Kogut, 1991). Institutional distance has profound impacts on 
acquirers’ cross-border M&A value creation.  
However, previous research has provided mixed evidence regarding the effects of 
institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation (e.g., Ghemawat, 2003; 
Rugman & Collinson, 2005). I propose the concept of asymmetric institutional distance, 
which helps to resolve previous mixed findings. Accordingly, I examine the asymmetric 
effects of institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation.  
Institutional Control and Cross-border M&A Value Creation 
Next, I examine main effects of institutions of regulatory, economic, and physical 
infrastructure in host countries on cross-border M&A value creation. Subsequently, I 
examine how political institutions in host countries moderate the relationship between 
regulatory institutions in host countries and cross-border M&A value creation. Figure 1 
below illustrates my institutional control and cross-border M&A value creation 
theoretical model.   
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FIGURE 1 
Institutional Control and Cross-border M&A Value Creation Theoretical Model 
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As discussed earlier, institutions can act as selection mechanisms that influence 
economic activities within a country (North, 1990; Potts, 2007). Remarkable 
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to exploit and thus to create value. For example, the deregulation that occurred in the 
United States in the 1990s created new investment opportunities for industry, removing 
long-standing barriers to merging and consolidating (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 
2001).  
According to institutional theory, firm behavior is affected by institutional 
environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1993; Scott, 2001). Both domestic and foreign firms 
are likely to respond to the improvement in regulatory institutions by exploiting new 
market opportunities in these countries. Schaede (2006) suggested that cross-border 
M&As in the 21st century have been partially caused by regulatory changes. As foreign 
firms exploit new market opportunities in these countries, they bring in diverse and 
different knowledge. As a result, the amount and diversity of knowledge stocks in these 
countries tend to increase. Valuable and diverse knowledge available in these countries 
can be a source of value creation for prospective foreign acquirers (Venkataraman, 1997). 
Firms domiciling in these countries are more likely to generate new products/services, 
and new production processes by combining these diverse knowledge (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). These firms are valuable targets for 
prospective foreign acquirers.  
Because acquirers’ interests tend to be more protected in countries with advanced 
regulatory institutions (i.e., strong property right protection), knowledge transfer 
between acquirers and targets is facilitated. Strong property right protection also helps 
encourage knowledge transfer among firms within a country and thus promotes 
knowledge acquisition and integration (North, 2005). As a result, acquirers are more 
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likely to expand their knowledge stocks, which tend to contribute to knowledge creation 
and thereby value creation.  
Property right protection indeed is more important in technology-based industries, 
particularly those related to e-commerce. Property right protection tends to increase the 
trust in on-line impersonal transactions and thus enhance the confidence of foreign firms 
in exploiting huge profitable opportunities in e-commerce markets (Oxley & Yeung, 
2001). As firms are also more likely to internalize their intangible assets (on-line 
business competences), they tend to acquire foreign firms in these countries to exploit 
these opportunities and thus create value (Capron, 1999; Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006a). As a 
result, foreign acquirers are more likely to create value through acquiring targets in 
countries with more advanced regulatory institutions.  
Additionally, many countries, particularly emerging economies, have recently 
liberalized their economies, and are now competing with other countries for the foreign 
capital and advanced technologies (brought by high-tech firms) necessary for firms to 
survive in the global marketplace (Tsang & Yip, 2007). Emerging market governments 
that intend to attract foreign capital and promote economic efficiency and sustain 
economic growth generally encourage cross-border M&As, selling state assets at below 
market prices to restructure loss-generating state firms (Tsang & Yip, 2007; Uhlenbruck 
& Castro, 2000). Uhlenbruck and Castro (2000) found that Eastern European countries 
tend to sell their higher performing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to foreign firms for 
financial resources and advanced technologies. As such, foreign acquirers tend to have 
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the first-mover advantages in selecting superior resources within a pool of available 
targets (McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008).  
Emerging market governments have also recently begun to provide property right 
protection to attract more foreign investment. As a result, foreign acquirers are likely to 
create value by acquiring targets in these emerging economies that have been 
transforming to provide better regulatory institutions for firms to operate.   
Less Advanced Regulatory Institutions 
Restrictive regulatory institutions considerably decrease valuable business 
opportunities available for prospective foreign acquirers. For example, some 
governments expressly intend to protect domestic industries through regulatory control, 
restricting foreign firms’ access to these industries (Ghemawat, 2001). In turn, foreign 
firms may expect little operation autonomy and thus are less likely to create value within 
countries with restrictive regulatory institutions (Simons & Ingram, 2003). 
 For example, while Google acquired firms across countries to establish market 
power in the global market, acquiring Chinese firms in 2006 has been inhibited because 
of China’s restrictive regulatory institutions (Google milestones, 2006). Even after 
Google was allowed to operate in China, Google was not able to provide full services to 
consumers in China and did not create the huge value that was expected. For example, 
many foreign websites are not allowed access to China.  
Restrictive regulatory institutions can significantly decrease acquirers’ value 
creation in the host country and in the global market because valuable information is not 
accessible in a timely manner for firms operating in countries with restrictive regulatory 
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institutions. Foreign acquirers are less likely to make fast and effective strategic 
decisions. Yet, the speed of strategic decision making has emerged as a crucial 
competitive weapon for firms to compete successfully in a dynamic global business 
environment (Eisenhardt, 1990). A slow strategic decision process can be as ineffective 
as implementing the wrong strategy. As time costs, communication costs and transaction 
costs increase tremendously, acquirers’ value creation in host countries with restrictive 
regulatory institutions is less expected.  
Weitzel and Berns (2006) found that while corruption in the host country does not 
constitute a significant barrier to cross-border M&As, foreign acquirers tend to pay less 
premiums to the targets in corrupt countries. This also suggests that acquirers tend to 
perceive less synergy with targets, thereby expecting less value creation by acquiring 
targets in these countries. Ample evidence shows that firms typically shy away from 
doing business in countries known for corruption or social conflict (Ghemawat, 2001). 
Foreign acquirers need to undertake costly preparation to avoid corruption and social 
conflicts (Hensiz, 2000a). As such, acquirers are less likely to create value by acquiring 
targets in countries with less advanced regulatory institutions (e.g., restrictive regulatory 
institutions). In contrast, acquirers can create value by acquiring targets in countries with 
advanced regulatory institutions (e.g., less restrictive regulatory institutions, strong 
property rights protection). These arguments lead to the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between the level of regulatory 
institutions in the host country and cross-border M&A value creation.  
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Economic Institutions 
Since the focus of this dissertation is value creation in cross-border M&As, I define 
economic institutions in a narrow sense; that is, with reference only to investment 
constraints, capturing the degree to which money supply is channeled into investments. 
Economic institutions include a country’s inflation rate, liabilities, and liquidity (Hitt et 
al., 2008). Economic institutions tend to reflect monetary conditions within the country, 
which affects the level and structure of monetary demand. Specifically, monetary 
conditions affect the motives, abilities and decisions of economic agents (e.g., firms) to 
finance productive and speculative activities, and thus influence firm growth (Beck, et 
al., 2005; Fontana & Palacio-vera, 2002). Cash flow is indeed a necessary condition for 
financing productive or speculative activity because firms need monetary injections to 
finance inputs (Beck, et al., 2005). Economic and finance researchers have long posited 
that the government utilizes macroeconomic tools such as interest rate to influence 
economic activities within the country (e.g., Taylor, 1993). 
Low Levels of Economic Institutions 
Researchers have suggested that economic institutions affect prices across a wide 
variety of markets including financial assets, durable goods and real estate (e.g., Ireland, 
2005). Economic institutions affect the development of equity markets, through which 
firms are able to access abundant financial resources and liquidity (Ireland, 2005). 
Money tends to reflect its real value in countries with low levels of economic institutions 
(high levels of investment constraints). As shown in equity markets, the present value of 
future earning flows tends to be lower in countries with low levels of economic 
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institutions (Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2004). Equity markets are depressed in these 
countries. The connection between equity markets and the rate of capital stock growth is 
well-established (Ergungor, 2003). Liquidity in these countries is limited to banks 
subject to licensing and supervision (Hawkins, 2005). Banks also need to have credit 
standing (Hawkins, 2005). 
The key element for the viability and soundness of technological sectors is cash 
flow. Capital intensive investments in technology industries such as design and 
component production tend to be limited in countries with low levels of economic 
institutions (Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2004). High-tech firms are less likely to develop in 
these countries because information asymmetry significantly decreases high-tech firms’ 
abilities to obtain external financing (Ng & Schaller, 1996). Foreign acquirers (U.S. 
acquirers) are likely to evaluate irreversible investments (i.e., cross-border M&As) based 
on growth opportunities to survive and compete successfully in the global market 
(Pindyck, 1988). Technology firms, particularly high-tech firms have substantial 
expected future returns (Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2004). Obtaining technological know-
how and developing technical capabilities are increasingly important motives for cross-
border M&As (Ahuja & Katila, 2001). Foreign firms are less likely to acquire targets in 
these countries. Cross-border M&A value creation is also less expected because value 
creation is more likely to emanate from technological sectors in the increasingly 
dynamic global market.   
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Extremely Low Levels of Economic Institutions 
Extremely low levels of economic institutions refer to those economic institutions 
that are not able to provide funds for firms to invest, and that they even have high 
foreign debts and need to pay these loans and loan rates. Firms in countries with 
extremely low levels of economic institutions (high investment constraints) such as 
Thailand, South Korean and Malaysia firms after the 1990s financial crisis are valuable 
targets (Baker, Foley, & Wurgler, 2006). Local firms need to sell their assets at any costs 
to obtain immediate liquidity (Mody & Negishi, 2000). Only foreign firms, largely 
foreign firms from developed countries are able to afford to buy these firms. Facing this 
extreme liquid crisis, local firms lost their confidence in their abilities to create value.  
Due to such economic cataclysm, local firms also temporarily lost their legitimacy 
in the eyes of their stakeholders including employees, consumers, community (Kostova 
& Zaheer, 1999). The lack of confidence of the public in local firms’ inabilities to create 
value serves to legitimatize foreign firms during this period. As a result, almost any 
foreign firm was immediately perceived as legitimate and capable (Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). Local firms tended to benefit form the legitimate spillovers of foreign acquirers 
during this period of time.  
On the one hand, foreign acquirers bring in financial resources and help to resolve 
these local firms’ liquidity problems. On the other hand, foreign acquirers enlarge the 
scope and scale of their businesses through the massive scale of purchases of the shares 
and assets in these countries. Apart from bringing foreign capital, foreign acquirers 
introduce valuable management knowledge and practices, such as effective capital 
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structure, efficient management processes, etc. Unlike targets in other countries firms, 
targets in these countries are usually open to restructuring (Froese, Pak, & Chong, 2007). 
Hence, foreign acquirers are more able to transfer new managerial, production and 
marketing resources to targets successfully and thus improve efficiency, promote 
innovation and create value. As foreign acquirers access new resources (human capital) 
and different resource management in local markets, foreign acquirers are likely to 
create value by achieving economies of scale, and combining and recombining resources 
to create new values. 
Rajan and Zingles (1998) point out that investment decisions are less likely to go 
wrong in situations of extreme capital scarcity relative to available investment 
opportunities, even with absence of market information. It is usually relatively clear as to 
which investment would be profitable in situations of extreme capital scarcity. 
Distressed firms’ assets are also more likely to be close to real value (Lewellen & 
Kracaw, 1987). Thus, foreign acquirers are more likely to create value by acquiring 
distressed firms in countries with extremely low levels of economic institutions 
(extremely high investment constraints). 
Foreign acquirers may help bridge the gap between these depressed markets and 
deeper and well-developed foreign financial markets, and thus bring and enforce a 
capital allocation system with strict and transparent rules and regulations in these host 
countries (Aguiar & Gopinath, 2005). The greater liquidity and new economic 
institutional environments brought by foreign acquirers facilitate the trade of ownership 
of productive technologies and thus promote efficient resource allocation within the 
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country (Levine & Zervos, 1998). Hence, foreign acquirers are likely to sustain their 
value creation by acquiring distressed firms in these countries. Additionally, Aguiar & 
Gopinath (2005) found that the effects of liquidity (e.g., investment constraints) on 
cross-border M&As are prominent in the tradable sectors such as technological sectors 
with many potential investment opportunities.  
High Levels of Economic Institutions  
An expansionary monetary policy tends to encourage the development of equity 
markets. Firms are also more likely to obtain funding from banks because such 
expansionary monetary policy would have allowed banks to survive without seriously 
considering their loan portfolios (Borensztein & Lee, 2002). Liquidity is thus enhanced 
by allowing broad access to the financial resources (Hawkins, 2005). Abundant external 
financial resources in turn increase the demand for liquid financial assets (Jackson & 
Vitols, 2000). As a result, technology sectors requiring intensive capital investments are 
likely to develop in these countries. Active equity markets in these countries provide 
firms opportunities to divest resources and to acquire new resources (e.g., productive 
technologies), which help technological firms build dynamic capabilities to compete 
successfully in the dynamic global market. Hence, firms in these countries are valuable 
targets that are likely to contribute significantly to acquirers’ value creation.  
Equity markets in these countries are likely to offer potentially useful information 
about firm performance because they summarize the views of market players who have 
strong incentives to have well informed opinions (Hawkins, 2005). Market prices are 
also available immediately and are not revised (Hawkins, 2005). While extremely high 
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information asymmetry exists between acquirers and targets in cross-border M&As, 
foreign acquirers tend to decrease information asymmetry by acquiring targets in these 
countries providing transparent and reliable firm information. Hence, foreign acquirers 
are more likely to identify valuable targets that tend to contribute most to acquirers’ 
cross-border M&A value creation.  
The continued development of banking sectors and financial markets in emerging 
economies, along with the ongoing improvements of regulatory and legal frameworks, 
have raised expectations of higher investment returns in the future, and thus have driven 
foreign firms to invest currently against expected future income to achieve inter-
temporal substitution (Backe & Wojcik, 2006). This strategy assumes that an investment 
today may derive its value from the future choices it makes possible. Investment today 
generates information that is used to help make a subsequent decision (Rivoli & Salorio, 
1996). For example, investment in product development gives the firm the alternatives to 
proceed with manufacturing. As such, current investments serve as a valuable platform 
that leads to profitable future investments (Rivoli & Salorio, 1996). Expansionary 
monetary supply associated with lower inflation rate in emerging economies ensures 
economic stability and thus helps to build the confidence of investors, particularly 
foreign investors (Backe & Wojcik, 2002). Hence, as foreign firms acquire targets in 
emerging economies, foreign acquirers are likely to create value in both the short term, 
and the long term. These arguments lead to the following hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 2: There is a U-shaped relationship between the level of 
economic institutions in the host country and cross-border M&A value 
creation. 
Physical Infrastructure Institutions 
Physical infrastructure refers to national transportation infrastructures that facilitate 
the distribution of goods and services within the country. Seitz and Licht (1995) found 
that physical infrastructure encourages private investment because firms need access to 
physical infrastructures such as roads, ports, reliable electricity, telecommunications 
systems, and the like to obtain needed resources (Carr, et al., 2002). Physical 
infrastructure also influences transportation costs for products, particularly for low 
value-to-weight or bulk ratios products, and fragile or perishable products. Firms 
acquiring targets in these countries are likely to decrease their transaction costs, thereby 
being more likely to create value. Governments, particularly those of emerging 
economies have recently invested heavily in physical infrastructure in order to provide 
more and higher quality physical infrastructures to compete with other countries to 
attract FDI (Seitz & Licht, 1995). For example, Ireland and South Korean have invested 
heavily in internet infrastructures in order to attract high-tech FDI (Lee, 2003; Rugman, 
2002).  
A significant proportion of local outputs of foreign acquirers is intended for local 
sales (Carr, et al., 2002). Local physical infrastructure thus plays an important role in 
helping foreign acquirers to create value in local markets. Foreign acquirers need local 
established distribution networks to capitalize on proprietary technologies in the local 
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market and to achieve economies of scale. Knowledge-based assets (i.e., technologies) 
are at least partially joint or public inputs across subunits, giving rise to firm-level scale 
economies (Carr, et al., 2002).  
Local knowledge leakage and imitation provide incentives for firms to gain more 
benefits from technologies by exploiting economies of scale before their local potential 
rivals imitate their technologies and to extract profits from them (Isobe, et al., 2000). 
Local firms have strong incentives to imitate advanced technologies brought by foreign 
firms. Imitation has been an important technological development foundation for many 
economies such as Japan in 1960s and Taiwan in 1970s (Orru, Biggart, Hamilton, 1991). 
Better physical infrastructures such as distribution networks help foreign acquirers 
achieve such economies of scale faster (Lee, 2003). Accordingly, foreign acquirers tend 
to attain higher market shares, creating value in local markets (Mitchell, 1991). 
Researchers have found that physical infrastructure leads to net increases in 
economic activities, resulting in economic growth (Chandra & Thompson, 2000). Firms 
acquiring targets in these countries could further benefit from nearby factor markets and 
affordable consumers to buy products, thereby being more likely to create value. 
Physical infrastructures help foreign acquirers to be physically proximate to local 
customers and thus better understand and satisfy local customers’ needs. Foreign 
acquirers are also more likely to obtain local markets’ business information. Information 
about local customers and local businesses is a valuable resource for foreign acquirers 
that need adapt to local markets and innovate to compete successfully in the global 
market (Porter, 1992). 
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High-quality and dense physical infrastructures further facilitate business 
information and knowledge transfer (Rangan & Drummond, 2004). Communication and 
information costs tend to be lower within these countries (Grosse & Goldberg, 1991). 
Physical infrastructure development further facilitates local technology and human 
capital development because goods and services derived from advanced technologies are 
more likely to be brought in these places. Thus, firms in these countries are likely to be 
valuable targets for foreign acquirers. As foreign acquirers integrate high-quality local 
distribution networks into their complex networks of production and distribution systems 
around the world, resource exchange, and information and knowledge transfer between 
foreign acquirers and local targets is facilitated (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990). Foreign 
acquirers are more likely to create value by acquiring targets in countries with high-
quality and supportive physical infrastructure.  
However, acquirers tend to incur high costs to distribute goods and services, and to 
obtain information from distant customers in order to evaluate and monitor 
geographically distant businesses effectively and in a timely manner in host countries 
with limited physical infrastructure (Ghemawat, 2003; Ursacki & Vertinsky, 1992; Zhu 
& Hitt, 2007). Information asymmetry resulting from low-quality physical infrastructure 
deters transactions within the country and across countries (Ghemawat, 2001). Costs 
tend to increase exponentially as organizational diseconomies such as coordinating with 
geographically distant subunits, and monitoring local managers’ efforts and service 
qualities are likely to arise (Berger & Deyoung, 2001; Thomas & Grosse, 2001). Foreign 
acquirers are even more competitively disadvantaged as they penetrate in geographically 
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distant and large markets. Therefore, foreign acquirers are less likely to create value by 
acquiring firms in these countries. Indeed, Carr, et al. (2002) found that low-quality 
infrastructures make these countries unprofitable locations for production. These 
arguments lead to the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: There is a positive relationship between the level of physical 
infrastructure institutions in the host country and cross-border M&A value 
creation. 
Political Institutions  
Political institutions refer to the level of discretion and power a government 
maintains over its citizenry (Hitt et al., 2008). Political institutions also reflect the 
government’s ability to provide a credible commitment to the returns of private 
investment (Henisz, 2000a). This underlying political structure reflects the ability of a 
government to craft a credible commitment to an existing policy regime (e.g., regulatory 
institutions) (Henisz & Zelner, 2006; Hitt, et al., 2006b). I refer to democratic political 
institutions as providing a high level of civil and political rights to citizenry and making 
a credible commitment to regulatory institutions, and other institutions. In contrast, I 
refer to authoritarian political institutions as providing a low level of civil and political 
rights to citizenry and a low level of commitment to regulatory institutions, and other 
institutions (Mulligan, Gil, & Martin, 2004). As such, institutions are likely to be stable 
in countries with democratic institutions and yet change frequently in countries with 
authoritarian institutions.  
As discussed earlier, foreign acquirers are likely to obtain more value-creating 
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opportunities in countries with high level (e.g., less restrictive) regulatory institutions. 
Yet, both measurement and enforcement of these regulatory institutions may be 
imperfect to provide credible commitments to them (North, 1990). Firms may encounter 
expropriation hazards from the host country government. The host country government 
may either directly seize assets or adversely change taxes, regulations or other 
agreements to diminish acquirers’ return on assets (Henisz, 2000b). Political institutions 
enforcing regulatory institutions have its own agenda, differing from the agenda of 
regulatory institutions (North, 1990). Political institutions that guarantee the 
government’s commitment toward regulatory institutions are needed to ensure the 
returns to foreign acquirers’ investments. Researchers have suggested that the 
enforcement of regulatory institutions is at least as important as regulatory institutions 
(Pistor, Raiser, & Gelfer, 2000; Calderon, Chong, & Leo, 2007). 
Democratic Political Institutions 
Knowledge transfer and knowledge creation. Democratic political institutions 
encourage continuous trials that lead to value adding discoveries (North, 2005). Firms 
are more likely to develop new ideas within these countries (Sen, 1999). Firms also 
desire to exchange knowledge with others that contributes to knowledge creation. They 
are more likely to establish national intra- and inter- industrial networks to promote 
knowledge transfer and obtain knowledge spillovers, which tend to contribute to 
technological innovation and discoveries (Mahmood & Rufin, 2005). There is evidence 
that the higher density of national networks, the higher interaction among firms and the 
higher knowledge spillovers within countries such as Germany (Kogut & Walker, 2001).  
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As discussed earlier, democratic political institutions ensure that the government 
credibly commits to regulatory, economic, and physical infrastructure institutions. As 
high-level regulatory institutions provide firms abundant and diverse knowledge stocks 
and opportunities, and strong property right protection, democratic political institutions 
facilitate firms’ exploitation of these opportunities without fearing the hazards of 
expropriation and thus create value. Co-existence of high-level regulatory institutions 
and democratic political institutions provide protection of foreign firms’ assets, ensure 
the returns on private assets and thus decrease contractual hazards among firms. High-
level regulatory institutions providing property right protections and democratic and 
credible political institutions enforcing property right protections are able to ensure and 
facilitate continuous knowledge transfer within intra- and inter- industry networks. Thus, 
firms are more able to access and integrate diverse stocks of knowledge, characterized as 
public goods, externalities and information asymmetry, that tend to contribute to firms’ 
value creation (North, 2005).  
Under these regulatory and political institutional environments, acquirers are also 
more likely to transfer knowledge to targets, and targets in turn tend to acknowledge new 
ideas and knowledge from acquirers. Knowledge acquisition, integration and creation 
are facilitated within the combined firm. Foreign acquirers are more likely to create 
value by acquiring targets in these institutional environments. It is also important to note 
that the value of targets operating in countries with democratic political institutions is 
more than an individual value-creating agent. Targets’ embedded and dense supporting 
networks add significant value to target value. 
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Value added targets. As democratic political institutions guarantee certain social 
and occasionally economic rights of their citizens, they tend to set a floor to cost 
competition and thus make economic development based on low cost competition less 
feasible (Pontusson, 1992; Riain, 2000). In contrast, these countries force firms to move 
into higher value-added sectors, to pursue higher quality, skill, and productive strategies, 
and to push firms into new and more dynamic sectors and activities (Pontusson, 1992; 
Riain, 2000). The number of firms does matter for the technological development of the 
industry. With an increasing number of technology firms, which exchange knowledge 
regularly, the number of product innovations increases sharply (Wersching, 2005). Firms 
in countries with democratic institutions are attractive targets, which tend to enhance 
foreign acquirers’ innovation and thus value creation capabilities in the dynamic global 
market.  
Legitimacy. Guillen (2000) suggested that democratic political institutions that 
recognize and ensure individuals’ political and civil rights are more likely to provide 
extensive labor rights to employees, and give labor unions a role to play. Unions 
representing the interests of workers  tend to emphasize job security (Schneper & 
Guillen, 2004). As a method of corporate restructuring to achieve efficiency and 
profitability, foreign acquirers tend to layoff employees and even the management team 
of acquired firms, thereby threatening job security of acquired firms. Democratic 
political institutions fully recognizing labor rights and protecting labor rights by 
favorable labor legislation boost union’s confidence that the job security of employees is 
ensured and that labors are likely to gain value owing to the entry of profitable foreign 
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firms (Guillen, 2000; Riain, 2000). Therefore, unions and work forces in countries with 
democratic political institutions tend to have less hostility toward foreign acquirers. Thus, 
foreign acquirers are more likely to gain support from labor unions and workforces in 
general, and are perceived as legitimate players. As legitimate players, foreign acquirers 
are more likely to obtain needed resources (e.g., skilled labors) and create value that is 
appreciated by local customers.  
Authoritarian Political Institutions 
Knowledge transfer and knowledge creation. In contrast, many authoritarian 
political institutions are not able to provide credible commitments to regulatory, 
economic, physical infrastructure institutions, and others. Under these political 
institutions, trust among social actors is deterred. One typical characteristic of 
authoritarian political institutions is the high level of mistrust it creates in the society. 
Firms are less likely to exchange information and ideas because they fear other firms 
will exploit their information and ideas and become their competitors.    
Therefore, firms in countries with authoritarian political institutions are less likely to 
establish trustful innovation networks that foster uninhibited idea exchanges and 
knowledge spillovers (Mahmood & Rufin, 2005; Porter, 1998).  Authoritarian political 
institutions defined in this dissertation differ from those defined by previous sociological 
researchers. Henisz and Zelner (2006) found that a few authoritarian countries defined 
by previous sociological researchers provide stable political institutional environment 
such as Hungary. In this dissertation I refer to countries with authoritarian political 
institutions as those with frequent political institutional changes. Political institutions 
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indeed represent and emphasize the dominant group’s interests because politicians are 
likely to accept offers of financial and electoral resources from special interests groups, 
and thereby designing and implementing policies that reflect these groups’ interests 
(Mahmood & Rufin, 2005).  
Frequent political changes also cause regulatory and other institutions tend to 
change frequently. As a result, the credibility of regulatory institutions decreases. 
Foreign firms fearing hazards of expropriation are less likely to, and less able to exploit 
opportunities and to create value in these countries. Firms entering these countries tend 
to fear contractual hazards and thus are less likely to exchange knowledge with other 
firms. 
While democratic political institutions facilitate the formation of intra- and inter-
industry networks to promote regular knowledge transfer, authoritarian political 
institutions deter the formation of these value creation networks, inhibiting knowledge 
transfer within the country (Rummel, 1997). These authoritarian political institutions 
may even disrupt knowledge spillovers directly (e.g., by limiting internet contacts with 
the outside world). As a result, while high-level regulatory institutions provide 
tremendous value-creating opportunities, authoritarian political institutions deter foreign 
firms to exploit these opportunities and to create value by inhibiting their access to 
valuable complementary resources and diverse knowledge stocks.  
Political hazards. Authoritarian governments tend to control factor resources in 
their countries (Mulligan, et al., 2004). As firms acquire targets in these countries, they 
tend to incur additional political costs to obtain legitimacy from political institutions in 
 
49 
 
order to obtain needed factor resources and thus create value in these countries. As 
mentioned earlier, the lack of checks and balances on authoritarian political institutions 
makes cross-border M&As less feasible because foreign acquirers more likely to 
encounter expropriation hazards from host country governments. This is particularly a 
serious concern for foreign acquirers that make a strong commitment (i.e., cross-border 
M&As) in these countries. Even if these foreign acquirers have bargaining powers 
relative to host country governments, the bargaining advantages largely evaporate as 
soon as foreign acquirers have made durable and immobile investments in host countries 
(Henisz, 2000a).  
Human capital. As discussed previously, authoritarian political institutions are less 
likely to provide civil rights to citizens. These authoritarian political institutions are 
often less likely to invest in workfare programs that provide high quality training to help 
employees failing in the competitive marketplaces move into employment (Wincott, 
2003). Thus, innovative labor forces are less likely to be reproduced in countries with 
authoritarian political institutions (Riain, 2000). Yet, valuable human capital possessing 
critical know-how is an important source of firm innovation and value creation (Hitt, 
Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001). Carr, et al. (2002) found that U.S. outward 
investment seeks good labor skills and large markets. Obviously, firms in countries with 
authoritarian political institutions are less attractive targets for foreign acquirers. Cross-
border M&A value creation is likely to be lower from acquiring targets in these 
countries. Thus, these arguments lead the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 4: The level of host country political institutions positively 
moderates the positive relationship between the level of host country 
regulatory institutions and cross-border M&A value creation.  
Institutional Distance 
In this section, I first examine the effect of institutional distance on cross-border 
M&A value creation. Next, I propose asymmetric institutional distance concept. Further, 
I examine the effects of asymmetric regulatory distance and asymmetric economic 
distance on cross-border M&A value creation. Figure 2 below presents the theoretical 
model of the relationship between institutional distance and cross-border M&A value 
creation.   
In addition to institutional control in the host country, I also examine the effect of 
institutional distance between the host and the home country on cross-border M&A 
value creation. Distance is an important barrier for which firms must explicitly and 
thoroughly account when they decide to acquire foreign firms and expect to create value 
successfully (Ghemawat, 2001). Prior research has focused on the concept of psychic 
distance encompassing cultural difference, and business factor differences such as legal 
and competitive environment (e.g., O’Grady & Lane, 1996). Empirical work has focused 
more narrowly on the concept of cultural distance indices based on Hofstede’s work on 
culture (Tihanyi, Griffith, & Russell, 2005). I examine the effect of institutional distance 
on cross-border M&A value creation in this work. Further, I propose the asymmetric 
institutional distance concept, and examine the asymmetric effects of regulatory and 
economic institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation.  
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FIGURE 2 
Institutional Distance and Cross-border M&A Value Creation Theoretical Model 
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Institutional Distance and Cross-border M&A Value Creation 
M&A and Value Creation 
By prescribing both formal and informal “rules of the game”, institutions guide most 
interactions among firms, and influence the perceptions of firms regarding which 
resource combinations and recombinations are possible and productive (North, 1990). 
Thus, institutions exert powerful inertial forces that tend to encourage firms to manage 
their resources in ways that follow certain trajectories. Organizational structures, policies, 
and practices tend to reflect the institutional environment in which they are embedded 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Xu, & Shenkar, 2002).  
M&As including both domestic and cross-border ones provide a platform for 
combination of new resources and/or new combinations of existing resources, and thus 
increase the combined firm’s potential value creation capabilities (Morrow, Sirmon, Hitt 
& Holcomb, 2007; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). Firms’ value creation stems from the 
way resources are managed including structuring the resource portfolio, bundling 
resources to build capabilities and leveraging capabilities (Sirmon, Hitt, & Ireland, 2007). 
Resource combinations and recombinations are of greater importance under high 
environmental uncertainty such as in high-tech industries (Sirmon, et al., 2007). As a 
result, the way that the combined firms create value through domestic M&As tends to be 
path-dependent, and thus is less likely to lead firms to generate new rent streams 
required in the dynamic competitive global market (Sirmon, et al., 2007).  
Institutional Distance and Cross-border M&A Value Creation 
Fortunately, cross-border M&As involving firms from different institutional 
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environments help to overcome such inertia and to create new and even path-breaking 
value (Kogut, 1991). Firms from different institutional environments tend to accumulate 
varying stocks of knowledge and resources, develop different strategic goals and 
organizational routines, and are supported by diverse external institutions. Each 
country’s institutional environment representing a different set of “rules of the game” 
also motivates certain patterns of resource management by its effects on the costs of 
pursuing varying processes of resource management. Cross-border M&As combining 
firms from different institutional environments are likely to access diverse resources, and 
different ways that resources are managed, and thus firms are more likely to create new 
value. Meanwhile, the scope of value-creating opportunities is broadened through cross-
border M&As to include more opportunities that are not recognized and exploited in 
domestic markets, and resources that are currently managed in the host (home) country 
are made available for utilization within the firm under a different set of motivating 
conditions – the home (host) country.  
Further, it has been long established in FDI theory that exploitation of location-
specific advantages is one of the key motives to invest in foreign countries (Dunning, 
1994). A country’s institutional environment may be more favorable for certain activities. 
While firms are most familiar with their domestic institutional environments, this does 
not necessarily mean that their home institutional environments are most favorable for 
all kinds of activities. Accessing diverse knowledge stocks in varying institutional 
environments can be a source of value creation. Firms with expanding resource stocks 
also tend to secure the best use of their resources within certain institutional 
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environments (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999). As such, acquirers are likely to create value in 
institutionally distant markets (i.e., institutional arbitrage).   
Single- and Double-loop Learning, and Cross-border M&A Value Creation 
Cross-border M&As tend to involve two types of learning – single-loop learning and 
double-loop learning. Single-loop learning refers to learning external technological 
knowledge and double-loop learning refers to learning institutional norms and values 
underlying firms’ strategic behaviors (Frynas, Mellahi, & Pigman, 2006; Visser, 2007). 
Single-loop and double-loop learning occurs when individuals interact with other 
persons and the contextual institutional environments. While single-loop learning helps 
firms improve learning outcomes (i.e., new technologies), it places limitation on learning. 
Single-loop learners do not change their governing values, heuristics and norms during 
learning processes (Argyris, 1976). However, these governing values and norms may not 
be consistent with those in the new institutional environment. Single-loop learners may 
not be able to detect errors and solve problems which are subject to the understanding of 
new governing rules, heuristics and value (Visser, 2007).  
Double-loop learning focusing on exploring new basic values and norms can help 
single-loop learners overcome single-loop learning limitations, and thus avoid these 
consequences and function effectively in the new institutional environment (Lei, Hitt, & 
Bettis, 1996). As a result of single-loop and double-loop learning, acquirers tend to 
enrich their current knowledge base including advanced technologies and tacit 
knowledge of doing businesses in foreign markets.  
 
55 
 
More important, acquirers tend to discover their asymmetries with targets in terms 
of resources, capabilities, and norms and values underlying resource allocations, R&D 
investments, and so forth. Knowledge is asymmetrically allocated among economic 
agents, and knowledge asymmetry lies at the heart of unique value creation 
(Venkataraman, 1997). It is important to note that knowledge is cumulative and can be 
transmitted voluntarily or involuntarily without losing any value. Thus, learning allows 
firms to acquire and accumulate knowledge which is the precondition for generating 
successful innovation: either to raise productivity through process innovation or to 
attract new consumer groups with new products through product innovations. As Miller 
(2003) suggested, firms can conceptualize these asymmetries and leverage them across 
appropriate market opportunities, turning these asymmetries into sustainable capabilities. 
In fact, Zahra, Ireland and Hitt (2000) found that learning gained from international 
environments improve international venture performance (growth and ROE).  
Cross-border M&As may act as buying “an admission ticket” for acquirers to 
navigate in different institutional environments, enabling/motivating more exchanges 
(i.e., a series of acquisition and divestiture in foreign countries), and discovering 
potential yet unknown resources and services (Smit, 2001). Cross-border M&As tend to 
not only divert inertial forces exerted by acquirers’ home institutional environments but 
also provide more “constructive destruction” value creation opportunities for acquirers.   
Identity and Cross-border M&A Value Creation 
Identity reflects the degree to which employees of acquirers and targets experience a 
state of attachment to and identify with the combined firm. Employees who identify with 
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the firm are likely to share the knowledge and engage more actively in knowledge 
transfer (Kostova, 1999). Employees are also more likely to acknowledge knowledge 
transferred. Employees of acquirers and targets partly derive their self-identities from 
combined organizational membership. Child and Rodrigues (1996) found that 
knowledge transfer in international joint ventures is facilitated when the partners 
involved in knowledge transfer hold similar social identities and is impeded when they 
hold different social identities. Acquirers tend to provide formal integrative mechanisms 
to facilitate firm-wide learning and thus to achieve competitive advantage (Hansen & 
Lovas, 2004). The presence of internal formal integrative mechanisms may underscore 
the common identity that acquirers and targets share, and thus facilitate knowledge 
transfer between each other (Hansen & Lovas, 2004). Thus, sharing the same identity 
can offset the negative effects of distance, and can facilitate cooperation between 
acquiring and target firms. 
Challenges Involved in Institutional Distances, and Cross-border M&A Value Creation 
While acquirers are likely to create value by acquiring firms in institutionally distant 
markets, institutional distance poses great challenges for acquirers. Acquirers tend to 
encounter information asymmetries and liability of foreignness (LOF) when operating in 
distant institutional environments (e.g., Eden & Miller, 2004). Thus, firms may be less 
able to realize value creation in distant markets. Although acquirers might benefit from 
diverse resources and capabilities that targets in distant institutional environments bring, 
benefits might decrease as institutional distance increases (Gaur & Lu, 2007). Eventually 
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the challenges might override the benefits of institutional distance that contribute to 
cross-border M&A value creation.  
Acquirers’ LOF in host countries is derived from their lack of a deep knowledge of 
host countries. Distance could be perceived as a proxy for informational deficiencies. 
The more institutionally distant countries that acquirers enter, the less information they 
are likely to have with regard to host countries including regulatory, economic, political, 
and physical infrastructure institutions. Acquirers are also less likely to have a deep 
understanding of local consumers’ needs and preferences. Researchers have recently 
suggested that firms need to improve consumer benefits and to create value (Priem, 
2007). Local consumers lack information to evaluate new entrants from distant markets 
in terms of their product reliability, quality, etc., and thus they are hesitant to buy their 
products and/or services. As a result, acquirers incur additional costs to establish their 
legitimacy and gain acceptance by local constituents when they decide to enter distant 
markets.  
While acquirers are able to access diverse, novel and valuable knowledge from 
institutionally distant host countries, it is important to note that acquirers’ ability to 
recognize, to assimilate, and to apply novel knowledge to commercial ends is the 
function of prior related knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). High levels of 
knowledge differences tend to create an almost unbridgeable cognitive gap and hence 
lower the probability of assimilating different knowledge and thereby of generating 
technological innovations. Acquirers tend to have more difficulties in understanding and 
correctly interpreting distant institutional requirements (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999).  
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Too much institutional distance makes it causally ambiguous for acquirers to figure 
out how firms in host countries succeed and thus what acquirers need to do to succeed in 
these host countries. Wuyts, Colombo, Dutta and Nooteboom (2004) suggested that 
optimal learning entails a trade-off between the advantage of a higher novelty value of 
knowledge, and the disadvantage of less mutual understanding. Hence, the heterogeneity 
of knowledge should be sufficiently small to allow for understanding but sufficiently 
large to yield non-redundant, novel knowledge. Wuyts, et al. (2004) suggested that the 
value of learning has an inverse-U shaped relation with knowledge novelty, with 
optimum level that yields maximal value of learning.  
Researchers have suggested that firms are largely less capable of accessing and 
deploying required resources to compete successfully in a distance market (Rugman & 
Verbeke, 2004). Acquirers are likely to suffer performance declines when operating in 
an institutionally distant country. Prior studies have shown that firms decrease their 
performance as they locate in a distant market (Berger & Deyoung, 2001; Miller & 
Parkhe, 2002). For instance, Li and Guisinger (1991) found that foreign-owned affiliates 
in the United States have a lower survival rate compared to domestic U.S. firms. 
Rugman and Collinson (2005) also found that firms regionalizing their activities are 
better able to extract benefits from internationalization than those trying to globalize.  
Institutional Similarity and Cross-border M&A Value Creation  
Institutional similarity results in similar, hence familiar business procedures such as 
knowledge about transaction. Institutional similarity facilitates transaction processes, 
and reduces transaction costs (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995). Firms acquiring the target in 
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a similar institutional environment tend to decrease their transaction costs. Due to 
institutional similarity, the level of comfort and trust between acquirers and targets is 
likely to increase, facilitating knowledge transfer and mutual problem solving (Hansen 
& Lovas, 2004). Acquirers are more able to share superior knowledge within similar 
institutional environments, and more likely to exploit their competitive advantages in 
these environments.  
As acquirers tend to compete with firms domiciling in similar institutional 
environments for similar resources and market space, positive benefits of institutional 
similarity are reduced due to negative competition effects. These negative effects tend to 
grow rapidly and become dominant. For example, Buckley, Clegg and Wang (2007) 
found that investment from Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan multinational enterprises 
compete fiercely with local Mainland Chinese firms.  
Acquirers may be less likely to create value in relatively similar institutional 
environments because important institutional differences may not be anticipated (e.g., 
O’Grady & Lane, 1996; Shenkar, 2001). For example, Tsang and Yip (2007) found that 
hazard rates of FDI are lower in more developed and less developed countries than in 
countries with similar economic development as the home country. Acquirers from 
ineffective institutional environments are less able to create value through acquiring 
targets in similar ineffective institutional environments as they are locked in a situation 
with less valuable knowledge spillovers (De Groot, Linders, Rietveld, & Subramanian, 
2004). These arguments lead the following hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 5: There is an inverted-U shaped relation between institutional 
distance and cross-border M&A value creation.  
Asymmetric Institutional Distance 
Distance by definition is symmetrical: the distance from point A to point B is 
identical to the distance from point B to point A. Yet, researchers have suggested that the 
effects of distance might not be symmetrical (e.g., O’Grady & Lane, 1996; Shenkar, 
2001). O’Grady & Lane (1996) found that while U.S. retailers have been successful in 
Canada, large numbers of Canadian retailers have failed in the United States. 
The theory of resource dependency originated with the work of Pfeffer and Salancik 
(1978), which showed that organizational external resource providers shape the focal 
firm’s behavior because the focal firm’s survival hinges on its ability to procure critical 
resources from its resource providers. Casciaro and Piskorski (2005) reformulated the 
resource dependence model, suggesting two distinct theoretical dimensions of 
interdependence. Power imbalance refers to the difference in the power of each actor 
over the other; and mutual dependence refers to the existence of bilateral dependencies 
in the relationship, regardless of whether the two actors’ dependencies are balanced or 
imbalanced. They also found that mutually dependent and power balanced firms are 
more likely to form a merger.   
While the acquirer and the target are likely to be mutually dependent, I contend that 
a power imbalance exists between the acquirer and the foreign target. Resource 
dependence researchers examine the proportion of the acquirer’s needed resources that 
the target can provide; and the proportion of the target’s needed resources that the 
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acquirer can provide. On the basis of the comparison of these proportions, researchers 
evaluate resource dependence, and thus power imbalance existing between the acquirer 
and the target (Casciaro & Piskorski, 2005; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
While it might be easy to evaluate the proportion of needed tangible resources such 
as financial assets quantitatively, it is much more difficult to quantitatively evaluate the 
proportion of needed intangible resources, particularly tacit knowledge such as advanced 
technologies, managerial knowledge, and social norms and value etc. As a result, when 
resources the acquirer (target) needs from the target (acquirer) are tacit, researchers may 
not be able to calculate and compare the proportion of needed resources that each 
provides to the other, and thus access resource dependence and power imbalance 
between the acquirer and the target.  
However, it might be helpful to recognize distinct types of critical resources that the 
acquirer needs from the foreign target, and those the target needs from the acquirer. 
Indeed, critical resources that the acquirer needs differ from those the foreign target 
needs (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle, and Borza, 2000; Steensma, Barden, Dhanaraj, 
Lyles, & Tihanyi, 2008). For example, Hitt, et al. (2000) found that emerging economy 
firms emphasize and depend on developed country firms for financial assets, technical 
capabilities, and intangible assets. This suggests that developed country acquirers tend to 
have more power over emerging economy targets regarding financial assets, technical 
capabilities, and intangible assets. Further, Hitt et al. (2000) also found that developed 
country firms emphasize and depend on emerging economy firms for local market 
knowledge. This further suggests that emerging economy targets tend to more power 
 
62 
 
with developed country acquirers regarding local market knowledge. Hitt et al. (2000)’s 
findings imply that a distinct power imbalance exists between developed country 
acquirers and emerging economy targets. So, differencing the types of resources that the 
acquirer and the foreign target need reveals power imbalance existing between the 
acquirer and the foreign target clearly. Importantly, this power imbalance influences the 
effects of distance on the acquirer and the foreign target differently and significantly.   
In this work, I contend that a distinct power imbalance between the acquirer and the 
foreign target reflects resource, knowledge and ability difference between the acquirer 
and the foreign target. As the acquirer and the target are embedded in and affected by 
their respective institutional environments (North, 1990; Scott, 2001), resources, 
knowledge and ability difference reflect the difference of home and host country 
institutional environments (North, 1990; Scott, 2001).  
Extending the power imbalance existing between the acquirer and the foreign target, 
I contend that the power imbalance exists between home country firms and host country 
firms. Further, due to power imbalance, home country firms tend to emphasize certain 
institutions, and yet de-emphasize others in host countries. It is important to note that 
these emphasized host country institutions can provide resources that home country 
firms need. In the similar vein, I contend that host country firms tend to emphasize 
certain institutions, and yet de-emphasize others in home countries. It is also important 
to note that these emphasized home country institutions may be different from those 
emphasized by home country firms. Further, these emphasized home country institutions 
can provide resources that host country firms need. For example, U.S. acquirers may 
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emphasize regulatory and political institutions in China. Indeed, Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2001) found that political risks in the host country significantly influence U.S. 
firms’ foreign entry strategies (e.g., M&A). In contrast, Zeng and Williamson (2003) 
suggested that Chinese acquirers may emphasize economic institutions in the United 
States. It has been observed that Chinese acquirers have recently started to acquire 
developed country targets in order to move up the learning curve pertaining to 
technological innovations and product-engineering skills (e.g., Zeng & Williamson, 
2003).  
It is likely that the above mentioned host country firms acquire home country firms. 
Power imbalance still exists between these two countries and between these two country 
firms. But, the direction of power imbalance is different from the point view of the 
acquirer (U.S. and Chinese acquirer) because acquirers from different countries are 
likely to pay attention to distinct host country institutions that could provide their needed 
resources. This directional power imbalance influences asymmetric effects of distance 
between home and host country on cross-border M&A value creation. So, I propose that 
the effects of institutional distance are asymmetric (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; 
Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006b). 
In this work I examine the asymmetric effects of regulatory and economic 
institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; 
Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006a). As discussed earlier, power imbalance exists between the 
acquirer and the foreign target. Acquirers tend to pay special attention to certain host 
country institutions that could provide acquirers’ needed resources. Yet, targets may pay 
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special attention to certain home country institutions that are different from country 
institutions acquirers emphasize. So, examining one institutional dimension distance (i.e., 
regulatory, economic institutional distance) could provide a clear understanding of 
power imbalance between the acquirer and the target.  
Focusing on one institutional dimension distance could also reveal the direction of 
power imbalance from the vantage point of the acquirer clearly. For example, as U.S. 
firms acquire Chinese firms, they enter a lower level of regulatory governance 
institutional environment; and yet as Chinese firms acquire U.S. firms, they enter a 
higher level of regulatory governance institutional environment. As shown in the 
following, as firms acquire the target in a less regulated institutional environment, 
regulatory institutional distance tends to affect cross-border M&A value creation 
negatively. Yet, as firms acquire the target in a more regulated institutional environment, 
regulatory institutional distance may have an inverted U-shaped relation with cross-
border M&A value creation. Examining asymmetric effects of institutional distance for 
certain institutional dimensions (i.e., regulatory and economic institutions) in this work 
is the first step to unpack the asymmetric effects of institutional distance on cross-border 
M&A value creation.  
Asymmetric Regulatory Distance and Cross-border M&A Value Creation  
Acquirers can capitalize on economies of scale in terms of their organizational 
practices, gaining rents by exploiting market opportunities in host countries with similar 
regulatory environments. Acquirers are likely to have different organizational practices 
from those of targets when home and host country regulatory institutions, representing 
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local dominant stakeholders’ interests (e.g., government or private owners) are different 
(Kostova, 1999). For example, Orru and colleagues (1991) found that firms in Japan, 
Taiwan, and South Korea exhibit dissimilar organizational and inter-organizational 
structures according to different institutional principles. While acquirers are likely to 
encounter LOF and thus increase their costs of operating in countries with different 
regulatory institutions, acquirers are likely to benefit from regulatory institutional 
difference in certain circumstances. I suggest that the effects of regulatory distance on 
cross-border M&A value creation are not symmetric.  
I concur that as regulatory distance becomes larger, acquirers are more likely to 
encounter LOF and thus increase operating, monitoring costs, etc (Kostova & Roth, 
2002).  As regulatory distance becomes larger, acquirers are less able to transfer their 
organizational practices to host countries (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Their organizational 
practices may even conflict with the local regulatory requirements. Acquirers are likely 
to encounter legitimacy challenges because they may be perceived as seeking conflicting 
interests from local stakeholders. Acquirers lacking legitimacy are likely to lose their 
capabilities to access local resources that are vital for acquirers to survive in host 
countries. Hence, acquirers need to spend additional costs to establish their legitimacy.  
Liberalization in many emerging economies heightens the importance of 
understanding idiosyncratic regulatory institutions (Hensiz, 2003; Westney, 1993). Firms 
tend to incur social costs and learning costs due to the unfamiliarity of local regulatory 
institutions (Hitt, et al., 2004; Hitt, Dacin, Tyler, & Park, 1997; Kostova, 1996). This is 
the case when firms acquire targets in countries with higher level regulatory institutions 
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(i.e., less restrictive regulatory institutions). Even worse, constrained by acquirers’ 
previous knowledge and experiences in operating in countries with lower level 
regulatory institutions (i.e., restrictive regulatory institutions), these acquirers are less 
capable of providing full-featured integrated services in host countries with higher level 
regulatory institutions, and to compete with host country firms successfully.  
However, this may not be the case when firms acquire targets in countries with 
lower level regulatory institutions (more restricted regulatory institutions). As firms 
acquire targets in host countries with lower level regulatory institutions, the benefits of 
operating in these distant markets may override the costs of LOF (Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc, 2008). This is particularly true when these firms have prior experiences of 
operating in host countries with lower level regulatory institutions (Perkin, 2006). In 
recent years, emerging economies (lower level regulatory institutions) have begun to 
liberalize their economies to imitate developed countries (i.e., higher level regulatory 
institutions). This is likely to be a long and nonlinear transition process. On the one hand, 
emerging economies imitate regulatory institutions in developed countries and make 
changes. On the other hand, they still inherit some legacies from previous regulatory 
institutions.  
As developed country firms acquiring targets in emerging economies, they are still 
likely to encounter LOF and thus increase their operating, monitoring costs, etc. 
However, new regulatory institutions changes in emerging economies are similar to 
those in developed countries. Developed country acquirers are more familiar with these 
new regulatory institutions than firms in emerging economy firms are. Thus, developed 
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country acquirers are able to capitalize on their competitive advantage (e.g., rich 
knowledge and experience of providing full-featured services) in these emerging 
economies.  
Emerging economy countries have also been providing tremendous amounts of 
prospective opportunities for developed country acquirers to exploit. These benefits 
significantly override the costs of operating in distant host countries. Developed country 
firms acquiring targets in emerging economies are also likely to benefit from regulatory 
institutional distance. Yet, as regulatory distance increases, it is likely that idiosyncratic 
yet ineffective regulatory institutions still permeate within the host country. As a result, 
information deficiency and LOF dominate when acquirers operate in very distant 
regulatory environments (e.g., Eden & Miller, 2004). These arguments lead to the 
following hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 6a: When the level of host country regulatory institutions is lower 
than that of home country regulatory institutions, there is an inverted U-shaped 
relation between regulatory distance and cross-border M&A value creation.  
Hypothesis 6b: When the level of host country regulatory institutions is higher 
than that of home country regulatory institutions, there is a negative relation 
between regulatory distance and cross-border M&A value creation.  
Asymmetric Economic Distance and Cross-border M&A Value Creation 
As discussed earlier, acquirers are able to replicate their existing business model and 
thus rely on economies of experience, scale, and standardization to exploit opportunities 
and create value in host countries with similar economic institutions (Ghemawat, 2001; 
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Miller & Parkhe, 2002). Acquirers can standardize their technologically advanced 
products and/or services and achieve economies of scale across similar countries (e.g., 
Hitt, Hoskisson & Kim, 1997).  
Economic Distance Asymmetry 
At the same time, it is important to note that the effects of economic distance are not 
symmetric. For instance, the distance that developed country acquirers face when they 
acquire targets in emerging economies is not identical with the distance that emerging 
economy acquirers face when acquiring targets in developed countries. There is 
evidence that the effects of economic distance on foreign direct investment (FDI) are 
asymmetric. The World Investment Report (2005) showed that developed market 
countries made the FDI of 637.4 billions of dollars in other less developed countries in 
2004. Yet, emerging market countries made much less FDI (i.e., less than 83.2 billions 
of dollars) in more developed countries in 2004. 
The level of economic institutions is lower in emerging and developing countries 
than developed countries. As I argue previously, developed countries have mature and 
active equity markets, and diverse funding channels for firms to obtain financial 
resources as they need such as seed fund, angel fund (Ireland, 2005). These financial 
markets not only provide rich financial resources for firms to invest, but also allow firms 
to invest in risky and yet profitable projects, providing investment service to help firms 
evaluate the investment project, monitor the investment and thus increase the success 
rate of investing in risky yet profitable projects. However, equity markets in emerging 
economies are in the very early stage, and diverse funding channels are less available to 
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emerging market firms. Banks in emerging economies primarily provide financial 
resources to state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Other firms need to rely on their own 
savings, family financial resource, and/or gray financial markets to start their businesses. 
As such, they are more conservative in their investment. They are less likely to invest in 
industries that require significant R&D (e.g., high-tech industries, innovations). 
Therefore, developed country firms largely possess advanced technological 
knowledge stocks and worldwide reputations. As developed country firms acquire 
targets in emerging economies, they tend to bring in advanced technological knowledge, 
and innovative products/services. Their worldwide reputations as competent and 
innovative companies also signal their reliability and accountability (e.g., legitimacy) to 
emerging market consumers, and thus decrease local consumers’ uncertainty about their 
product and service quality and credibility (Podolny, 1994). Developed market firms 
acquiring emerging and/or developing market firms are likely to increase their 
knowledge diversity and to build new firm-specific advantages that increase their ability 
to compete successfully in global markets (Cantwell & Janne, 1999; Kuemmerle, 1999). 
Hence, cross-border M&As involving acquirers from developed countries and targets 
from emerging or developing countries are likely to create value.  
Research showed that firms in countries with lower level economic institutions 
prefer acquirers from countries with higher level economic institutions because acquirers 
from countries with higher level economic institutions bring not only financial capital 
but also new values, norms, organizational practices, and notions of how business is 
done (Lowinski, Schiereck, & Thomas, 2004). These values, norms, organizational 
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practices, and notions of how business is done brought by developed country acquirers 
have been dominating the competitive global market (Ingram, Robinson, & Busch, 
2003). Targets in countries with lower level economic institutions desiring to survive 
and compete successfully in the global market are receptive to new value, norm and 
organizational practices brought by acquirers from countries with higher level economic 
institutions.  
The basis of competitive advantage has recently shifted from efficiency based on 
economies of scale to firms’ capabilities for innovation and upgrading skills and 
technologies (Porter, 1992). Firms from countries with higher level economic 
institutions have started to acquire targets in countries with lower level economic 
institutions in order to increase their knowledge diversity and to build new firm-specific 
advantages that increase their ability to compete successfully in global markets 
(Cantwell & Janne, 1999; Kuemmerle, 1999). Hence, cross-border M&As involving 
acquirers from countries with higher level economic institutions and targets from 
countries with lower level economic institutions are likely to create value. These 
arguments lead to the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 7a: If the level of host country economic institutions is lower than 
that of home country economic institutions, there is a positive relationship 
between economic distance and cross-border M&A value creation.  
However, acquirers from countries with lower level economic institutions generally 
have fewer resources and are less competent, and thus they may have self-doubts about 
their capabilities to compete in host countries with lower level economic institutions 
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(Bartlett & Ghoshal, 2000). Acquirers encounter competitive rivals in host countries 
with higher level economic institutions, and the experiences of these firms in countries 
with higher level economic institutions reinforce their self-doubt (Barlett & Ghoshal, 
2000). Local potential consumers in countries with higher level economic institutions 
generally lack information about products and services from countries with lower level 
economic institutions.  
Previous studies have also shown that consumers in countries with higher level 
economic institutions perceive products and services from countries with lower level 
economic institutions as low quality, and rank their producers as low status (Aulakh, 
Kotabe, & Teegen, 2000; Cordell, 1993). Thus, acquirers from countries with lower 
level economic institutions may not gain legitimacy from host country potential 
consumers, decreasing their capability to compete successfully in host countries with 
higher level economic institutions.  
While acquirers from countries with lower level economic institutions may benefit 
from legitimacy spillovers from their targets in countries with higher level economic 
institutions, they are still less likely to create value in host countries with higher level 
economic institutions. On the one hand, cross-border M&As are costly for acquirers 
from countries with lower level economic institutions; on the other hand, these acquirers 
face fierce competition pressures in countries with higher level economic institutions. 
Acquirers from countries with lower level economic institutions are also much less 
resourceful to invest for learning to develop cost-effective and innovative products that 
sophisticated and demanding consumers in countries with higher level economic 
 
72 
 
institutions desire. Therefore, cross-border M&As involving acquirers from countries 
with lower level economic institutions and targets from countries with higher level 
economic institutions are less likely to create value. These arguments lead to the 
following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 7b: As the level of host country economic institutions is higher than 
that of home country economic institutions, there is a negative relationship 
between economic distance and cross-border M&A value creation.  
Summary 
This chapter reviewed cross-border M&A value creation, institutions and 
institutional distance literature, and developed the hypotheses of the effects of 
institutional control and institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation.  
Specifically, theoretical base section (i.e., section one) reviewed the extant cross-
border M&A value creation, institutions and institutional distance literature. New 
concepts (i.e., institutional control, four institutions including regulatory, economic, 
physical infrastructure and political institutions and asymmetric institutional distances) 
were proposed. 
In institutional control and cross-border M&A value creation section (i.e., section 
two), I examined main effects of regulatory, economic and physical infrastructure 
institutions in the host country on cross-border M&A value creation. I also investigated 
how host country political institutions moderate the relationship between regulatory 
institutions and cross-border M&A value creation.  
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In institutional distance and cross-border M&A value creation section (i.e., section 
three), I continued developing hypotheses yet put a separate focus on the effects of 
institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation. First, I showed an inverted-U 
shaped relation between institutional distance and cross-border M&A value creation. 
Second, I proposed asymmetric institutional distance concept. Specifically, I examined 
the effects of asymmetric regulatory distance and asymmetric economic distance on 
cross-border M&A value creation.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to describe the methodology used to test the 
hypotheses developed in Chapter II. The important methodological topics discussed 
herein are: (1) sample; (2) measures of dependent, independent, and control variables; 
and (3) statistical analysis techniques. I begin with the sample. 
Sample 
 
Cross-border M&As 
A sample of cross-border M&As are obtained from SDC Thomson’s International 
M&As Database. SDC collates information from over 200 English and foreign language 
news sources such as SEC filings and the filings from its international counterparts, 
trade publications, newswire reports, proprietary surveys of investment banks, law firms, 
other advisory firms, the Wall Street Journal, Reuters, Financial Times and other 
newspapers, periodicals, and press releases to assemble a robust and comprehensive 
listing of acquisition activity (Chari, Ouimet, & Tesar, 2004; Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006b). 
For each transaction, the SDC database provides information about the date on which the 
transaction was announced and the date on which the transaction became effective. The 
database also provides some characteristics of acquirers and targets such as name, 
industry sector, primary SIC classification and nation. Many of the transactions contain 
transaction-specific information such as the percent of the shares acquired. This database 
currently represents one of the most comprehensive sources of information on cross-
border M&As.  
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Cross-border M&A transactions in the sample must fulfill the following criteria. 
First, acquirers and targets must be based in different countries/areas; Second, acquirers 
and targets must be in one of 50 countries/areas that are in Hitt, et al. (2007)’s 
institutional database. Country/area names can be found in Appendix A. Third, 
consistent with the Hitt et al. (2008) institutional data (see institutional environment 
section below), cross-border M&A announcement dates must be between 1995 and 2003. 
Fourth, cross-border M&A acquirers need to hold no less than 51 percent of the target 
after the acquisition, and hold no more than 49 percent of the target before the 
acquisition (Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006a). Fifth, acquirers have to be publicly listed and 
thus have reliable stock return data available for calculating acquirers’ abnormal return 
(AR) attributable to cross-border M&A announcements.  
Sixth, cross-border M&As must be in technology industries. Target industries were 
utilized to categorize cross-border M&A industries. I relied on (1) high-technology 
industry codes provided by Thomson International M&A database; (2) high-technology 
industry classification provided by Zahra, et al. (2000); and (3) the list of high-
technology industries published at the American Electronics Association (AeA) website 
(See Appendix B) to identify all high-technology targets and thus cross-border M&As. 
Next, I identified targets that were not in high-technology industries but have technology 
components.  Accordingly, I classified cross-border M&As with these targets as 
technology cross-border M&As. I described detailed procedures to identify technology 
cross-border M&As in Appendix C. 
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Institutional Environment 
 I relied on Hitt, et al. (2008) institutional dataset to examine the composition and 
measurement of country institutions. Hitt et al. (2008) institutional dataset includes 
extensive institutional data on 50 countries/areas for the period of 1995-2003, resulting 
in 450 country-year observation. Of the 50 countries/areas in the dataset, 22 were located 
in the continent of Europe, 14 in Asia, 9 in North, South, or Central America, 3 in Africa, 
and 2 in the continent of Australia. Hitt et al. (2008) uses various sources: Euromonitor 
International, Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) (Gwartney, Lawson, & Block, 1996), 
Freedom House’s annual survey of political rights and civil liberties, the Political 
Constraint Index (POLCON) Dataset (Henisz, 2000b), International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG), Political Risk Services, World Bank’s World, Development Indicators (WDI) 
(World Bank, 2004) and the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness (GLOBE) project (House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). 
The countries/areas selected were included in these datasets. Sampled countries/areas 
can be found in Appendix A.  
Further, I collected (1) acquirers and targets’ yearly company financials; (2) 
acquirers and targets’ daily stock return; (3) daily local market return; (4) daily world 
market return; (5) foreign currency exchange rate; and (6) Taiwan’s quarterly bilateral 
trade from Datastream. Datastream is one of the largest historical numerical financial 
databases in the world, with data on stock prices, market indices, exchange rates, 
company financials, etc. Data are available on approximately 170 countries. Moreover, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) database 
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provided quarterly bilateral trade data for more than 190 countries/areas except Taiwan. 
So, I obtained the other 49 countries/areas’ quarterly bilateral trade data from IMF DOT.  
Finally, I consolidated cross-border M&A data, institutional data, company 
financials, stock return data, foreign currency exchange rate and bilateral trade data. 
Because SDC Thomson’s International M&As Database do not provide datastream 
codes for all acquirers and targets, acquirers and targets that do not have datastream 
codes and thus do not have financials and stock return data were removed from the 
dataset. This yielded an initial sample size 13909 cross-border M&As.  
Measures 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is cross-border M&A value creation. As M&A theorists 
have consistently encouraged, I employed two distinct measures: cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR), and Tobin’s Q to capture acquirers’ post-acquisition performance 
(Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; King et al., 2004). While both are market-based measures, 
CAR captures acquirers’ post-acquisition market-based performance in a short period of 
time (e.g., three weeks), and Tobin’s Q captures acquirers’ post-acquisition market-
based performance in a long period of time (e.g., two years).  
CAR 
Event study. The most statistically reliable evidence on whether cross-border 
M&As create value for shareholders comes from event studies. Cross-border M&As 
commonly involve a huge investment for acquirers to operate in an unfamiliar 
institutional environment, representing an important event for acquirers and their 
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shareholders. Similar to transfer pricing regulation change to Japanese firms operating in 
the United States, investors have both expectations and concerns about acquirers’ post-
acquisition value creation (Eden, Valdez, & Li, 2004; Shimizu, et al., 2004).  
Using event studies, cumulative abnormal stock market return (CAR) around the 
date of cross-border M&A announcement can be calculated to capture acquirers’ value 
creation from cross-border M&As reliably (Capron, & Pistre, 2002; Nixon, et al., 2004; 
Miller, Li, Eden, & Hitt, 2008). The majority of existing post-acquisition performance 
research uses a stock market event study (King, et al., 2004; Shimizu, et al., 2004). 
Therefore, I utilized the event study to gauge the value that acquirers create from cross-
border M&As in this work (Andrade, et al., 2001; Chari, et al., 2004; McWilliams & 
Siegel, 1997).  
Event studies assume that markets are informationally efficient, such that security 
prices reflect all publicly available information, and price changes reflect new 
information. Substantial evidence indeed supports the market efficiency argument. If 
markets were not efficient, they would adjust slowly (or not all) to new information. On 
the basis of over 100 studies, Elton and Gruber (1987) demonstrated that the market 
responds rapidly to new information. Further, the typical result in event studies using 
daily data is that on average, stock prices seem to adjust within a day to event 
announcements. “Although the evidence is not literally 100 percent in support of the 
efficient market hypothesis, no proposition in any of the science is better documented.” 
(Jensen, 1988: 26). Thus, ample evidence supports the market efficiency assumption 
underlying event study methodology.  
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However, researchers started to challenge the market efficiency assumption in the 
late seventies and early eighties (Kothari & Warner, 2005). Accordingly, researchers 
hypothesize and study abnormal performance over a long horizon such as one year or 
five years following the major event (Kothari & Warner, 2005). Researchers primarily 
use the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and Jensen-alpha (i.e., calendar-time) 
approaches to estimate risk-adjusted abnormal performance over a long horizon (Kothari 
& Warner, 2005; Sorescu, Shankar, & Kushwaha, 2007). Yet, the long-horizon event 
studies suffer from two critical issues - risk adjustment and expected returns (Kothari & 
Warner, 2005). How to address these issues and estimate abnormal returns over a long 
horizon effectively still remains an open question. 
Fortunately, the error in calculating abnormal performance due to errors in risk 
adjustment is likely to be small in short-horizon event studies (Kothari & Warner, 2005). 
The use of daily data rather than monthly data in short-horizon event studies permits 
more precise measurement of abnormal returns and more informative studies of 
announcement effects (Kothari & Warner, 2005). Hence, the importance of an event like 
a cross-border M&A can be assessed more effectively by short-horizon event studies. So, 
I adopted the short-horizon event study in this work.  
Global event study. Most event studies in the previous two decades have analyzed 
firms in a single country, usually in the United States (Park, 2004; Uhlenbruck, et al., 
2006b). The market model utilized to calculate abnormal returns for firms in the United 
States has also represented a valid market model to calculate abnormal returns for firms 
in other countries (Park, 2004). The market model utilized in these event studies takes 
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into account daily firm stock returns and daily local market return information. The 
strong assumption of market model is that financial markets are not integrated across 
countries. So, market model did not take into account of foreign stock market 
movements in calculating firms’ abnormal returns.  
However, due to active international trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), 
stock returns for firms, particularly those involved in international businesses, are 
significantly affected by both domestic and foreign stock market movements (Park, 
2004). This indicates that the assumption underlying the above market model is not valid. 
Foreign stock movement should be taken into account to calculate a firm’s abnormal 
stock market returns.  Applying market model to calculate abnormal returns for firms, 
particularly those involved cross-border events (i.e., cross-border M&As) may lead to 
biased analysis results.  
Park (2004) expands this market model to a world market model, adding daily 
global financial market movement and daily foreign exchange rates information. These 
two factors have been confirmed to have significant and stable impacts on firm stock 
returns (Beckers, Connor, & Curds, 1996; Bodnar & Gentry, 1993; Miller & Reuer, 
1998). This world market model can be used to examine the effects of firms’ cross-
border strategic actions such as cross-border M&As on their stock market performance. 
This world market model can also simultaneously analyze firms in multi-countries. 
Therefore, I followed Park (2004)’s global event study approach, calculating stock price 
reactions to cross-border M&A announcements in multi-countries simultaneously. A 
detailed global event study approach can be found in Appendix D.  
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As mentioned above, I obtained daily firm stock return, daily local market return, 
daily world market return and daily nominal foreign exchange rates from DataStream. 
As I obtained nominal foreign exchange rates from Datastream, I followed previous 
studies and used countries’ quarterly top 10 trade partner data to adjust nominal 
exchange rates to real exchange rates. Countries’ quarterly trade data were obtained from 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (DOT) database and 
Datastream.  
With regard to the event window, I adopted a three-week window which includes 19 
days prior to, the day at, and the day following the announcement (Capron & Pistre, 
2002; King et al., 2004). As Miller, et al (2008) found, investors in emerging stock 
markets react to the event earlier because of information leakage and insider trading in 
these markets. Research findings showed that cross-border M&A information sometimes 
leaks out to some market participants earlier than to others (Asquith,1983; McNamara, 
Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008). Thus, more days before the M&A announcement in the 
estimation window are needed to capture the abnormal return related to information 
leakage and insider trading related to cross-border M&As in stock markets (Capron & 
Pistre, 2002; McWilliams & Siegel, 1997).  
It is necessary to check if there are country-specific unusual events such as terrorist 
attacks and sudden political crises within estimation windows. These unusual events 
might have an impact on the stock price during cross-border M&A event estimation 
windows (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997). Yet, it requires both time- and cost- intensive 
work to check all such unusual events in 50 countries/areas over 9 years. Park (2004) 
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suggested that researchers can employ longer estimation windows as alternatives to 
reduce the impact of those unusual events. An unusual market movement for a few days 
tends to be only a small portion of the entire longer estimation period. So, adopting a 
three-week estimation window in this work also helps to reduce the impact of those 
unusual events in 50 countries/areas over 9 years.  
To control for confounding events, I checked if an acquirer announced multiple 
cross-border M&As during this three week event window (Shen & Cannella, 2003). 
These cross-border M&A transactions were removed from the sample (McWillaims & 
Siegel, 1997; Nixon, et al, 2004). McWillaims and Siegel (1997) has emphasized that 
researchers need to check and control for confounding effects in event studies. They 
documented that these confounding events can have impact on the share price during 
event estimation windows. After checking this confounding effect, the sample size 
decreases from the initial 13909 to 8231 cross-border M&A transactions. 
Tobin’s Q 
Cross-border M&A value creation is also measured by Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q 
compares the market value of assets to their replacement cost or book value (Bertrand & 
Schoar, 2003; Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007). It reflects the market’s 
perception of firm’s current and potential profitability. Tobin’s Q is widely used as a 
market-based measure of firm long-term performance. So, I obtained acquirers’ Tobin’s 
Q at two years after cross-border M&A announcements as the longer term performance 
measure. As mentioned above, acquirers’ market value and book value of assets were 
obtained from DataStream.   
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Independent Variables 
The key independent variables are regulatory, economic, physical infrastructure and 
political institutions, and in the host country, and institutional, regulatory and economic 
distance between the home and the host country.   
Regulatory, Economic and Political Institutions and Physical Infrastructure in the Host 
Country 
In the most recent large empirical study, Hitt and his colleagues (2008) found four 
dimensions of institutional environments. These four dimensions are regulatory, 
economic, and political institutions and physical infrastructure. Regulatory institutions 
reflect the level of regulatory governance in supporting business activities within a 
country. It is measured by contract and property rights, corruption, fiscal burden, foreign 
investment restrictions, etc (Hitt, et al., 2008). A higher score on regulatory institutions 
indicates a lower level of regulatory control (i.e., less advanced regulatory institutions).  
Economic institutions reflect the level of investment constraints within a country. 
This is measured by money supply, net reserves, budget balance, etc.  The higher score 
on economic institutions indicates a lower level of investment constraints (Hitt, et al., 
2008).  
Physical infrastructure institutions reflect the level and quality of physical 
transportation systems within a country to facilitate business communications and 
operations. This is measured by density of road network, air transport carriers, distance 
travelled by air, etc. The higher score on physical infrastructure institutions indicates the 
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higher level and quality of physical transportation system within the country (Hitt, et al., 
2008).  
Political institutions reflect the level of discretion and power that a government 
maintains over its citizenry. This is measured by civil liberties, political rights, political 
constraints and political restrictions, etc. The higher score of political institutions 
indicates the more democratic and credible political institutions within a country (Hitt, et 
al., 2008).  Hitt et al. (2008) also demonstrated criterion-related and discriminant validity 
for these four institutions. Therefore, on the basis of Hitt et al. (2008), I obtained 
regulatory, economic, physical infrastructure, and political institutions scores to measure 
these four institutions in host countries. 
Institutional Distance 
Institutional distance measures the level of institutional environment similarity 
between the home country and the host country. On the basis of Hitt et al. (2008)’s four 
institution measures, I obtained the scores of four institutions including regulatory, 
economic, physical infrastructure and political institutions in the home country. Then I 
used Euclidean distance to measure institutional distance between the home and host 
country, incorporating all four institutional dimensions.  The following formula is 
utilized to assess institutional distance: 
                                              
                                                                                                                  4 
ID jh  = SQRT [ ∑  (X ij - X ih )2] 
                                                                                                                 i=1 
This index measures deviation along four institutional dimensions (i.e., regulatory, 
economic, physical infrastructure and political institutions) of each host country from 
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those of the home country. Where Xij stands for the index of the ith institutional 
dimension and jth host country, ID jh is the institutional difference of the jth host country 
from the hth home country where h indicates the home country (Kogut & Singh, 1988).  
Regulatory Distance 
On the basis of Hitt et al. (2008), I obtained regulatory institutions scores for each 
home and host country. Then, I measured regulatory distance by calculating the absolute 
regulatory institutions score difference between the home and host country. 
Regulatory Distance Asymmetry 
I created a regulatory distance asymmetry dummy variable. Regulatory distance 
asymmetry was coded as 1 when home country regulatory institution score is higher than 
host country regulatory institutions score. Otherwise, regulatory distance asymmetry was 
coded as 0.  
Economic Distance 
On the basis of Hitt et al. (2008), I obtained economic institutions scores for each 
home and host country. Then, I measured economic distance by calculating the absolute 
economic institutions score difference between the home and host country. 
Economic Distance Asymmetry 
I created an economic distance asymmetry dummy variable. Economic distance 
asymmetry was coded as 1 when home country economic institutions score is higher 
than host country economic institutions score. Otherwise, economic distance asymmetry 
was coded as 0.  
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Control Variables 
 In order to show that my arguments add value to the literature on post-acquisition 
M&A value creation, I need to control for other possible explanations. These variables 
are treated as control variables and discussed below.   
Host Country M&A Experience  
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999) found that U-shaped relationship between firm 
acquisition experiences and acquisition performance, suggesting the influences of 
acquisition experiences on cross-border M&A value creation. Particularly, firms’ 
acquisition experiences in the focal host country can provide more relevant knowledge 
about acquiring targets and thus creating value in this host country. Therefore, I included 
firms’ M&A experiences in the focal host country as a control variable. This is measured 
by acquirers’ total number of cross-border M&As within the focal host country in the 
three-year period prior to the focal cross-border M&A announcement. The data were 
obtained from SDC Thomson’s International M&As Database.  
Method of Payment 
Two fundamental methods by which acquirers can pay for an acquisition are cash 
and stock shares (equity). Research showed that managers tend to finance an acquisition 
with cash if they believe their firms’ stock is undervalued, and with equity (i.e., shares of 
stock) if they believe their firms’ stock is overvalued (Hitt, et al., 2001b). Therefore, the 
use of cash may signal manager expectations that post-acquisition performance will be 
particularly strong.  The methods of payment affect the method of accounting for an 
acquisition, which has implications for post-acquisition performance (Hitt, et al., 2001b; 
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King et al., 2004). I created a dummy variable to represent method of payment. 
Specifically, I coded cash payment as 0; and stock shares (equity) payment as 1. If 
acquirers use both cash and stock share payments, I coded the dominant method of 
payment. For example, if the acquirer uses cash to pay 51% of the total cross-border 
M&A transaction, I coded it as 0. Method of payment was obtained from SDC 
Thomson’s International M&As Database.  
Acquirer-to-target Relatedness 
Because of potential synergies between acquirers and targets, the market may tend 
to value related acquisitions more highly than unrelated acquisitions. Previous research 
showed that firms pursuing related diversification strategies outperform those pursuing 
unrelated strategies (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Hitt, Hoskisson, & Kim, 1997).  
Following Haleblian and Finkelstein (1999), I employed a continuous measure of 
relatedness to capture the various degrees of relatedness between acquirers and targets. I 
assigned greater weight to 4-digit acquirer-target SIC-code matches, followed by 3-digit 
and then 2-digit matches. Specifically, if any of the SIC codes of the acquirer and target 
matched, the acquisition was assigned to a 2 at the 2-digit level match, a 3 at the 3-digit 
level match, and a 4 at the 4-digit level match. If there are no matches, the acquisition 
was assigned to 1. Acquirers and targets’ SIC codes were obtained from SDC 
Thomson’s International M&As Database. 
Acquirer Slack 
Previous research suggested various potential influences of slack on acquisition 
performance. Hitt, et al. (1998) argued that with greater amounts of the slack held by the 
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acquirer, financing is less necessary and debt financing is also less costly and easier to 
obtain. They also found that slack, in the form of a large amount of available cash or a 
favorable debt position, is associated with successful acquisitions. Following Haunschild 
(1993), I measured acquirer slack as Operating income - Taxes - Interest expense - 
Preferred dividend - Common dividend/Common equity. It was measured at the end of 
the year before the year of cross-border M&A announcements.  Acquirers’ financial data 
were obtained from Datastream.  
Acquirer Performance  
Research indicated that firms with better financial performance are more likely to 
achieve acquisition success (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). I computed acquirer 
performance as ROA value at the end of the year before the year of cross-border M&A 
announcements. Acquirers’ financial data were obtained from Datastream. 
Cultural Distance 
As discussed earlier, I examine a country’s formal institutions in this dissertation. 
Accordingly, institutional distance in this dissertation refers to the formal institution 
difference between the home and the host country. A country’s culture is a country’s 
informal institutional environment. So, cultural distance is not the component of 
institutional distance in this dissertation. As previous studies suggested that cultural 
distance influences acquirers’ post-acquisition performance, I control cultural distance in 
this dissertation. 
 Cultural distance is defined as the degree to which the cultural norms in one 
country differ from those in another country (Kogut & Singh, 1988). Tihanyi, et al. 
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(2005)’s meta-analysis found that cultural distance had a strong positive effect on MNE 
performance for developed country investments. Researchers also found that cultural 
differences produce difficulties and challenges for managers, who must invest more time 
in communication to avoid conflicts and cultural misunderstanding. Findings regarding 
the effects of cultural distance on MNE performance are mixed in the literature (Tihanyi, 
et al., 2005). Yet, these prior studies suggested that cultural distance tends to affect 
M&A performance (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998). I obtained both cultural value and 
cultural practice scores from the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior 
Effectiveness (GLOBE) project (House et al., 2004). 
Each of cultural value and cultural practice includes nine indicators: (1) institutional 
collectivism; (2) in-group collectivism; (3) future orientation; (4) gender egalitarianism; 
(5) humane orientation; (6) performance orientation; (7) power distance; (8) uncertainty 
avoidance; (9) assertiveness. I measured culture distance in terms of cultural value and 
cultural practice respectively. I employed Euclidean distance to capture cultural value 
and cultural practice distances between the home and the host country by the formula 
below. Then I obtained cultural distance by calculating the average of the cultural value 
and cultural practice distance. 
                                              
                                                                      9 
CDcp jh  = SQRT [ ∑  (X ij - X ih )2] 
            i=1 
  
                                                                                                                     9 
CDcv jh  = SQRT [ ∑  (X ij - X ih )2] 
                                                                                                                   i=1 
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                                              CD jh      =   (CDcp jh   + CDcv jh  )/2 
This index measures deviation along nine cultural dimensions mentioned above of each 
host country from the home country. Where X ij stands for the index of the ith cultural 
dimension and jth country, CDcp jh  is the cultural practice difference of the jth country 
from the home country, and h indicates the home country. CDcv jh  is the cultural value 
difference of the jth country from the home country, and h indicates the home country. 
CD jh indicates the cultural distance between the home and the host country. 
Statistical Analytical Techniques 
Event Study Methodology 
As discussed above, I employed a global event study methodology to obtain 
acquirers’ abnormal return around the date of cross-border M&A announcements (Park, 
2004). Several key research design and implementation issues for the event study also 
need to be identified (McWilliams & Siegel, 1997; Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006a). First, I 
had a sufficient sample size to support the normality assumption. Second, I assessed 
whether there are outliers because event studies are sensitive to outliers.  
Third, I utilized a three week estimation window and thus ensured abnormal returns 
around the date of cross-border M&A announcements were captured. As discussed 
earlier, this three week estimation window also helps reduce the impact of those unusual 
market movements, such as terrorist attacks, sudden political crises, and/or natural 
disasters.  
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Hierarchical Linear Modeling 
In this work, independent variables (i.e., institutions in the host country, and 
institutional distance between the home and the host country) and one control variable, 
cultural distance, are at the country level, and other control variables are at the firm level.  
     Both firm level and country level variables explain acquirers’ cross-border M&A 
value creation. Hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) is appropriate to test the hypotheses. 
The variance of acquirers’ value creation can be partitioned between the country-level 
and firm-level variables in HLM analysis (Hitt, Beamish, Jackson, & Mathieu, 2007; 
Hox, 2002; Parboteeah, Hoegl, & Cullen, 2008; Poston, 2002). Standard errors of 
coefficients are estimated with adjustment for the dependency within level-2 (country) in 
HLM analysis. Yet, traditional ordinary least-squares (OLS) do not take the dependency 
into account. The standard errors of the regression coefficient in OLS are generally 
underestimated (Hox, 2002). Thus, using OLS is likely to result in spuriously significant 
results. HLM methodology must be employed to analyze the data and thus test the 
hypotheses appropriately. Level-1 and level-2 HLM equations per hypothesis were 
presented in Chapter IV. Level 1 included firm-level control variables; and level-2 
included country-level predictors and control variables.   
Statistical Power, and Level-1 (firm) and Level-2 (country) Sample Size in HLM 
In this work firms (level-1) are nested in countries (level-2) in two-level HLM 
analysis. Acquirers from the same (home) country acquiring targets in the same (host) 
country are influenced by the same institutional environment—the same home and host 
institutional environment. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that cross-border M&As 
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involved in the same home and host country are correlated with each other. Accordingly, 
I classified cross-border M&As involved the same home and host country in the same 
level-2 cluster. I called this level-2 cluster as ordered home-host country dyads in this 
work. For example, cross-border M&As involved the United States as the home country 
and Canada as the host country are classified in a different level-2 dyad as those 
involved Canada as the home country and the United States as the host country.  This 
two-level design is displayed below in Figure 3.  
This classification results in 635 home-host country ordered dyads in level-2.  Each 
level-2 dyad has 1 and more than 1 cross-border M&As. Researchers have suggested 
that the large number of level-2 dyads yields a high power for testing parameters in the 
model, even if the number of level-1 units per level-2 dyad is very low (Snijders, & 
Bosker, 1993). Further, Snijders and Bosker (1993) argued that n (i.e., the number of 
level 1 unit within each level-2 dyad) needs to be bigger than 10 according to their 
experiences. Bryk and Raudenbush (1992) suggested that a size of larger than 15 may 
yield a high power for testing parameters in the model. So, ordered home-host country 
dyads with the number of cross-border M&As less than and equal to 20 were removed 
from the sample.  
Totally 533 ordered home-host country dyads and 2090 cross-border M&A 
transactions were removed from the sample. This results in 79 ordered home-host 
country dyads and 6141 cross-border M&As as the final sample size. Acquirers and 
targets in the final sample size are from 27 countries. These 27 countries could be found 
in Appendix E.  
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FIGURE 3 
Illustration of Two-level Design 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level-2 
 
Home Country: United States 
Host Country:   Canada 
Level-1 
 
Acqu
Target
irer: US Energy Sys Inc  
: Trigen Energy Co, Canada 
Date Announced: 2001-06-12 
Level-1 
 
Acquirer: Bell Microproducts Inc, U.S. 
Target: Forefront Graphics Corp, 
Canada 
Date Announced: 2001-05-30 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Level-2 
 
Home Country: Canada 
Host Country:   United States 
Level-1 
 
Level-1 
 
Acquirer: Intrawest Corp,  
               Canada 
Target:  Max Snowboards Inc,   
              U.S. 
Date Announced: 1998-09-08 
Acquirer: Kingsway
Canada 
 Financial Services, 
Target: Hamilton Investments Inc, U.S. 
: 1998-08-31 Date Announced
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
The primary purpose of Chapter IV is to report the results of the hypotheses 
developed in Chapter II. First, I presented the descriptive and correlation statistics for the 
sample. Second, I presented the global event study results. Third, the results of null 
model HLM analysis were reported. Fourth, the results of hypotheses were reported.   
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for level-1 variables. 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for level-2 variables. I 
included dependent variables in both Table 1 and Table 2. Dependent variables include 
acquirers (1) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) at 19 days prior to, the day of, and one 
day following cross-border M&A announcements (CAR-19,0,+1); (2) Tobin’s Q at two 
years after cross-border M&A announcements (Tobin’s Q2).  
Level-1 Descriptive Statistics 
Level-1 variables include acquirer ROA, acquirer slack, the relatedness between the 
acquirer and the target, acquirer M&A experiences in the host country, and the method 
of payment. These are control variables at the firm level. As mentioned above, I also 
included two dependent variables in Table 1.  
First, consistent with previous research, acquirer ROA is significantly and positively 
correlated with Tobin's Q2 (.191, p<.001), and CAR-19,0,+1(.040, p<.01). Acquirer slack is 
also significantly and positively correlated with Tobin's Q2 (.022, p<.1), and acquirer 
CAR-19,0,+1 (.098, p<.001).  
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Second, unexpectedly, acquirers’ M&A experience in the host country is 
significantly but negatively related to Tobin's Q2 (.-041, p<.001). Further, acquirer’s 
M&A experience in the host country is not statistically significantly correlated with 
acquirer CAR-19,0,+1.  
Third, while the relatedness between the acquirer and the target is significantly 
correlated with Tobin's Q2 (.076, p<.001), it is not significantly correlated with acquirer 
CAR-19,0,+1.  Further, method of payment is not statistically significantly correlated with 
acquirer Tobin's Q2 and CAR-19,0,+1.  
Fourth, correlation between Tobin's Q2 and CAR-19,0,+1 is not statistically significant. 
This suggests that Tobin's Q2 and CAR-19,0,+1 are two distinct dimensions of acquirer 
post-acquisition performance. Further, as shown in the Table 1, the correlation between 
firm level variables and acquirer Tobin's Q2 is stronger than the correlation between firm 
level variables and acquirer CAR-19,0,+1 . As cross-border M&A announcements are an 
unanticipated event, CARs capture this unanticipated event, and an abnormal stock price 
effect associated with it.  Stock market investors do not have much information about 
this cross-border M&A, and do not have much time to digest this “unanticipated” event 
and anticipate the economic ramifications of this “unanticipated” event at the time 
around cross-border M&A announcements. Therefore, the short-term nature of event 
studies may not fully capture economic ramifications of cross-border M&As due to 
information asymmetries and short-term estimation window (Hitt, Harrison, Ireland, & 
Best, 1998). 
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In sum, these results suggested that these firm level variables need to be controlled 
in analytic models. I also include a table with the scores for each home country for each 
level-1 independent variables in Appendix F.   
Level-2 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics and correlations for Level-2 variables. 
Level-2 variables include regulatory, economic, political and physical infrastructure 
institutions in the host country, and cultural, institutional, economic and regulatory 
distance between the home and the host country.  These are independent variables and 
the control variable at level-2 (ordered home-host country dyad) level. I also included 
two dependent variables in Table 2.  
First, regulatory institutions in the host country are significantly and yet positively 
correlated with acquirer Tobin's Q2 (.056, p<.001). Political institutions are significantly 
and positively correlated acquirer Tobin's Q2 (.038, p<.01) as expected. Further, 
institutional distance between the home and the host country is significantly and 
positively correlated with acquirer Tobin's Q2 (.095, p<.001). Similarly, economic 
distance between the home and the host country is significantly and positively correlated 
with acquirer Tobin's Q2 (.115, p<.001). Additionally, cultural distance between the 
home and the host country is significantly and negatively correlated with acquirer 
Tobin's Q2 (-.029, p<.05). Yet, regulatory and political institutions, and institutional, 
economic and cultural distance have no statistically significant correlation with acquirer 
CAR-19,0,+1. 
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Second, economic institutions in the host country are significantly and positively 
correlated with acquirer CAR-19,0,+1 (.049, p<.001). Physical infrastructure institutions in 
the host country is also significantly and positively correlated with CAR-19,0,+1 (.027, 
p<.05). Yet, both have no statistically significant correlation with Tobin's Q2. 
Unexpectedly, regulatory distance between the home and the host country has no 
statistically significant correlation with CAR-19,0,+1 and Tobin's Q2.
In sum, institutions in the host country have statistically significant correlations with 
Tobin's Q2 and CAR-19,0,+1 as expected.  Meanwhile, as can be seen in Table 2, when 
country institutions (e.g., institutions in the host country, and institutional distance 
between the home and the host country) are significantly correlated with Tobin's Q2, they 
are not statistically significantly correlated with CAR-19,0,+1.  Further, when country 
institutions are significantly correlated with CAR-19,0,+1, they have no statistically 
significant correlations with Tobin's Q2. This further suggest that Tobin's Q2 and CAR-
19,0,+1 are two distinct dimensions of acquirer post-acquisition performance. They also 
suggest that country institutions and acquirers’ cross-border M&A value creation (i.e., 
Tobin's Q2, CAR-19,0,+1) are related. I also include a table with the scores for each home 
country for each level-2 independent variables in Appendix G. 
Centering Variables  
Table 1 and Table 2 suggested that multicollinearity is not a concern for hypotheses 
testing. While correlation between host country regulatory institutions, and regulatory 
institutional distance between the home and the host country is large (.771, p<.001), I 
included each as the dependent variable in different analytical models. Further, the 
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correlation between institutional distance and economic distance is excessively large 
(.919, p<.001). Yet, each was presented in different analytical models. So, both are not 
the concern for hypotheses testing. 
Further, the inclusion of higher-order (e.g., interaction and polynomial) terms in 
analytical models can lead to non-essential multicollinearity problem (Aiken & West, 
1991; Marquardt, 1980). Non-essential multicollinearity is caused by multiple 
derivatives of a single independent variable being simultaneously present in a model. 
Centering variables can reduce non-essential multicollinearity by changing the scaling of 
the variables. So, I centered the data when including higher-order terms. Moreover, since 
interaction and curvilinear effects using higher-order terms in this work were tested at 
level 2 (ordered home-host country dyad), I centered data (level 2) at the grand mean 
(i.e., the mean across the sample) when including these higher-order terms (Bryk & 
Raudenbush, 1992; & Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Martin, Cullen, & 
Parboteeah, 2007). I also checked VIF scores for predictors per hypothesis testing 
carefully. As shown in Table 3, the average of VIF score is 1.677, most VIF scores are 
far below the cut off of 10, and the maximum VIF score is below the cut off of 10. So, 
multicollinearity is not a problem.  
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TABLE 3   
 VIF Scores   
        
Analytical Models 
Average  
VIF 
Minimum 
VIF 
Maximum  
VIF 
Hypothesis 1 1.49 1.01 2.32 
Hypothesis 2 1.86 1.01 3.87 
Hypothesis 3 1.5 1.01 2.3 
Hypothesis 4 1.71 1.01 2.82 
Hypothesis 5 1.5 1.01 2.26 
Hypothesis 6a 1.44 1.01 1.89 
Hypothesis 6b 2.82 1.01 8.73 
Hypothesis 7 1.5 1.01 2.4 
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Global Event Study 
Table 4 reported the daily abnormal returns (AR) and the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CAR) for the sample, as derived from the global event study. Global event study 
variable names and labels are presented in Table 5. 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 4a 
Daily Abnormal Return (AR) and
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) for Cross-border M&A Announcements 
 
Daily Abnormal Return (AR)   Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
Event Day Means s.d. t-testsb   Event Window Means s.d. t-testsb
AR-20 -0.031 1.982 -1.252  CAR0 0.352 2.578 10.714***
AR-1 -0.016 2.072 -0.617  CAR-1,0,1  0.360 4.029 7.001*** 
AR0 0.352 2.579 10.714***  CAR-19,0,+1 -0.571 10.441 -4.285*** 
AR1 0.024 2.111 0.881  CAR-1,0,+19 -1.190 10.767 -8.660*** 
AR20 -0.057 2.014 -2.234*   CAR-20, 0,+20  -2.210 16.506 -10.492*** 
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.01  *p < 0.05  † p < 0.1       
aN = 6141      
bt-test testing the null hypothesis that the mean of abnormal returns is zero  
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As shown in Table 4, the abnormal return (AR) at the date of cross-border M&A 
announcement is +0.352 percent, significantly different from zero, with a standard 
deviation of 2.579 percent. This suggests that the market reacts significantly and 
positively to the cross-border M&A transaction at the announcement date. Yet, AR-1, 
AR1, and AR-20, are not statistically significantly different from zero. While AR20 is 
statistically significantly different from zero, AR20 is negative (-0.057 percent), with a 
standard deviation of 2.014 percent.  
As shown in Table 4, acquirers achieved statistically significant and positive CAR-
1,0,1 (7.001, p<.001). Yet, acquirers achieved statistically significant and negative CAR-
19,0,+1 (-0.571, p<.001), CAR-1,0,+19 (-1.190, p<.001), CAR-20, 0,+20(-2.210, p<.001).  
Different Signs of ARs and CARs across Different Event Windows  
AR and CAR represents market investors’ collective expectation and judgment 
about cross-border M&A value creation at the time of announcements. Yet, market 
investors have limited information about cross-border M&As at the date of 
announcements. Further, due to bounded rationality, market investors are cognitively 
constrained and thus are not able to process limited available information to predict 
cross-border M&A value creation at the date of announcements. Research showed that 
when market investors’ information processing capability is exceeded, they are likely to 
attend to widely-held belief or dominant cognitive heuristics to react to the event in the 
market (Madhavan & Prescott, 1995; Oler, Harrison & Allen, 2007). For example, 
Madhavan and Prescott (1995) found that market investors positively react to joint 
venture announcements based on their heuristic (“joint venture are good news”) as joint 
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venture announcements exceed market investors’ information processing capacity. 
Similarly, as cross-border M&A announcements exceed market investors’ information 
processing capacity, it is plausible that market investors rely on the heuristics (“cross-
border M&As are good news”) to react cross-border M&As at the date of announcement. 
As shown in Table 4, AR0 is statistically significant and positive (.352, p<.001). Further, 
CAR-1,0,1 is also statistically significantly positive (.360, p<.001). Yet, both AR-1 and 
AR1 are not statistically significant. This suggests that “trading based on erroneous 
beliefs makes prices less rational” at the date of cross-border M&A announcements 
(Fama and French, 2007: 673). 
Further, researchers suggested that it takes a long time for market investors to obtain 
additional information, digest the information, and thus figure out cross-border M&A 
value creation (Oler, et al., 2007). As can be seen from Table 4, CAR-1,0,+19 is 
statistically significant and negative (-1.190, p<.001). This suggests that market 
investors have processed cross-border M&A related information, and showed their 
concerns about cross-border M&A value creation after the date of cross-border M&A 
announcements. Moreover, as suggested by statistically significant and negative AR20 (-
2.234, p<.05), market investors’ concerns about cross-border M&A value creation 
override their positive expectations of cross-border M&A value creation at 20 days after 
cross-border M&A announcements.  
Additionally, as discussed earlier, cross-border M&A information is likely to leak 
out to some market investors before public cross-border M&A announcements (Banerjee, 
& Eckard, 2001; Bhattacharya, & Daouk, 2002; Brunnermeier, 2005; Miller, et al., 
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2008). Investment bankers, stock traders, and officers of acquirers and targets consist 
principal inside traders and receive the information prior to public announcements 
(Banerjee & Eckard, 2001; Brunnermeier, 2005). As these insiders access private and 
rich information about cross-border M&As, the information help them to predict cross-
border M&A value creation rationally. As suggested by statistically significant and 
negative CAR-19,0,+1(-.571, p<.001), these market investors showed their concerns about 
cross-border M&A value creation. Market investors’ concerns about cross-border M&A 
value creation are also demonstrated by statistically significant and negative CAR-20,0,+20  
(-2.210, p<.001).  
In sum, global event study results suggest that stock markets react significantly to 
cross-border M&A announcements.  
HLM Null Model 
Hypotheses in this work predicted that host country institutions and institutional 
distance between the home and host country affect acquirers’ cross-border M&A value 
creation. Host country institutions and institutional distance predictors are in level-2 
(ordered home-host country dyad); and firm level control variables are in level-1 (firm). 
For hypotheses to be supported, there must be significant between level-2 (ordered 
home-host country dyad) variances in the outcome variables. Therefore, I estimated the 
null model in which no predictors were specified for either level 1 or level 2. The null 
model is in Table 6.  
I estimated the null model for each of two dependent variables. Results of these null 
models are in Table 7. I examined the significance of between level-2 variance, and intra 
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class correlation (ICC). ICC indicates the proportion of variance in the outcome variable 
that resides between level-2 (ordered home-host country) dyads. As indicated by Table 7, 
between level 2 dyads variances (sigma_u) are significant when outcomes are directed 
each of two dependent variables. Specifically, when outcomes are directed at CAR-19,0,1, 
between level-2 dyads variances is .651 (p<.001, ICC=.004); when outcomes are 
directed at Tobin's Q2,  between level-2 dyads variances is .219, (p<.001, ICC=.068). 
These results suggested that important level-2 predictors are needed to explain the 
outcomes (CAR-19,0,1 and Tobin's Q2). Thus, I can proceed with hypotheses testing by 
using STATA multilevel modeling. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6 
Null Model 
 
Level 1  
Yij = β0j + eij 
 
Level 2  
 βoj = γ00 +  U0j 
 
Combined  
 Yij = γ00 + eij+U0j 
 
Note: Yij : acquirer j’s cross-border M&A value creation 
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 TABLE 7  
  
Results of Null Model 
   
 Model 1 Model 2 
 CAR-19,0,+1
Tobin's 
Q2
Constant        -0.540 *** 1.698 *** 
Sigma_u        0.651 *** 0.219 *** 
Sigma_e        10.416 0.809 
Rho 0.003 0.068 
Note: *** p < 0.001  
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Tests of Hypotheses 
As discussed in Chapter III, all hypotheses were tested in hierarchical linear 
modeling (HLM) because independent variables and control variables are in two levels. 
Independent variables are in country level, and control variables are in firm level. The 
results of null model testing also suggested that I proceeded with HLM analysis.      
Before I proceeded with hypotheses testing, I need to test for potential endogeneity 
(Hausman, & Taylor, 1981; Shaver, 1998). That is, acquirers may purposely choose host 
countries to acquire targets. Acquirers expect they are more likely to create value in 
these host countries based on their resources and capabilities. Under this circumstance, 
the effects of country institutions on cross-border M&A value creation are conditional 
on acquirers’ resources and capabilities. Yet, the conclusion I want to draw from HLM 
analyses is that country institutions unconditionally lead to acquirers’ cross-border M&A 
value creation. So, it is necessary to address the endogeneity problem before testing each 
hypothesis.  
A great advantage of two level data is that I can investigate and address this 
endogeneity problem. The Hausman endogeneity test, called the Durbin-Wu-Hausman 
test in STATA provides results to address this endogeneity problem (Rabe-Hesketh, & 
Skrondal, 2005). A statistically insignificant Hausman test indicates that endogeneity 
problem does not exist, and the model is correctly specified. A random-intercept model 
should be used to test the hypothesis. A random-intercept model was discussed in 
detailed in hypotheses testing section. STATA’s (software package) XTREG, MLE 
(procedure) is the appropriate procedure to test the hypotheses. Yet, a statistically 
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significant Hausman test indicates that endogeneity problem exists and the model is mis-
specified. Under this condition, a fixed-effects model that only utilizes within level-2 
(ordered home-host country dyad) information should be selected to test hypotheses. 
STATA’s (software package) XTREG, FE (procedure) is the appropriate procedure to 
test the hypotheses. 
Control Variables 
Table 8 presented the HLM model including control variables. As shown in Table 8, 
I included firm level control variables in level 1 (firm), and cultural distance is in level 2 
(ordered home-host country dyad). I fixed the coefficient of each level-1 firm variable at 
level 2 ( β1j  ,β2j,  β3j ,β4j,  β5j ). There are no level-2 variables predicting them. First, cross-
level interaction effects (country institutions*firm variables) are not the main interest in 
this work. The main interest of this work is to examine the effects of country institutions 
(level-2) on cross-border M&A value creation. Second, adding level-2 variables 
predicting these firm level variables would result in many cross-level interaction terms 
in the combined model. This would cause multicollinearity in analytical models.  
Further, the effects of firm level variables (e.g., acquirer slack, ROA) on cross-
border M&A value creation vary across their embedded home-host country institutional 
environments. They do not randomly vary. So, I set the random error term U1j, U2j, U3j, U4j, 
 and U5j to be zero. When the random error terms U1j, U2j, U3j, U4j,  and U5j  are set to be zero, 
this HLM model is called a random-intercept model indicating that only level-1 intercept 
is randomly varying at level 2; yet level-1 coefficients are not allowed to randomly vary 
at level 2.    
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As shown in Table 9, the Hausman test statistic for the control variable model is 
statistically significant when dependent variables are CAR-19,0,+1 (χ  =15.65, p<.01) and 
Tobin's Q2(χ=26.51, p<.001). So, fixed effect models were utilized to test control 
variable models with CAR-19,0,+1, and Tobin's Q2 as dependent variables. Further, a fixed 
effect model only utilizes within level-2 home-host country dyad information and 
ignores between level-2 variances. So, care should be taken in interpreting fixed effect 
results. Results of fixed effect models show how control variables and independent 
variables affect cross-border M&A value creation within level-2 home-host country 
dyads.  
Table 10 presents the result. As shown in Table 10, acquirer ROA is significantly 
and positively associated with CAR-19,0,+1 (5.846, p<.05), and Tobin's Q2 (2.037, p<.001) 
within home-host country dyads. Relatedness between the acquirer and the target is 
significantly and positively associated with Tobin's Q2 (0.038, p<.001) within home-host 
country dyads. Yet, relatedness between the acquirer and the target has no statistically 
significant correlation with CAR-19,0,+1. Further, acquirers’ M&A experiences in the host 
country, and method of payment have no statistically significant association with CAR-
19,0,+1 and Tobin's Q2.  
These results demonstrate the importance of controlling for firm-level variables in 
analytical models. Without these controls, the coefficients would likely present 
misleading results. 
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TABLE 8 
Control Variable Model 
 
Level 1  
Yij = β0j + β1j Host country M&A experience+ β2j Method of payment +  
        β3j Relatedness between the acquirer and the target + β4j Acquirer slack + β5j Acquirer ROA  
+ eij 
 
Level 2  
βoj = γ00 + γ01 Cultural distance+ U0j
β1j = γ10  
β2j = γ20 
β3j = γ30
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
 
Combined  
Yij = γ00 +γ10 Host country M&A experience + γ20 Method of payment + γ30 Relatedness between 
the acquirer and the target + γ40 Acquirer slack + γ50 Acquirer ROA   + γ01 Cultural distance + 
eij+U0j 
 
 
Note: Yij : acquirer j’s cross-border M&A value creation 
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    TABLE 9    
Hausman Endogenity Test: Control  Variable Model 
          
   Model 3 Model 4  
     CAR-19,0,+1  Tobin's Q2  
  Chi-square 15.65**  
26.51 
***   
  df 5 5  
  ** p < 0.01     
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TABLE 10 
Control Effectsa 
 
  Model 3b Model 4b  
  CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2  
M&A Host experiences -0.068 -0.000  
  (0.063) (0.004)  
Method of payment 0.099 -0.026  
  (0.316) (0.024)  
Relatedness 0.076 0.038 ***  
  (0.103) (0.007)  
Acquirer slack 0.010 -0.093  
  (0.871) (0.066)  
ROA  5.846 * 2.037 ***  
  (2.425) (0.185)  
Cultural distance    
     
Constant  -1.231** 1.484 ***  
  (0.386) (0.029)  
sigma_u  1.469 0.241  
sigma_e  10.425 0.796  
rho  0.019 0.083  
LR Chi square    
F   2.38* 39.86***  
aN=79,  n=77.7,  N*n=6141    
bfixed effect     
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.01  *p < 0.05  † p < 0.1   
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Hypothesis 1   
Hypotheses 1-4 focus on the effects of the host country institutions on cross-border 
M&A value creation. To test hypotheses 1-4, I added home country institutions as 
control variables. The primary reason is to control the effects of home country 
institutions on cross-border M&A value creation. For example, Giovanni (2002) found 
that the size of financial markets and the credit provided to the private sector in the home 
country are significantly related to firms’ cross-border M&As.  
Hypothesis 1 predicted that there is a positive relationship between the level of host 
country regulatory institutions and cross-border M&A value creation.  As lower score 
indicates higher level regulatory institutions, I expected there was a negative relationship 
between host country regulatory institutions and cross-border M&A value creation.  
As shown in Table 11, host country regulatory institutions and home country 
institutions were added in the level-2 HLM analytical model. As discussed in control 
variables section, I fixed the coefficient of each level-1 firm variable (β1j  ,β2j,  β3j ,β4j,  β5j ). 
This HLM analytical model was analyzed twice times, once for each dependent variable 
(CAR-19,0,+1,  and Tobin's Q2). 
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As stated earlier, I did the Hausman endogeneity test of the analytical model before 
proceeding with hypothesis testing. As shown in Table 12, Hausman statistics is 
statistically insignificant when dependent variables is Tobin's Q2 (χ=10.64, n.s.). So, a 
random-intercept model was utilized to test Hypothesis 1 with Tobin's Q2 as the 
dependent variables. The Hausman statistics is statistically significant when dependent 
variable is CAR-19,0,+1 (χ=20.14, p<.05). So, a fixed effect model was utilized to test 
Hypothesis 1 with CAR-19,0,+1 as the dependent variable.  
Table 13 presents the results. As shown in Table 13, host country regulatory 
institutions are statistically significantly associated with Tobin's Q2. As shown in Figure 
4, the relationship is positive (.080, p<.001). Similarly, fixed effect model 5 showed that 
host country regulatory institutions is statistically significantly and positively associated 
with CAR-19,0,+1(2.149, p<.01) within ordered home-host country dyads. These results 
suggested an opposite relationship between host country regulatory institutions and 
cross-border M&A value creation as hypothesized in hypothesis 1. So, hypothesis 1 did 
not receive the support.  I discussed this opposite finding in the discussion section.  
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TABLE 11 
Host Country Regulatory Institutions Main Effect Model 
 
Level 1  
Yij = β0j + β1j Host country M&A experience+ β2j Method of payment +  
        β3j Relatedness between the acquirer and the target + β4j Acquirer slack + β5j Acquirer ROA  
+ eij 
 
Level 2  
 βoj = γ00 + γ01 Cultural distance+ γ02 Home country regulatory institutions +γ03 Home country 
economic institutions + γ04 Home country political institutions + γ05 Home country physical 
infrastructure institutions + γ06 Host country regulatory institutions +U0j 
β1j = γ10  
β2j = γ20  
β3j = γ30 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
 
Combined  
Yij = γ00 + γ10 Host country M&A experience + γ20 Method of payment + γ30 Relatedness between 
the acquirer and the target +γ40 Acquirer slack+ γ50 Acquirer ROA + γ01 Cultural distance +γ02 
Home country regulatory institutions +γ03 Home country economic institutions + γ04 Home 
country political institutions + γ05 Home country physical infrastructure institutions + γ06 Host 
country regulatory institutions + eij+U0j 
 
 
Note: Yij : acquirer j’s cross-border M&A value creation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
 
 
 
     TABLE 12    
Hausman Endogenity Test:  Hypothesis 1 
Host Country Regulatory Institutions Main Effect Model 
         
   Model 5 Model 6    
   CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2    
  Chi-square 20.14* 10.64    
  df 10 10    
  *p < 0.05       
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TABLE 13 
Hypothesis1 Host Country Regulatory Institutions Main Effect Model 
 
 
  Model 5b Model 6 
  CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2
M&A Host experiences -0.065 -0.000 
  (0.063) (0.004) 
Method of payment 0.109 -0.024 
  (0.316) (0.023) 
Relatedness 0.073 0.039 *** 
  (0.103) (0.007) 
Acquirer slack 0.062 -0.089 
  (0.872) (0.065) 
ROA  5.799 * 2.153 *** 
  (2.442) (0.184) 
Cultural distance  -0.050 
   (0.034) 
Home regulatory institutions -0.350 -0.235 *** 
  (1.342) (0.057) 
Home economic institutions 0.141 .0738 *** 
  (0.507) (0.014) 
Home political institutions 0.944 0.176 ** 
  (1.984) (0.060) 
Home physical infrastructure institutions -0.154 -0.014 
  (0.313) (0.013) 
Host regulatory institutions 2.149 ** 0.080 ** 
  (0.780) (0.029) 
Constant  -0.612 1.191 *** 
  (2.222) (0.119) 
sigma_u  2.267 0.144*** 
sigma_e  10.421 0.793 
rho  0.045 0.032 
LR Chi square  288.83*** 
F   2.06*   
aN=79,  n=77.7,  N*n=6141, bfixed effect   
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.01  *p < 0.05 † p  < 0.1  
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FIGURE 4 
Main Effects of Host Country Regulatory Institutions on Tobin’s Q2 
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Hypothesis 2 
Hypothesis 2 predicted that there is a curvilinear relationship between host country 
economic institutions and cross-border M&A value creation. Acquirers are more likely 
to create value by acquiring targets in host countries with middle and high level, and 
extremely low level economic institutions. Yet, acquirers are less likely to create value 
by acquiring targets in host countries with low level economic institutions. So, I 
expected a U-shaped relation between host country economic institutions and cross-
border M&A value creation.  
As shown in Table 14, two variables including host country economic institutions 
and host country economic institutions squared were added in the level-2 HLM 
analytical model. Host country economic institutions provides a test of the general linear 
trend, while host country economic institutions squared provides a test of curvilinearity 
and the direction of the nonlinear effect. As discussed in control variables section, I 
fixed the coefficient of each level-1 firm variable (β1j  ,β2j,  β3j ,β4j,  β5j ). This HLM 
analytical model was analyzed twice, once for each dependent variable (CAR-19,0,+1, and 
Tobin's Q2). 
As stated earlier, I examined Hausman test of the analytical model before 
proceeding with hypothesis testing. As shown in Table 15, the Hausman statistic is 
statistically insignificant when the dependent variable is CAR-19,0,+1(χ=10.14, n.s.) So, a 
random-intercept model was utilized to test Hypothesis 2 with CAR-19,0,+1 as the 
dependent variable. The Hausman statistics is statistically significant when the 
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dependent variable is Tobin's Q2(χ=50.69, p<.001).  So, a fixed effect model was utilized 
to test Hypothesis 2 with CAR-19,0,+1 as the dependent variable.  
Table 16 presents the results. Host country economic institutions is found to 
positively and significantly associated with CAR-19,0,+1 (.634, p<.001), while host 
country economic institutions squared is found to be negatively and significantly 
associated with CAR-19,0,+1 (-.084, p<.1). Similarly, the fixed model 8  also showed that 
host country economic institutions is positively and significantly associated with Tobin's 
Q2  (.362, p<.001), while host country economic institutions squared is found to be 
negatively and significantly associated with Tobin's Q2  (-.048, p<.001). These results 
suggested that when acquirers acquire targets in host countries with low level economic 
institutions, acquirers are less likely to create value; as acquirers acquire targets in host 
countries with middle level economic institutions, they are more likely to create value; 
yet as acquirers acquire targets in host countries with high level economic institutions, 
they are less likely to create value.  
As can be seen in Figure 5, the results suggest that acquirers are less likely to create 
value by acquiring targets in host countries with high level economic institutions. This is 
opposite to what I hypothesized. As I hypothesized that acquirers are more likely to 
create value by acquiring targets in host countries with middle level economic 
institutions, the results support it. In total, the results partially support hypothesis 2.  
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TABLE 14 
Host Country Economic Institutions Curvilinear Effect Model 
 
Level 1  
Yij = β0j + β1j Host country M&A experience+ β2j Method of payment +  
        β3j Relatedness between the acquirer and the target + β4j Acquirer slack + β5j Acquirer ROA  
+ eij 
 
Level 2 
 βoj = γ00 + γ01 Cultural distance+ γ02 Home country regulatory institutions +γ03 Home country 
economic institutions + γ04 Home country political institutions + γ05 Home country physical 
infrastructure institutions + γ06 Host country economic institutions + γ07 Host country economic 
institutions squared + U0j 
β1j = γ10  
β2j = γ20  
β3j = γ30 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
 
Combined  
 Yij = γ00 + γ10 Host country M&A Experience + γ20 Method of Payment +                              
γ30 Relatedness between the acquirer and the target + γ40 Acquirer Slack  +                              
γ50 Acquirer ROA   + γ01 Cultural distance +γ02 Home country regulatory institutions +γ03 Home 
country economic institutions + γ04 Home country political institutions + γ05 Home country 
physical infrastructure institutions + γ06 Host country Economic institutions + γ07 Host country 
Economic institutions squared+ eij+U0j 
 
 
Note: Yij : acquirer j’s cross-border M&A value creation 
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TABLE 15 
Hausman Endogenity Test:  Hypothesis 2 
Host Country Economic Institutions Curvilinear Effect Model 
 
    Model 7 Model 8    
   CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2    
  Chi-square 10.14 50.69***    
  df 11 11    
  *** p < 0.001   
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TABLE 16  
Hypothesis 2 Host Country Economic Institutions Curvilinear Effect Model 
 
 
  Model 7 Model 8b  
  CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2  
M&A Host experiences -0.092 -0.000  
  (0.060) (0.004)  
Method of payment 0.124 -0.025  
  (0.301) (0.024)  
Relatedness 0.037 0.037 ***  
  (0.101) (0.007)  
Acquirer slack -0.075 -0.077  
  (0.851) (0.066)  
ROA  6.540 ** 2.132  
  (2.392) (0.185)  
Home regulatory institutions -1.024 * -0.245 *  
  (0.523) (0.102)  
Home economic institutions -0.237 * 0.131 ***  
  (0.102) (0.038)  
Home political institutions 1.379 ** 0.181  
  (0.496) (0.151)  
Home physical infrastructure institutions 0.043 -0.070 **  
  (0.139) (0.024)  
Host economic institutions 0.634 *** 0.362 ***  
  (0.181) (0.061)  
Host economic institutions squared -0.084† -0.048 ***  
  (0.047) (0.010)  
Constant  -3.555 *** 0.677 ***  
  (0.981) (0.168)  
sigma_u  0.000 0.366  
sigma_e  10.403 0.790  
rho  0.000 0.176  
LR Chi square 43.89***   
F     27.12***  
aN=79,  n=77.7,  N*n=6141,  bfixed effect    
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.01  *p < 0.05  † p < 0.1      
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FIGURE 5 
Curvilinear Effects of Host Country Economic Institutions and Tobin’s Q2 
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Hypothesis 3 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that there is a positive relation between host country physical 
infrastructure institutions and cross-border M&A value creation. Acquirers are more 
likely to create value by acquiring targets in host countries with high level and quality 
physical support systems.  
As shown in Table 17, host country physical infrastructure institutions were added 
in the level-2 HLM analytical model. As discussed in control variables section, I fixed 
the coefficient of each level-1 firm variable (β1j  ,β2j,  β3j ,β4j,  β5j ). This HLM analytical 
model was analyzed twice, once for each dependent variable (CAR-19,0,+1, and Tobin's 
Q2). 
As stated earlier, I did Hausman endogeneity test of the analytical model before 
proceeding the hypothesis testing. As shown in Table 18, the Hausman statistic is 
statistically insignificant when dependent variables are CAR-19,0,+1(χ=15.71, n.s.), and 
Tobin's Q2(χ=11.86, n.s.).  So, a random-intercept model was utilized to test hypothesis 3. 
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Table 19 presents the results. As shown in Table 19, host country physical 
infrastructure institutions is positively and significantly associated with CAR-19,0,+1 (.259, 
p<.05).  Similarly, host country physical infrastructure institutions is found to be 
positively and significantly associated with Tobin's Q2 (.026, p<.01). I also tested if there 
is a curvilinear relationship between host country physical infrastructure institutions and 
CAR-19,0,+1 , and between  host country physical institutions and Tobin's Q2 by adding the 
squared term of host country physical infrastructure institutions. Results show that the 
squared term of host country physical infrastructure institutions is not statistically 
significant. These results provide support for hypothesis 3 that there is a linear positive 
relationship between host country physical infrastructure institutions and cross-border 
M&A value creation.  
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TABLE 17 
Host Country Physical Infrastructure Institutions Effect Model 
 
Level 1  
Yij = β0j + β1j Host country M&A experience+ β2j Method of payment +  
        β3j Relatedness between the acquirer and the target + β4j Acquirer slack + β5j Acquirer ROA  
+ eij 
 
Level 2   
 βoj = γ00 + γ01 Cultural distance+ γ02 Home country regulatory institutions +γ03 Home country 
economic institutions + γ04 Home country political institutions + γ05 Home country physical 
infrastructure institutions + γ06 Host country physical institutions  + U0j 
β1j = γ10  
β2j = γ20  
β3j = γ30 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
 
Combined  
 Yij = γ00+ γ10 Host country M&A Experience + γ20 Method of Payment +γ30 Relatedness between 
the acquirer and the target + γ40 Acquirer Slack+γ50 Acquirer ROA + γ01 Cultural distance +γ02 
Home country regulatory institutions +γ03 Home country economic institutions + γ04 Home 
country political institutions + γ05 Home country physical infrastructure institutions+ γ06 Host 
country Physical infrastructure institutions  + eij+U0j 
 
 
Note: Yij : acquirer j’s cross-border M&A value creation 
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    TABLE 18    
Hausman Endogenity Test:  Hypothesis 3 
Host Country Physical Infrastructure Institutions Model 
            
   Model 9c Model 10c    
   CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2    
  Chi-square 15.71 11.86    
  df 10 10    
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TABLE 19 
Hypothesis 3 Host Country Physical Infrastructure Institutions Model 
 
   Model 9 Model 10 
  CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2
M&A Host experiences -0.039 -0.000 
  (0.059) (0.004) 
Method of payment 0.242 -0.025 
  (0.300) (0.023) 
Relatedness 0.020 0.038 *** 
  (0.101) (0.007) 
Acquirer slack -0.076 -0.085 
  (0.852) (0.065) 
ROA  6.549 ** 2.171 *** 
  (2.395) (0.184) 
Cultural distance 0.203 -0.029 
  (0.210) (0.034) 
Home regulatory institutions -0.580 -0.239 *** 
  (0.508) (0.058) 
Home economic institutions -0.334 *** 0.085 *** 
  (0.098) (0.014) 
Home political institutions 1.352** 0.161 ** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 (0.498) (0.061) 
Home physical infrastructure institutions -0.003 -0.029† 
  (0.152) (0.015) 
Host physical institutions 0.259 * 0.026 ** 
  (0.114) (0.009) 
Constant  -2.380 ** 1.084 *** 
  (0.924) (0.117) 
sigma_u  0.000 0.152*** 
sigma_e  10.412 0.792 
rho  0.000 0.035 
LR Chi square 33.03*** 288.89*** 
F       
aN=79,  n=77.7,  N*n=6141   
bfixed effect    
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.01  *p < 0.05  † p < 0.1   
Note: F test is for fixed effect model, and LR Chi square is 
for random effect model. 
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Hypothesis 4 
Hypothesis 4 predicted that host country political institutions positively moderate 
the positive relationship between the level of host country regulatory institutions and 
cross-border M&A value creation. To test the hypothesis, I added host country political 
institutions, host country regulatory institutions and the interaction term between host 
country political institutions and host country regulatory institutions into the model. 
Specifically, host country regulatory institutions provides a test of the general linear 
trend across the sample, and the interaction term between host country political 
institutions and host country regulatory institutions provides a test of moderation and the 
direction of the moderation.   
As shown in Table 20, these three variables were added in the level-2 HLM 
analytical model. As discussed in control variables section, I fixed the coefficient of each 
level-1 firm variable (β1j  ,β2j,  β3j ,β4j,  β5j ). This HLM analytical model was analyzed twice, 
once for each dependent variable (CAR-19,0,+1,  and Tobin's Q2). 
As stated earlier, I did Hausman endogeneity test of the analytical model before 
proceeding the hypothesis testing. As shown in Table 21, the Hausman statistic is 
statistically significant when dependent variables are CAR-19,0,+1(χ=32.79, p<.001), and 
Tobin's Q2(χ=37.81, p<.001). So, a fixed effect model was utilized to test Hypothesis 4. 
Table 22 presents the results. As shown in Model 11, host country regulatory 
institutions is positively and statistically significantly related with CAR-19,0,+1 (4.349, 
p<.001), and the level of political institutions in the host country negatively moderates 
the positive relationship between host country regulatory institutions and CAR-19,0,+1 (-
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3.111, p<.01). Figure 6 shows the plot of the moderating effects of host country political 
institutions on the relationship between host country regulatory institutions and CAR-
19,0,+1. As shown in Figure 6, the level of host country political institutions weakens the 
positive relationship between host country regulatory institutions and CAR-19,0,+1.  These 
findings are opposite to hypothesis 4.Meanwhile, as can been see from Figure 6, host 
country political institutions moderate the relationship between host country regulatory 
institutions and CAR-19,0,+1. The general logic of Hypothesis 4 is supported.  
Further, the interaction term between host country political institutions and host 
country regulatory institutions is negatively and statistically significantly associated with 
Tobin's Q2. Figure 7 graphically shows this interaction effect.  The level of host country 
political institutions positively moderates the negative relationship between host country 
regulatory institutions and Tobin's Q2. That is, acquirers are more likely to create value 
by acquiring targets in countries with higher level regulatory institutions than by 
acquiring targets in countries with lower level regulatory institutions. Further, this 
relationship is strengthened in host countries with high level political institutions. These 
findings support hypothesis 4.  
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TABLE 20 
Host Country Regulatory and Political Institutions Effect Model 
 
Level 1  
Yij = β0j + β1j Host country M&A experience+ β2j Method of payment +  
        β3j Relatedness between the acquirer and the target + β4j Acquirer slack + β5j Acquirer ROA  
+ eij 
 
Level 2  
βoj = γ00 + γ01 Cultural distance+γ02 Home country regulatory institutions +γ03 Home country 
economic                     institutions + γ04 Home country political institutions + γ05 Home country 
physical infrastructure institutions +γ06 Host country regulatory institutions + γ07 Host country 
political institutions+γ08 Host country regulatory institutions* Host country political institutions 
+ U0j 
β1j = γ10  
β2j = γ20  
β3j = γ30 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
 
Combined Model 
Yij = γ00 + γ10 Host country M&A experience + γ20 Method of payment +γ30 Relatedness between 
the acquirer and the target + γ40 Acquirer slack  +  γ50 Acquirer ROA +γ01 Cultural distance +γ02 
Home country regulatory institutions +γ03 Home country economic institutions + γ04 Home 
country political institutions +  γ05 Home country physical infrastructure institutions+  γ06 Host 
country regulatory institutions + γ07 Host country political institutions + γ08 Host country 
regulatory institutions* Host country political institutions +  eij+U0j
 
Note: Yij : acquirer j’s cross-border M&A value creation 
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    TABLE 21      
  Hausman Endogenity Test:  Hypothesis 4  
Host Country Political and Regulatory Institutions Effect Model
              
   Model 11 Model 12      
   CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2      
  Chi-square 32.79*** 37.81***      
  df 12 12      
  *** p < 0.001          
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TABLE 22 
Hypothesis 4 Host Country Regulatory and 
Political Institutions Effect Model 
 
  Model 11b Model 12b
  CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2
M&A Host experiences -0.063 -0.000 
  (0.063) (0.004) 
Method of payment 0.087 -0.026 
  (0.316) (0.024) 
Relatedness 0.079 0.037 *** 
  (0.103) (0.007) 
Acquirer slack 0.023 -0.075 
  (0.871) (0.066) 
ROA  5.495* 2.112 *** 
  (2.441) (0.185) 
Home regulatory institutions -0.773 -0.282 ** 
  (1.350) (0.102) 
Home economic institutions 0.102 0.153 *** 
  (0.515) (0.039) 
Home political institutions 1.071 0.249 
  (1.983) (0.150) 
Home physical infrastructure institutions 0.038 -0.081 *** 
  (0.331) (0.025) 
Host regulatory institutions 4.349 *** -0.079 
  (1.174) (0.089) 
Host political institutions  -2.225 * 0.253 *** 
  (0.976) (0.074) 
Host economic institutions squared -3.111 ** -0.457 *** 
Host political institutions   * (1.147) (0.087) 
Constant  1.475 0.602 *** 
  (2.484) (0.188) 
sigma_u  7.531 0.457 
sigma_e  10.412 0.791 
rho  0.343 0.250 
F   2.77*** 24.26*** 
aN=79,  n=77.7,  N*n=6141, bfixed effect   
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.01  *p < 0.05  † p < 0.1    
Note: F test is for fixed effect model, and LR Chi square is for random effect model. 
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FIGURE 6 
Moderation Effects of Host Country Political Institutions on the Relationship 
between Host Country Regulatory Institutions and CAR-19,0,+1 
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FIGURE 7 
Moderation Effects of Host Country Political Institutions on the Relationship 
between Host Country Regulatory Institutions and Tobin’s Q2 
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Hypothesis 5 
Hypothesis 5-7 focuses on the effects of institutional distance between the home and 
the host country on cross-border M&A value creation. To test hypotheses 5-7, I just 
included control variables. I did not include home and host country institutions as 
control variables because the institutional distance variable includes the information 
about home and host country institutions. So, including home and host country 
institutions in analytical model would cause multicollinearity problems in testing the 
effects of institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation. 
 Hypothesis 5 predicted that there is a curvilinear relationship between institutional 
distance and cross-border M&A value creation. Acquirers are less likely to create value 
in similar institutional environments, and more likely to create value in distant 
institutional environments. Yet, their cross-border M&A value creation decreases as they 
enter too distance institutional environment. As shown in Table 23, institutional distance 
and institutional distance squared were entered in the level-2 HLM analytical model. 
Institutional distance provides a test of the general linear trend, while institutional 
distance squared provides a test of nonlinearity and the direction of that nonlinearity. 
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 As discussed in control variables section, I fixed the coefficient of each level-1 firm 
variable (β1j  ,β2j,  β3j ,β4j,  β5j ). This HLM analytical model was analyzed twice, once for 
each dependent variable (CAR-19,0,+1, and Tobin's Q2). 
As stated earlier, I did the Hausman endogeneity test of the analytical model before 
proceeding the hypothesis testing. As shown in Table 24, the Hausman statistic is 
statistically significant when dependent variable is CAR-19,0,+1 (χ=21.3, p<.01), and 
Tobin's Q2 (χ=21.76, p<.01). So, a fixed effect model was utilized to test Hypothesis 5.  
Table 25 presents the results. As shown in model 13, the relationship between 
institutional distance and CAR-19,0,+1  is positive and statistically significant (.521, p<.05), 
and the relationship between institutional distance squared and CAR-19,0,+1 is negative 
and statistically significant (-.109, p<.10). Similarly, as shown in model 14, the 
relationship between institutional distance and Tobin's Q2 is positive and statistically 
significant (.111, p<.05), and the relationship between institutional distance squared and 
Tobin's Q2 is negative and statistically significant (-.017, p<.001). These suggest that 
there is an inverted-U relationship between institutional distance and CAR-19,0,+1, and 
between institutional distance and Tobin's Q2. So, hypothesis 5 is supported.  
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TABLE 23 
Institutional Distance Effect Model 
 
Level 1  
Yij = β0j + β1j Host country M&A experience+ β2j Method of payment +  
        β3j Relatedness between the acquirer and the target + β4j Acquirer slack + β5j Acquirer ROA  
+ eij 
 
Level 2  
 βoj = γ00 + γ01 Cultural distance+ γ02 Institutional distance +γ03 Institutional distance squared +  
U0j 
β1j = γ10  
β2j = γ20  
β3j = γ30 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
 
Combined  
Yij = γ00 +γ10 Host country M&A experience + γ20 Method of payment + γ30 Relatedness between 
the acquirer and the target + γ40 Acquirer slack  + γ50 Acquirer ROA   + γ01 Cultural distance + 
γ02 Institutional distance +γ03 Institutional distance squared +  eij+U0j
 
Note: Yij : acquirer j’s cross-border M&A value creation 
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    TABLE 24  
Hausman Endogeneity Test:  Hypothesis 5 
Institutional Distance Effect 
        
   Model 13 Model 14  
   CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2  
  Chi-square 21.3** 21.76**  
  df 7 7  
  ** p < 0.01      
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TABLE 25 
Hypothesis 5 Institutional Distance Effect Model 
  Model 13b Model 14b
  CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2
M&A Host experiences -0.065 0.000 
  (0.063) (0.004) 
Method of payment 0.091 -0.028 
  (0.316) (0.024) 
Relatedness 0.071 0.037 *** 
  (0.103) (0.007) 
Acquirer slack 0.083 -0.073 
  (0.871) (0.066) 
ROA  6.108 ** 2.127 *** 
  (2.431) (0.184) 
Cultural distance   
    
Institutional distance 0.520 * 0.111 *** 
  (0.232) (0.017) 
Institutional distance squared -0.109†  -0.017 *** 
  (0.064) (0.004) 
Constant  -2.264 *** 1.245 *** 
  (0.590) (0.044) 
sigma_u  1.597 0.229 
sigma_e  10.42 0.792 
rho  0.022 0.077 
LR Chi square   
F   2.47* 37.06*** 
aN=79,  n=77.7,  N*n=6141   
bfixed effect    
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.01  *p < 0.05  † p < 0.1    
          Note: F test is for fixed effect model, and LR Chi square is for random  
         effect model. 
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Hypothesis 6a  
Hypothesis 6a predicts that when the level of host country regulatory institutions is 
higher than that of home country regulatory institutions, there is a negative relationship 
between regulatory distance and cross-border M&A value creation. Hypothesis 6b 
predicts that when the level of host country regulatory institutions is lower than that of 
home country regulatory institutions, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship between 
regulatory distance and cross-border M&A value creation. Hypothesis 6a and 6b suggest 
that the effects of regulatory distance on cross-border M&A value creation is not 
symmetric.  
As shown in Table 26, regulatory distance, regulatory distance asymmetry dummy 
variable, and the interaction term between regulatory distance and regulatory distance 
asymmetry were entered in the level-2 HLM analytical model to test hypothesis 6a. As 
discussed in control variables section, I fixed the coefficient of each level-1 firm variable 
(β1j  ,β2j,  β3j ,β4j,  β5j ). This HLM analytical model was analyzed twice, once for each 
dependent variable (CAR-19,0,+1, and Tobin's Q2).  
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As stated earlier, I did a Hausman endogeneity test of the analytical model before 
proceeding the hypothesis testing. As shown in Table 27, the Hausman statistics is 
statistically significant when the dependent variable is CAR-19,0,+1 (χ=19.45, p<.05),  and 
Tobin's Q2 (χ=30.58, p<.001). So, a fixed effect model was utilized to test Hypothesis 6a. 
Table 28 presents the results. As shown in Table 28, hypothesis 6a received supported 
from the results in model 15 with CAR-19,0,+1  as the dependent variable. Regulatory 
distance was positively and significantly associated with CAR-19,0,+1  (1.453, p<.10), and 
regulatory distance asymmetry negatively moderates the positive relationship between 
regulatory distance and CAR-19,0,+1  (-3.004, p<.05). As shown in Figure 8, when the 
level of host country regulatory institutions is higher than that of home country 
regulatory institutions, there is a negative relationship between regulatory distance and 
CAR-19,0,+1. Yet, model 16 did not support hypothesis 6a. While regulatory distance is 
negatively and statistically significantly associated with Tobin's Q2 (-.106, p<.10), the 
interaction term between regulatory distance and regulatory distance asymmetry has no 
statistically significant association with Tobin's Q2. In total, hypothesis 6a received the 
support from model 15 with CAR-19,0,+1  as the dependent variable; and yet did not 
receive the support from model 16 with Tobin's Q2 as the dependent variable.  
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TABLE 26 
Asymmetric Regulatory Distance Main Effect Model 
 
Level 1 
Yij = β0j + β1j Host country M&A experience+ β2j Method of Payment +  
        β3j Relatedness between the acquirer and the target + β4j Acquirer slack + β5j Acquirer ROA  
+ eij 
 
Level 2  
 βoj = γ00 + γ01 Cultural distance+ γ02 Regulatory distance +γ03 Regulatory distance asymmetry + 
γ04 Regulatory distance* Regulatory distance asymmetry + U0j 
β1j = γ10  
β2j = γ20  
β3j = γ30 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
 
Combined  
Yij = γ00 + γ10 Host country M&A experience + γ20 Method of payment + γ30 Relatedness between 
the acquirer and the target + γ40 Acquirer slack +  γ50 Acquirer ROA   + γ01 Cultural distance + 
γ02 Regulatory distance + γ03 Regulatory distance asymmetry + γ04 Regulatory distance* 
Regulatory distance asymmetry +  eij+U0j
 
Note: Yij :  acquirer firm j’s cross-border M&A value creation 
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       TABLE 27      
        Hausman Endogenity Test:  Hypothesis 6a  
Asymmetric Regulatory Distance Main Effect Model 
            
   Model 15 Model 16    
   CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2    
  Chi-square 19.42* 30.58***    
  df 8 8    
  *** p < 0.001  *p < 0.05      
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TABLE 28 
Hypothesis 6a Asymmetric Regulatory Distance Main Effect Model 
 
  
Model 
15b Model 16b  
  
CAR-
19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2  
M&A Host experiences -0.070 -0.000  
  (0.063) (0.004)  
Method of payment 0.097 -0.025  
  (0.316) (0.024)  
Relatedness 0.071 0.038 ***   
  (0.103) (0.007)  
Acquirer slack 0.048 -0.095  
  (0.871) (0.066)  
ROA  5.808 * 2.033 ***   
  (2.426) (0.185)  
Cultural distance    
     
Regulatory distance 1.453† -0.106†  
  (0.834) (0.063)  
Regulatory distance asymmetry -1.277 0.049  
  (0.789) (0.060)  
Regulatory distance squared    
     
Regulatory distance* -3.004 * 0.127  
Regulatory distance asymmetry (1.425) (0.108)  
Regulatory distance squared*    
Regulatory distance asymmetry    
Constant  
-1.871 
***  1.537 ***   
  (0.570) (0.043)  
sigma_u  1.885 0.265  
sigma_e  10.423 0.796  
rho  0.031 0.099  
LR Chi square    
F   2.1* 25.29***  
aN=79,  n=77.7,  N*n=6141    
bfixed effect     
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.01  *p < 0.05  † p < 0.1     
    Note: F test is for fixed effect model, and LR Chi square is for random effect model. 
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FIGURE 8 
Moderation Effects of Regulatory Distance Asymmetry on the Relationship 
between Regulatory Distance and CAR-19,0,+1 
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Hypothesis 6b 
As discussed earlier, hypothesis 6b predicts that when the level of host country 
regulatory institutions is lower than that of home country regulatory institutions, there is 
an inverted U-shaped relationship between regulatory distance and cross-border M&A 
value creation. As shown in Table 29, regulatory distance, regulatory distance 
asymmetry dummy variable, regulatory distance squared, the interaction term between 
regulatory distance and regulatory distance asymmetry, and the interaction term between 
regulatory distance squared and regulatory distance asymmetry were entered in the level-
2 HLM analytical model to test hypothesis 6b. As discussed in control variables section, 
I fixed the coefficient of each level-1 firm variable (β1j  ,β2j,  β3j ,β4j,  β5j ). This HLM 
analytical model was analyzed twice, once for each dependent variable (CAR-19,0,+1,  and 
Tobin's Q2). As stated earlier, I did a Hausman endogeneity test of the analytical model 
before proceeding the hypothesis testing. As shown in Table 30, a Hausman statistic is 
statistically significant when the dependent variable is CAR-19,0,+1 (χ=30.82, p<.001), and 
Tobin's Q2 (χ=33.5, p<.001). So, a fixed effect model was utilized to test Hypothesis 6b.  
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Table 31 presents the results. As shown in model 17 with CAR-19,0,+1 as the 
dependent variable, the interaction term between regulatory distance squared and 
regulatory distance asymmetry is statistically significant (-11.743, p<.001). Figure 9 
graphically shows this moderation interaction effect.  When the level of host country 
regulatory institutions is lower than that of home country regulatory institutions, 
acquirers are more likely to create value by acquiring targets in these countries as 
regulatory distance increases. Yet, this effect does not decrease after a certain point as 
hypothesized. So, hypothesis 6b did not receive support. Similarly, the interaction term 
between regulatory distance squared and regulatory distance asymmetry is statistically 
significant in model 18 with Tobin's Q2 as the dependent variable (.602, p<.10). As 
shown in Figure 10, when the level of host country regulatory institutions is lower than 
that of home country regulatory institutions, there is an inverted U-shaped relationship 
between regulatory distance and Tobin's Q2. This supports Hypothesis 6b. So, model 17 
with CAR-19,0,+1 as the dependent variable did not support hypothesis 6b. Model 18 with 
Tobin's Q2as the dependent variable supports Hypothesis 6b. 
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TABLE 29 
Hypothesis 6b Asymmetric Regulatory Distance Curvilinear Effect Model 
 
Level 1  
Yij = β0j + β1j Host country M&A experience+ β2j Method of payment +  
        β3j Relatedness between the acquirer and the target + β4j Acquirer slack + β5j Acquirer ROA  
+ eij 
 
Level 2  
 βoj = γ00 + γ01 Cultural distance+ γ02 Regulatory distance + γ03 Regulatory distance asymmetry + 
γ04 Regulatory distance squared + γ05 Regulatory distance* Regulatory distance asymmetry + 
γ06Regulatory distance squared* Regulatory distance asymmetry +U0j 
β1j = γ10  
β2j = γ20  
β3j = γ30 
β4j = γ40 
β5j = γ50 
 
Combined  
Yij = γ00+γ10 Host country M&A experience+ γ20 Method of payment + γ30 Relatedness between 
the acquirer and the target + γ40 Acquirer slack +  γ50 Acquirer ROA   + γ01 Cultural distance + 
γ02 Regulatory distance +  γ03 Regulatory distance asymmetry + γ04 Regulatory distance squared + 
γ05 Regulatory distance*Regulatory distance asymmetry+γ06Regulatory distance squared* 
Regulatory distance asymmetry +eij+U0j
 
Note: Yij : acquirer j’s cross-border M&A value creation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
153 
 
TABLE 30 
Hausman Endogenity Test:  Hypothesis 6b Asymmetric Regulatory Distance 
Curvilinear Effect Model 
          
   Model 17 Model 18  
   CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2  
  Chi-square 30.82*** 33.5***  
  df 10 10  
  *** p < 0.001    
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TABLE 31 
Hypothesis 6b Asymmetric Regulatory Distance Curvilinear Effect Model 
 
  Model 17b Model 18b   
  CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2   
M&A Host experiences -0.069 -0.000   
  (0.063) (0.004)   
Method of payment 0.100 -0.025   
  (0.316) (0.024)   
Relatedness 0.068 0.039 ***    
  (0.103) (0.007)   
Acquirer slack 0.030 -0.094   
  (0.871) (0.066)   
ROA  5.775 * 2.039 ***    
  (2.426) (0.185)   
Cultural distance     
      
Regulatory distance 1.538 † -0.131 *   
  (0.859) (0.065)   
Regulatory distance asymmetry -0.649 0.038   
  (0.838) (0.064)   
Regulatory distance squared 0.062 0.040   
  (0.417) (0.031)   
Regulatory distance* 2.471 -0.107   
Regulatory distance asymmetry (2.426) (0.185)   
Regulatory distance squared* 
-11.743 
** 0.602†   
Regulatory distance asymmetry (4.278) (0.326)   
Constant  
-1.963 
*** 1.534 ***    
  (0.575) (0.043)   
sigma_u  1.970 0.261   
sigma_e  10.418 0.796   
rho  0.034 0.097   
LR Chi square     
F   2.46** 20.68***    
aN=79,  n=77.7,  N*n=6141     
bfixed effect      
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.01  *p < 0.05  † p < 0.1   
    
Note: F test is for fixed effect model, and LR Chi square is for random effect model. 
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FIGURE 9 
Moderation Effects of Regulatory Distance Asymmetry on the Curvilinear 
Relationship between Regulatory Distance and CAR-19,0,+1 
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FIGURE 10 
Moderation Effects of Regulatory Distance Asymmetry on the Curvilinear 
Relationship between Regulatory Distance and Tobin’s Q2 
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Hypothesis 7 
Hypothesis 7 predicted that as the level of host country economic institutions is 
lower than that of home country economic institutions, economic distance is positively 
related to cross-border M&A value creation (hypothesis 7a); and as the level of host 
country economic institutions is higher than that of home country economic institutions, 
economic distance is negatively related to cross-border M&A value creation (hypothesis 
7b). To test hypothesis 7, I added economic distance between the home and the host 
country, the dummy variable indicating whether the level of host country economic 
institutions is higher than that of home country economic institutions, and the interaction 
term between economic distance and economic distance asymmetry into the level-2 
HLM analytical model as shown in Table 32. As discussed in control variables section, I 
fixed the coefficient of each level-1 firm variable (β1j  ,β2j,  β3j ,β4j,  β5j ). This HLM 
analytical model was analyzed twice, once for each dependent variable (CAR-19,0,+1, and 
Tobin's Q2). As stated earlier, I did a Hausman endogeneity test of the analytical model 
before proceeding the hypothesis testing. As shown in Table 33, the Hausman statistic is 
statistically insignificant when dependent variables are CAR-19,0,+1(χ  =12.96, n.s.), and 
Tobin's Q2(χ=12.87, n.s.). So, a random-intercept model was utilized to test hypothesis 7. 
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Table 34 presents the results. As shown in Model 23 with CAR-19,0,+1 as the 
dependent variable, economic distance is statistically significantly and positively 
associated with CAR-19,0,+1 (.420, p<.01), and the interaction term between economic 
distance and economic distance asymmetry is statistically significantly and negatively 
associated with CAR-19,0,+1 (-.460, p<.05).  
As shown in Figure 11, when the level of host country economic institutions is 
lower than that of home country economic institutions, there is a positive relationship 
between economic distance and CAR-19,0,+1. This supports hypothesis 7a.  Further, the 
positive relationship between economic distance and CAR-19,0,+1  is stronger when the 
level of host country economic institutions is higher than that of home country economic 
institutions. This is opposite to hypothesis 7b. Further, while economic distance is 
statistically significantly and positively associated with Tobin's Q2 (.039, p<.05), the 
interaction term between economic distance and economic distance asymmetry has no 
statistically significant association with Tobin's Q2.  
In total, hypothesis 7a receives support when the dependent variable is CAR-19,0,+1. 
The opposite relationship between economic distance and CAR-19,0,+1was found when 
the level of host country economic institutions is higher than that of home country 
economic institutions.  So, hypothesis 7b did not receive the support when the dependent 
variable is CAR-19,0,+1. I discuss these in discuss section. 
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TABLE 32 
Asymmetric Economic Distance Effect Model 
 
Level 1  
Yij = β0j + β1j Host country M&A experience+ β2j Method of payment +  
        β3j Relatedness between the acquirer and the target + β4j Acquirer slack + β5j Acquirer ROA  
+ eij 
 
Level 2  
 βoj = γ00 + γ01 Cultural distance+ γ02 Economic distance+ γ03 Economic distance asymmetry+ γ04 
Economic distance* Economic distance asymmetry   +U0j 
 
β1j = γ10  
 
β2j = γ20  
 
β3j = γ30 
 
Combined  
Yij = γ00 + γ10 Host country M&A experience + γ20 Method of payment +γ30 Relatedness between 
the acquirer and the target + γ40 Acquirer slack  + γ50 Acquirer ROA   + γ01 Cultural distance + 
γ02 Economic distance + γ03 Economic distance asymmetry+ γ04 Economic distance* Economic 
distance asymmetry +  eij+U0j
 
Note: Yij : acquirer j’s cross-border M&A value creation 
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TABLE 33 
Hausman Endogenity Test:  Hypothesis 7 
Asymmetric Economic Distance Effect 
 
   Model 23 Model 24  
   CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2  
  Chi-square 12.96 12.87  
  df 8 8  
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TABLE 34 
Hypothesis 7 Asymmetric Economic Distance Model 
 
    
Model 
23 Model 24 
    
CAR-
19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2
M&A Host experiences -0.081 -0.001 
    (0.060) (0.004) 
Method of payment 0.143 -0.022 
    (0.298) (0.023) 
Relatedness 0.030 0.038 ***  
    (0.101) (0.007) 
Acquirer slack -0.121 -0.088 
    (0.850) (0.065) 
ROA   6.574 ** 2.178 ***  
    (2.369) (0.183) 
Cultural distance 0.226 -0.017 
    (0.205) (0.034) 
Economic distance 0.420 ** 0.066 ***  
    (0.150) (0.014) 
Economic distance asymmetry 
-1.052 
*** 0.107 * 
    (0.285) (0.045) 
Economic distance* -0.460 * 0.011 
Economic distance asymmetry (0.197) (0.018) 
Constant   
-1.654 
** 1.305 ***  
    (0.639) (0.083) 
sigma_u   0.000 0.161*** 
sigma_e   10.412 0.793 
rho   0.000 0.039 
LR Chi square 33.32*** 278.52*** 
F       
aN=79,  n=77.7,  N*n=6141     
bfixed effect      
*** p < 0.001  ** p < 0.01  *p < 0.05  † p < 0.1     
 Note: F test is for fixed effect model, and LR Chi square is for random effect model. 
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FIGURE 11 
Moderation Effects of Economic Distance Asymmetry on the Relationship 
between Economic Distance and CAR-19,0,+1
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Summary of Results 
Overall, the results support most of the hypotheses. The combination of these results 
demonstrates that host country institutions have significant effects on acquirers’ cross-
border M&A value creation. Further, the combination of these results clearly showed 
that the effects of institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation are not 
symmetric. The effects of regulatory and economic distance on cross-border M&A value 
creation are conditional on the direction of regulatory and economic distance 
respectively. Table 35 provides the summary of the results.  
The first four hypotheses addressed the effects of host country institutions on cross-
border M&A value creation. These hypotheses answered the first research question: how 
do host country institutions affect cross-border M&A value creation?  
First, results show that acquirers are able to create value by acquiring targets in  host 
countries with lower level regulatory institutions (less advanced regulatory institutions) 
in the short term (CAR-19,0,+1,) and in the long term (Tobin's Q2) (Supporting hypothesis 1).  
This is opposite to hypothesis 1. I discussed it in discussion section. 
Second, results show that acquirers are more likely to create value by acquiring 
targets in host countries with middle level economic institutions (less investment 
constrained). This is consistent with hypothesis 2. Further, results suggest that acquirers 
are less likely to create value by acquiring targets in host countries with high level 
economic institutions. This is opposite to hypothesis 2. So, hypothesis 2 is partially 
supported. I discussed it in discussion section.  
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Third, results demonstrate that acquirers are able to create value by acquiring targets 
in host countries with high level and quality physical infrastructures in the short term 
(CAR-19,0,+1), and in the long term (Tobin's Q2) (Supporting hypothesis 3).  
Fourth, results showed that host country political institutions moderate the 
relationship between host country regulatory institutions and cross-border M&A value 
creation in the short term (CAR-19,0,+1) and in the long term (Tobin's Q2). Meanwhile, 
results suggest that there is a positive relationship between host country regulatory 
institutions and CAR-19,0,+1. Further, this positive relationship is weakened in host 
countries with high level political institutions. These findings are contrary to  
hypothesis 4.  
Moreover, results suggest that there is a negative relationship between host country 
regulatory institutions and Tobin's Q2.  Results also suggest that this negative effect is 
strengthened in host countries with high level political institutions. This supports 
hypothesis 4.  
The last three hypotheses addressed how institutional distance affects cross-border 
M&A value creation. Particularly, I argued that the effects of distance (i.e., regulatory 
institutional distance, and economic institutional distance) on cross-border M&A value 
creation are conditional on the direction of the institutional distance. So, how does 
institutional distance, and how do regulatory and economic distance affect cross-border 
M&A value creation asymmetrically? Results suggest that acquirers are less likely to 
create value in similar institutional environments. Acquirers are more likely to create 
value when institutional distance between home country and host country increases. 
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Further, acquirers are less likely to create value by acquiring targets in too distant 
institutional environments. Institutional distance has an inverted U-shaped relationship 
with CAR-19,0,+1 and Tobin's Q2 (Supporting hypothesis 5).  
Second, results suggest that the effects of regulatory distance on cross-border M&A 
value creation are conditional on the direction of regulatory distance. When the level of 
host country regulatory institutions are higher than that of home country regulatory 
institutions, there is a negative relationship between regulatory distance and CAR-19,0,+1  
(Supporting hypothesis 6a). When the level of host country regulatory institutions are 
lower than that of home country regulatory institutions, there is an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between regulatory distance and Tobin's Q2 (Supporting hypothesis 6a). 
Third, results demonstrate that the effects of economic distance on cross-border 
M&A value creation are conditional on the direction of economic distance. When the 
level of economic institutions in the host country is lower than that of home country 
economic institutions, there is a positive relationship between economic distance and 
CAR-19,0,+1  (Supporting hypothesis 7a). When the level of economic institutions in the 
host country is higher than that of home country economic institutions, the positive 
relationship between economic distance and CAR-19,0,+1  is strengthened.  Yet, this is 
opposite to hypothesis 7b. Further, results show the positive relationship between 
economic distance and Tobin's Q2.  Yet, results did not suggest that economic distance 
asymmetry moderates the relationship between economic distance and Tobin's Q2. While 
this supports hypothesis 7a, this does not support hypothesis 7b and the asymmetric 
economic distance effect logic of hypothesis 7. I discussed it in the discussion section.  
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TABLE 35 
Summary of Results 
 
 Hypotheses CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2
1 There is a positive relationship  Opposite Opposite 
 between the level of host country found found 
 regulatory institutions and    
 cross-border M&A value creation.    
2 There is a U-shaped relationship  Partial  Partial  
 between the level of host country support support 
 economic institutions and   
 cross-border M&A value creation.   
3 There is a positive relationship  Support Support 
 between the level of host country   
 physical infrastructure  institution and    
 cross-border M&A value creation.   
4 Host country political institutions positively  No  Support 
 moderates the positive relationship  support  
  between the level of host country   
  regulatory institutions and cross-border    
 M&A value creation.   
5  Institutional distance has an Support Support 
 inverted-U shaped relation with    
 cross-border M&A value creation.    
6a When the level of host country Support No 
  regulatory institution is higher than   Support 
 that of home country, regulatory distance is    
 negatively related to cross-border    
 M&A value creation.    
6b When the level of the host country  No Support 
 regulatory institution is less than  Support  
 that of home country, regulatory distance has   
  an inverted U-shaped relation with    
 cross-border M&A value creation.    
7a When the level of host country  Support Support 
 economic institution  is lower than    
 that of home country, economic distance is    
 positively related to cross-border    
 M&A value creation;    
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TABLE 35 Continued 
 Hypotheses CAR-19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2
7b when the level of host country economic No No 
  institution is higher than that of home  Support Support 
 country, economic distance is negatively related   
   to cross-border M&A value creation.      
 that of home country, economic distance is    
 positively related to cross-border    
 M&A value creation.   
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CHAPTER VI 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter discusses the results presented in the previous chapter.  First, I provide 
a brief overview of the study; Second, I discuss this study’s theoretical contribution 
including the discussion of the results of this study; Third, I discuss this study’s 
managerial implications and public policy implications; Fourth, I present directions for 
future research, and offer conclusions.   
Overview 
Cross-border M&As represent an increasingly popular strategy for firms to enter 
and compete in the global market (Hitt, et al., 2006a; Shimizu, et al., 2004). The value of 
cross-border M&A transactions reached a record of $3.79 trillion in 2006 (Thomason 
Financial, 2007). However, we have little understanding of whether and how acquirers 
create value from cross-border M&As (King, et al., 2004). M&A theorists suggested that 
synergy between the acquirer and the target leads to value creation (Hitt, Harrison & 
Ireland, 2001a). M&A theorists further suggested that acquirers need to identify the right 
target because synergy is more likely to be achieved between the acquirer and the right 
target (e.g., Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 1991). A significant amount of 
research  identifies the right target and on factors that facilitate or impede synergy 
realization between the acquirer and the target including resource complementarities 
between the acquirer and the target, and overpayment of acquirers, etc (e.g., Cording, 
Christmann, & King, 2008; Haleblian, & Finkelstein, 1999; Hitt, et al., 2001a; Hitt, et al., 
2001b; Laamanen, 2007).  
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M&A research has neglected the effects of external environments. The effects of 
external environments are particularly salient in cross-border M&A value creation. 
Institutional theorists have advocated that country institutions provide both incentives 
and constraints defining possible and productive business opportunity sets within the 
country (North, 1990). These business opportunities determine the kinds of firms that 
develop by shaping the supply of inputs (e.g., skills, capital) collectively available to 
firms (North, 1990). For example, bio-tech, IT and pharmaceutical firms in the United 
States are competitively advantaged in the global market. This is partly because the 
higher economic institutions in the United States supply rich financial resources for 
firms and allow firms to invest in these industries requiring continuous and intensive 
capital investment in R&D and innovation (Redding, 2005).  
Country institutions affect the existence of the type of target firm that acquirers 
desire. Moreover, country institutions also significantly influence the behaviors of 
embedded firms (North, 1990; Hitt, et al., 2006). Firms indeed can be seen as a 
repository of socially embedded knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982). Acquirers and 
targets’ behaviors influence post-acquisition integration between them and thereby 
influence synergy realization. Little attention has been paid to the effects of country 
institutions on cross-border M&A value creation. This work contributes to our 
knowledge of M&As by explicitly considering how country institutions, particularly 
institutions in host countries and institutional distance between home and host country 
affect cross-border M&A value creation. 
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Theoretical Contributions 
Several theoretical contributions stem from the core findings and inform not only 
M&A literature but also institutions literature. First, this work shows the importance of a 
country’s formal institutions including regulatory, economic, political and physical 
infrastructure institutions to cross-border M&A value creation. Particularly, I highlighted 
the importance of physical infrastructure institutions that have received limited attention 
in prior institutional research. For example, the low level and quality of physical 
infrastructure institutions in China in previous years have deterred foreign acquirers to 
capitalize on their core competences and to achieve economies of scale in huge Chinese 
markets. Yet, China’s recent development of its physical infrastructure has significantly 
enhanced its attractiveness for foreign direct investment.  Importantly, future research 
can examine the effects of these country institutions on other firm strategic behaviors 
and value creation.  
Second, examining the effects of country institutions on cross-border M&A value 
creation provides new insights into sources of cross-border M&A value creation, and 
thereby provides contributions to the M&A literature. Results revealed two overarching 
findings: First, host country institutions, including regulatory, economic, physical 
infrastructure and political institutions, significantly affect cross-border M&A value 
creation; Second, institutional distance between home and host country affects cross-
border M&A value creation. In particular, results demonstrated that the effects of 
institutional distance (i.e., regulatory and economic institutional distance) are not 
symmetric. The relationship between regulatory distance and cross-border M&A value 
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creation is contingent upon whether the level of host country regulatory institutions is 
higher than that of home country regulatory institutions. Similarly, the relationship 
between economic distance on cross-border M&A value creation is contingent upon 
whether the level of host country economic institutions is higher than that of home 
country economic institutions. I discussed the findings in detail below.  
Institutions in the Host Country 
Regulatory Institutions in the Host Country  
Findings indicate that acquirers create value by acquiring targets in host countries 
with a lower level of regulatory institutions (restrictive regulatory institutions) rather 
than a higher level of regulatory institutions as expected. As discussed earlier, countries 
with lower level regulatory institutions tend to restrict foreign entry (Hitt et al., 2008). A 
plausible reason for this outcome is that the competition tends to be less fierce in host 
countries with lower level regulatory institutions. Foreign acquirers are likely more able 
to exploit opportunities and create value in these markets because of the lower level of 
competition with which they have to deal. Higher level regulatory institutions in host 
countries provide strong property rights protection, and thus facilitate knowledge 
transfer between the acquirer and the target (Hitt et al., 2008).  
However, post-acquisition integration (e.g., knowledge transfer) generally takes a 
longer time. Cross-border M&A value creation is measured as acquirers’ Tobin’s Q at 
two years after acquisition in this work. It is likely that cross-border M&A value creation 
derived from higher level regulatory institutions may require more time and thus will not 
be reflected in this measure (i.e., more than two years after acquisition). Perhaps, a 
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longer term measure of performance may be necessary in these cases. This outcome 
suggests future research opportunities to examine the dynamic relationship between host 
country regulatory institutions and cross-border M&A value creation.  
Economic Institutions in the Host Country 
Findings suggest that acquirers are less likely to create value by acquiring targets in 
countries with low and high levels of economic institutions (not expected), and more 
likely to create value by acquiring targets in countries with a medium level of economic 
institutions (as expected). Firms in these countries are more able to invest significantly 
in technology sectors. Importantly, technology sectors possess huge growth 
opportunities and thus provide significant opportunities for value creation partly because 
of the increasingly dynamic global markets (Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2004). So, value 
creation is more likely by acquiring targets in these economic institutional environments.  
Yet, unexpectedly, acquirers are less likely to create value by acquiring targets in 
countries with high level economic institutions (i.e., no investment constraints). One 
plausible reason is that a large number of foreign acquirers are attracted to potential 
valuable targets in these countries (McNamara, Haleblian, & Dykes, 2008).  This may 
result in greater competition among foreign suitors and bid up target prices. This also 
stimulates competition in the local market as the number of firms operating in the local 
market increases. Under this circumstance, benefits of acquiring targets in these 
countries quickly erode allowing the costs of cross-border M&As to override the 
benefits. As foreign firms acquire targets in countries with a high level of economic 
institutions (i.e., no investment constraints), they are less likely to create value. 
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Further, I hypothesized that acquirers are more likely to create value by acquiring 
targets in extremely low economic institutions (extremely high investment constraints). 
Yet, this did not receive support from the results. The primary reason for this outcome is 
that the sample does not include host countries with extremely low economic institutions. 
So, the sample does not allow a reasonable test of the hypothesis. As shown in Table 2, 
the mean of host country economic institutions in this sample is 1.014, and the standard 
deviation is 1.437. I also checked the minimum of host country economic institutions in 
this sample. The minimum is -.570, around 1 standard deviation below the mean. This 
likely does not represent extremely low economic institutions. So, constrained by the 
variance of host country economic institutions in the sample, the results are not able to 
reveal acquirers’ value creation in host countries with extremely investment low 
economic institutions.  
Physical Infrastructure Institutions in the Host Country  
The findings demonstrated that acquirers create value by acquiring targets in host 
countries with high level and quality physical infrastructure institutions as expected. 
This suggests that host country physical institutions are important formal institutions, 
and strongly influence acquirers’ value creation. Certainly, high quality physical 
infrastructure can help to decrease foreign acquirers’ transportation costs for production 
factors and products. Using high quality physical infrastructure (i.e., local established 
distribution networks), foreign acquirers can further capitalize on proprietary 
technologies in the host country and to achieve economies of scale. Foreign acquirers 
can also benefit from being physically proximate to local customers and thus better 
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understand and satisfy local customers’ needs. As foreign acquirers penetrate in local 
markets, they are more likely to obtain additional local markets’ business opportunities. 
It is clear that physical infrastructure institutions in the host country strongly influence 
foreign acquirers’ value creation.  
Political Institutions and Regulatory Institutions in the Host Country  
This study offers greater theoretical precision for understanding the effects of host 
country regulatory institutions on cross-border M&A value creation. While acquirers are 
likely to create value by acquiring targets in host countries with higher level regulatory 
institutions (i.e., advanced regulatory institutions), it is necessary to simultaneously 
examine political institutions in these countries. Institutional researchers have 
recognized that higher level regulatory institutions require enforcement mechanisms 
supported by monitoring and sanctioning power (i.e., political institutions) (Henisz, 
2000a; Hitt, et al., 2008; Scott, 1995; North, 1990). Prior research showed that credible 
political institutions guarantee that regulatory institutions are effectively implemented 
and will not change unexpectedly (Henisz, 2000a; Hitt, et al., 2008).  
Thus, foreign acquirers are able to exploit rich business opportunities in host 
countries with a higher level of regulatory institutions. Foreign acquirers need not worry 
that regulatory institutions are not effectively enforced, and/or change unexpectedly, and 
thereby business opportunities provided by these high levels of regulatory institutions 
are not exploitable and/or disappear swiftly.  In contrast, when political institutions in 
host countries are not able to credibly implement their regulatory institutions, acquirers 
are likely to encounter expropriation by host country governments, unexpected 
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regulatory policy changes, etc. In these cases, acquirers are less likely to create value  
even in host countries with higher level regulatory institutions. 
As shown in Figure 6 and 7, the findings suggest that host country political 
institutions moderate the relationship between host country regulatory institutions and 
cross-border M&A value creation. As shown in Figure 6, results show that a high level 
of political institutions (democratic political institutions) in host countries enhance 
acquirers’ value creation in countries with high level regulatory institutions; and low 
level political institutions in host countries decrease acquirers’ value creation in 
countries with a low level of  regulatory institutions in the short term (CAR-19,0,+1).  
This finding suggests that high level political institutions encourage knowledge 
transfer and knowledge creation, expanding acquirers’ knowledge stock and value-
creating opportunities that are provided by a high level of regulatory institutions in the 
host country. Thus, value creation is expected in these situations (North, 2005). However, 
low level political institutions discourage knowledge transfer and knowledge creation, 
decreasing acquirers’ limited value-creating opportunities in host countries with low 
level regulatory institutions. Thus, value creation is a much lower probability (Mohmood 
& Rufin, 2005).  
As expected, the finding suggests that high level political institutions (i.e., credible 
political institutions) in host countries enhance acquirers’ value creation in these 
countries when combined with a high level of regulatory institutions especially in the 
long term (i.e., two years after cross-border M&A announcements). In addition, as can 
been seen in Figure 11, when the level of host country regulatory institutions are the 
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same as that of the acquirer’s home country regulatory institutions (e.g., providing the 
same amount of business opportunities, property rights protection), acquirers are less 
able to realize value creation in countries with lower level political institutions 
(authoritarian political institutions) than in higher level political institutions. This 
supports that the notion that regulatory institutions need to be supported by political 
institutions (Hitt, et al., 2008; Scott, 2001). Thus, high level political institutions 
guarantee that acquirers realize their value creation in host countries providing value-
creating opportunities (regulatory institutions). To my knowledge, this is the first study 
that examines how the monitoring, enforcement, and sanctioning power in a country 
affect the functions of regulatory institutions, and thus influences its embedded firms’ 
strategic behavior and value creation. The findings provide strong evidence to suggest 
that it is critical to examine a country’s political institutions when investigating the 
effects of a country’s regulatory institutions.  
As shown in Figures 6 and 7, findings indicate that market investors behave 
differently in the short term and in the long term regarding the effects of host country 
regulatory institutions and political institutions. The relationship between regulatory 
institutions and cross-border M&A value creation is negative in host countries with a 
high level of political institutions and also a low level of political institutions in the long 
term (Tobin’s Q2); and yet the relationship between regulatory institutions and cross-
border M&A value creation is positive in host countries with a high level of political 
institutions and a low level of political institutions in the short term (CAR-19,0,+1).  
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Several factors may explain market investors’ different expectations in the short 
term and in the long term. First, market investors have limited information about cross-
border M&As in the short window around the date of cross-border M&A 
announcements. As discussed in our examination of global event studies, market 
investors may rely on widely-understood heuristics that may not apply well to the focal 
cross-border M&A, or may react by following a popular sentiment that may not be 
accurate in the short term (Madhavan & Prescott, 1995; Oler, et al., 2007). For example, 
Oler, Harrison, and Allen (2007) found that market investors use widely-held beliefs 
about market power and economies of scale to positively and significantly evaluate 
horizontal acquisitions at the date of announcement.  
After acquirers operate in host countries for two years, market investors have more 
information and a deeper understanding of host country institutions and their effects on 
acquirers’ value creation. So, they are more likely to incorporate this knowledge about 
host country institutions and their effects on cross-border M&A value creation to react in 
the market in the long term. Second, due to bounded rationality, market investors may 
not be able to process the information about host country regulatory and political 
institutions and their effects on cross-border M&A announcements in the short term. 
Some researchers suggest that it takes a long time for market investors to digest and 
understand some information related to the economic ramifications of cross-border 
M&A announcements (Oler, et al., 2007).  
Therefore, market investors react differently in the short term and in the long term 
partly because different information available and different knowledge stocks regarding 
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the effects of host country regulatory and political institutions on cross-border M&A 
value creation. Further, Table 1 and Table 2 demonstrates that cross-border M&A value 
creation in the short term and in the long term represent two distinct dimensions of 
acquirers’ post-acquisition performance. As shown in Table 1 and Table 2, the 
correlation between cross-border M&A value creation in the short term(CAR-19,0,+1) and 
in the long term (Tobin's Q2) is low and statistically insignificant.  
Institutional Distance  
Institutional Distance 
This study confirms that acquirers fail in creating value by acquiring targets in 
similar institutional environments. This finding resonates with agglomeration strategy 
research suggesting that firms need to locate away from their competitors in similar 
institutional environments to avoid fierce competition for similar resources and market 
space (Shaver & Flyer, 2000). Further, this study demonstrates that acquirers could 
benefit significantly from accessing new resources and new markets in distant locations. 
Yet, as distance increases, LOF may dominate and override the benefits of accessing 
new resources and new opportunities in distant markets (Eden & Miller, 2004). As a 
result, acquirers are likely to suffer from performance declines.  
This finding supports the importance of investing in distant markets to access new 
resources, and exploit new opportunities yet being sensitive to the potential LOF. Firms 
are able to achieve competitive advantage in the dynamic global market. At the same 
time, acquirers should be mindful to avoid investing in too distant markets of which they 
have little knowledge. This is like a traveler who knows nothing about the region s/he 
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plans to go such as desert, rivers, mountains, animals, roads, and available transportation 
facilities. As a result, s/he is likely to be lost in her/his traveling.  
Asymmetric Regulatory Institutional Distance 
The second set of core findings provides an initial understanding of the asymmetric 
effects of regulatory and economic institutional distances on cross-border M&A value 
creation.  This study demonstrates that the effects of regulatory and economic distance 
are asymmetric. These asymmetric effects of regulatory and economic distance are 
discussed below.  
As shown in Figure 6 and Figure 7, foreign firms that acquire targets in host 
countries with higher level regulatory institutions are less able to create value in the 
short term when the regulatory distance is higher. As expected, market investors seem to 
believe that acquirers are unlikely to create value in those host countries with higher 
level regulatory institutions. For example, while host countries with higher level 
regulatory institutions provide acquirers rich business opportunities, acquirers from 
countries with lower level regulatory institutions may not be able to exploit these 
opportunities and compete with experienced local firms successfully.  Further, as 
acquirers are not familiar with local regulatory institutions, they encounter LOF which 
increases their costs when operating in distant regulatory institutional environments.  
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 10, findings show that when host country 
regulatory institutions are higher than home country ones, acquirers are more likely to 
create value in the long term when the regulatory distance is larger. Institutional research 
suggests that countries with a higher level of regulatory institutions clearly state and 
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entail explicit knowledge about how economic and social activities are regulated within 
the country and related to other countries (Scott, 1995). Yet, countries with a lower level 
of regulatory institutions are not able to provide comprehensive, clear and explicit 
regulatory institutions because these countries partly rely on implicit government control. 
Information and knowledge about how governments implicitly control social and 
economic activities is not explicitly stated, and not transparent to firms (Redding, 2005).  
Regulatory institutions in host countries with a higher level of regulatory institutions 
are more transparent, visible and easily accessible to firms than host countries with a 
lower level of regulatory institutions. Acquirers can easily find the information and 
materials about regulatory institutions in host countries with a higher level of regulatory 
institutions (Gaur & Lu, 2007). Their LOF in terms of regulatory institutions decreases 
significantly in the long term.  
Yet, while foreign acquirers are likely to learn regulatory institutions in host 
countries with a lower level of regulatory institutions in order to keep the transaction 
costs at manageable levels before cross-border M&As, available information and 
materials about regulatory institutions in these countries are generally far incomplete. 
Foreign acquirers need to incur significant costs in navigating, experiencing and learning 
implicit and idiosyncratic regulatory institutions in these host countries. Further, as 
higher level regulatory institutions clearly regulate how firms behave in transactions, 
transaction costs of doing businesses in countries with higher level regulatory 
institutions are significantly less compared to the lower level regulatory institutions in 
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home countries (Scott, 1995; North, 1990). Therefore, acquirers are more able to create 
value by operating in countries with higher level regulatory institutions in the long term.  
Further, as expected, results show that the effects of regulatory distance on cross-
border M&A value creation are asymmetric. That is, the effects of regulatory distance on 
cross-border M&A value creation when the level of host country regulatory institutions 
is lower than that of home country is different from those when the level of host country 
regulatory institutions is higher than that of home country. As seen from Figure 10, 
results suggest that when foreign firms acquire targets in host countries with lower level 
regulatory institutions, they are more likely to create value when the regulatory distance 
is higher, and yet are less able to do so in the long term when regulatory distance is too 
high. Moreover, as seen from Figure 6 and 7, results suggest that when foreign firms 
acquire targets in host countries with lower level regulatory institutions, they are more 
likely to create value in the short term when the regulatory distance is high. Yet, the 
finding did not show that value creation decreases when regulatory distance is very high.  
As discussed earlier, market investors may have limited information about host 
country regulatory institutions in the short window around the date of cross-border 
M&A announcements; and are too cognitively constrained to process all of the 
information correctly in a short period of time. Thus, they are likely to apply a widely-
understood heuristic, or a popular sentiment about host country regulatory institutions in 
evaluating the effects on cross-border M&A value creation (Oler, et al., 2007). It is 
likely that market investors use widely-held beliefs about potential value creation in 
distant host countries with lower level regulatory institutions in their short-term 
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evaluation of cross-border M&A announcements. Market investors tend to be 
sophisticated arbitragers in the stock market because they create value by taking 
advantages of buying and selling price differences (Hendershott & Seasholes, 2007). 
Therefore, they are likely to use arbitrage logic to evaluate cross-border M&A value 
creation in distant markets. As developed countries have been very successfully 
exploiting opportunities in less developed countries in the last century, market investors 
are likely to value acquiring targets in distant countries with lower levels of regulatory 
institutions than home countries. They tend to perceive that acquirers are able to gain 
arbitrage rents by acquiring targets in these distant markets (Ghemawat, 2003). 
In sum, results demonstrate that the effects of regulatory distance on cross-border 
M&A value creation are asymmetric. That is, the effects are conditional on the direction 
of regulatory distance.  
Asymmetric Economic Distance 
Figure 11 shows that when the level of economic institutions in host countries is 
lower than that in home countries, acquirers are more likely to create value in these host 
countries in the short term when economic distance is higher. However, results did not 
suggest a negative relationship between economic distance and cross-border M&A value 
creation in the short term. Rather the results indicate that when the level of economic 
institutions in host countries are higher than that in home countries, the positive 
relationship between economic distance and cross-border M&A value creation in the 
short term is weakened. But, the general logic of the effects of economic distance on 
cross-border M&A value creation are asymmetric is supported by the acquirers’ cross-
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border M&A value creation in the short term.  Thus, it is plausible that market investors 
value host countries with higher level economic institutions. Market investors may 
expect that acquirers can benefit from munificent financial resources available in these 
countries, and thus are able to invest in profitable yet capital intensive projects.  
Unexpectedly, results did not show that the effects of economic distance on cross-
border M&A value creation are conditional on the direction of economic distance after 
two years of cross-border M&A announcements. To have a better understanding whether 
the effects of economic distance on cross-border M&A value creation are conditional on 
the direction of economic distance in the long term, I examined the effects of economic 
distance on acquirers’ Tobin’s Q at the end of financial year of the focal acquirer’s 
cross-border M&A announcement. Figure 12 graphically shows the effects of economic 
distance on cross-border M&A value creation are conditional on the direction of 
economic distance at the year end of cross-border M&A announcements (in the long 
term).  
Interestingly, as shown in Figure 12, when the level of economic institutions is 
lower than that of home countries, acquirers are less likely to create value when the 
economic distance is higher. Further, when the level of economic institutions is higher 
than that of home countries, this negative relationship between economic distance and 
cross-border M&A value creation is strengthened.  This suggests that the relationship 
between economic distance and cross-border M&A value creation is likely to be 
dynamic over time. Research has suggested that acquirers tend to encounter liability of 
newness and foreignness, and thus fail in value creation after they start to operate in host 
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countries (Eden & Miller, 2004; Lu & Beamish, 2004). Lu and Beamish (2004) showed 
the S curve relationship between internationalization and firm performance, clearly 
demonstrating that firms experience significant costs to learn new environments in their 
early stages of international expansion, after which they can realize positive outcomes 
over time.  As seen from Figure 12, foreign firms experience these costs after acquiring 
targets in host countries with distant economic institutions. This may suggest future 
research opportunities.  
As discussed earlier, research is needed to examine the asymmetric effects of 
economic institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation in a longer term 
(e.g., more than two years of cross-border M&A announcements).  Cross-border M&A 
value creation is measured as acquirers’ Tobin’s Q at two years after acquisition in this 
work. It is likely that acquirers need a longer time to overcome their liability and 
newness in host countries with distantly economic institutions (i.e., more than two years 
after acquisition). The benefits of operating in host countries with distant economic 
institutions are possibly able to override the costs of operating in these countries over a 
longer term (e.g., more than two years of cross-border M&A announcements).   
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FIGURE 12 
Moderation Effects of Economic Distance Asymmetry on the Relationship 
between Economic Distance and Tobin’s Q0 
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Managerial and Public Policy Implications 
Managerial Implications 
This study also offers practical implications for firms and policy implications for 
governments. The results inform acquirers and their decision makers about how diverse 
host country institutions affect cross-border M&A value creation. Thus, armed with 
these results, firms and their decision makers should be able to better evaluate diverse 
host country institutions when deciding whether or not to acquire targets in foreign 
countries.  
Specifically, the findings suggest acquirers should acquire targets in host countries 
with a medium level of economic institutions (less investment constraints) to have the 
highest probability of creating value. Acquirers should avoid acquiring targets in host 
countries with low or high level economic institutions. Firms in countries with a low 
level of economic institutions generally represent less valuable targets because financial 
resources are not available for firms to invest in capital intensive technological sectors.  
Yet, technology is very important for firms to compete in the increasingly dynamic 
global economy. Further, while many acquirers are attracted to host countries with a 
high level of economic institutions, they should realize that competition in these 
countries is fierce. So, it may be wiser for firms to acquire targets in host countries with 
a medium level of economic institutions. Results also suggest that foreign firms should 
acquire targets in host countries with high quality physical infrastructure institutions.  
acquirers to capitalize on their core competence and achieve economics of scale in host 
countries.  
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Moreover, this study suggests that it is important for acquirers and their decision 
makers to pay attention not only to host country regulatory institutions, but also to host 
country political institutions simultaneously. While some countries have started to 
provide a higher level of regulatory institutions (i.e., less restrictive regulatory 
institutions) to attract foreign direct investment, acquirers and decision makers need to 
be cautious to ensure that these countries are able to credibly commit and deliver the 
appropriate monitoring and enforcement. One of important functions of political 
institutions is to enforce and commit to regulatory institutions within the country (Hitt et 
al., 2008). Certainly, acquirers and their decision makers should acquire targets in host 
countries providing high level political institutions that credibly commit to regulatory 
institutions.  
In addition to host country institutions, the findings suggest that acquirers and 
decision makers need to evaluate institutional distance between home and host countries. 
While acquirers may be unconsciously biased toward acquiring targets in similar 
institutional environments, the results suggest that acquirers should not do so if they 
desire to maximize value creation. Usually firms in similar institutional environments 
compete for similar resources and markets. Also, acquirers may not be aware of the 
nuances yet important differences when operating in similar institutional environments. 
Thus, they are less likely to create value by acquiring targets in these markets than they 
expect.  In contrast, acquirers should acquire targets in distant markets to obtain new 
resources, and exploit and explore new market opportunities. Yet, institutional 
environments in host countries should not be too distant from those in home countries. 
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Liability of foreignness and newness tend to dominate when operating in a too 
institutionally distant market (Eden & Miller, 2004).  
Importantly, the findings suggest that acquirers and decision makers should be pay 
careful attention to the direction of the institutional distance between the home and host 
countries. The results demonstrate that the effects of institutional distance on cross-
border M&A value creation are contingent on the direction of the distance. If firms plan 
to acquire targets in host countries with a higher level of regulatory institutions than that 
of home countries, acquirers should select targets in countries where the level of 
regulatory institutions is as high as possible. Yet, if firms plan to acquire targets in host 
countries with a lower level of regulatory institutions than that of home countries, 
acquirers should select targets in countries with a lower level of regulatory institutions. 
At the same time, acquirers should be aware that they should not select targets in 
countries with a too low level of regulatory institutions.  
Moreover, it might be better for acquirers to acquire targets in host countries with 
lower level economic institutions compared to home countries. While acquirers also tend 
to create value by acquiring targets in host countries with higher level economic 
institutions compared to home countries, acquirers can create more value by acquiring 
targets in host countries with lower level economic institutions than in host countries 
with higher level economic institutions (less investment constraints) compared to home 
countries.  
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Public Policy Implications 
This work offers important public policy implications for governments. Facing the 
increasing integrated and competitive global economy, governments need to make 
choices and provide an effective institutional environment that provide greater 
opportunities for both domestic and foreign firms to exploit and to create value. While 
many governments have started to provide higher level regulatory institutions to 
compete with other countries for foreign direct investment including financial resources 
and advanced managerial knowledge, governments should ensure that these higher level 
regulatory institutions can be credibly sustained and supported. Only after acquirers’ 
return on investment is ensured in host countries, are acquirers likely to invest their rich 
financial resources and advanced technologies, etc. 
Further, governments should invest in and attempt to provide as high a level and 
quality of physical infrastructure within the country as possible. Higher quality physical 
infrastructure facilitates firms to achieve economies of scale within the country in a 
shorter period of time.  In this dynamic competitive global economy, speed is an 
important competitive weapon. When firms are able to achieve higher returns on their 
investment in shorter periods of time, they are able to invest to provide more advanced 
products and services. Firms need to achieve temporary competitive advantages 
continuously in this dynamic global economy (Sirmon et al., 2007). So, they are able to 
achieve competitive advantage in the increasingly competitive global market over a 
longer time.  
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Governments should provide financial resources for local firms to invest in capital 
intensive technological sectors. Governments should realize that competition in the new 
century is based on capital intensive technologies, innovation, etc. On the one hand, 
local firms investing in technologies and innovation can increase their competitiveness 
in dynamic global markets. On the other hand, local firms investing in technologies and 
innovation also increase their knowledge base. So, these firms are better able to learn 
and absorb new technologies from their acquirers or targets, and thus continue increasing 
their knowledge stock and competitive capability in the dynamic global economy.    
Future Research 
This is the first study to systematically examine the effects of a country’s formal 
institutions on cross-border M&A value creation. Previous studies have examined the 
effects of a country’s formal institutions on inbound and outbound FDI and cross-border 
M&As (Aminian, Campart, & Pfister, 2008; Daniele & Marani, 2008; Globerman & 
Shapiro, 2003, 2005; Li, 2008). This work advanced our understanding of cross-border 
M&A value creation from an important yet neglected institutional perspective. The 
findings of this work provide initial insights about the effects of diverse host country 
institutions, and institutional distance between home and host country on cross-border 
M&A value creation. Meanwhile, more fruitful future research is needed.  
First, this study provides a good understanding of how country institutions on cross-
border M&A value creation. Yet, the mechanisms through which country institutions 
affect cross-border M&A value creation need to be investigated. As country institutions 
affect their embedded firms’ behavior, home and host country institutions certainly 
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influence the integration between the acquirer and the target such as transferring 
resources from the acquirer/target to the target/acquirer, and the percentage of the 
target’s top managers in the combined firm’ top management team etc. Research on 
these issues could provide us a more fine-grained understanding of the effects of country 
institutions on cross-border M&A value creation.  
Second, the sample of this work is from 1995 to 2003. During this period of time, 
acquirers from developed countries dominated cross-border M&A transactions. In recent 
years the percentage of acquirers from less developed countries has increased in cross-
border M&A transactions. This work demonstrates that the effects of institutional 
distance (i.e., regulatory and economic distance) on cross-border M&A value creation 
are conditional on the direction of institutional distance. Future research should examine 
recent cross-border M&As with acquirers from less developed countries. Using this 
sample, researchers would likely provide insights regarding the asymmetric effects of 
institutional distance on cross-border M&A value creation.  
Third, as discussed earlier, the effects of country institutions on cross-border M&A 
value creation are dynamic over time.  Acquirers tend to encounter liability of newness 
and foreignness in their early stages of operating in host countries, and could achieve 
their value creation over time. Future research could utilize HLM growth modeling to 
investigate the dynamic relationship between country institutions and cross-border M&A 
value creation.  
Fourth, constrained by the sample, this work is not able to test the effects of 
extremely low level economic institutions in host countries on cross-border M&A value 
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creation. It would be interesting for future research to investigate the S shape 
relationship between the level of economic institutions in the host country and cross-
border M&A value creation.  
Finally, in this work I did not use accounting-based measures such as return on 
assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and return on sales (ROS) because there are 
differences due to lack of standardization in international accounting conventions, and 
differences in methods of consolidating accounts after acquisition and across years, etc 
(Chakravarthy, 1986; Hitt, Ireland, & Harrison, 2001b). For example, the rule of pooling 
of interests (the assets of the two firms are combined at book value) was terminated in 
2000 in the United States (Hitt, et al., 2001b). As stock markets in emerging economies 
and developing countries are relatively new and under-regulated, market investors in 
these markets may react to cross-border M&A announcements differently from those in 
developed market countries (Miller, et al., 2008). As seen from this work, CARs with a 
short-term event window is a distinct dimension of post-acquisition performance. Using 
a long-term event study is able to reconcile market investors’ different reactions to cross-
border M&A announcements. Long-term event study takes into account of market 
investors’ reaction before announcement because of information leakage, and market 
investors’ reaction after they obtain and digest rich information following cross-border 
M&As announcements. Future research perhaps should utilize long-term event study 
techniques to examine acquirers’ cross-border M&A value creation. So, using a short-
term event study, long term event study, and Tobin’s Q could provide us a rich 
understanding of acquirers’ cross-border M&A value creation.  
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In conclusion, this works adds to a growing body of research on cross-border M&As. 
Based on prior research, this work shows that it is important to examine the effects of 
firm level factors on cross-border M&A value creation. More important, the findings of 
this work provide initial and strong evidence suggesting that country institutions 
influence firms’ behavior and thereby affect cross-border M&A value creation. Such 
research is of paramount importance if we want to advance our understanding, and 
improve the effectiveness of cross-border M&A value creation.  
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APPENDIX A 
Sampled Countries 
 
Argentina      
Australia      
Austria        
Brazil         
Bulgaria  
Canada         
Chile  
China          
Colombia       
Czech Republic  
Denmark        
Egypt          
Finland        
France         
Germany        
Greece         
Hong Kong      
Hungary        
India          
Indonesia      
Ireland        
Israel         
Italy          
Japan          
Malaysia       
Mexico         
Netherlands    
New Zealand    
Nigeria        
Pakistan  
Peru  
Philippines    
Poland         
Portugal       
Romania  
Russia         
South Africa       
South Korea        
Singapore      
Slovenia       
Spain          
Sweden         
Switzerland    
Taiwan         
Thailand       
Turkey         
United Kingdom 
United States  
Venezuela 
Vietnam 
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APPENDIX B 
List of 45 SIC Codes 
 
AeA uses 45 SIC codes that fall into three general groupings -- high-tech manufacturing, 
communications services, and software and computer-related services -- to define the 
U.S. high-technology industry.  
AeA website is http://www.aeanet.org/Publications/IDMK_definition.asp. 
HIGH-TECH MANUFACTURING 
Computers and Office Equipment 
3571 Electronic Computers 
3572 Computer Storage Devices 
3575 Computer Terminals 
3577 Computer Peripherals 
3578 Calculating and Accounting Machines 
3579 Office Machines 
Consumer Electronics 
3651 Household Audio and Video Equipment 
3652 Phonographic Records and Prerecorded Tapes and Disks 
Communications Equipment 
3661 Telephone and Telegraph Apparatus 
3663 Radio and TV Broadcast and Communications Equipment 
3669 Other Communications Equipment 
Electronic Components and Accessories 
3671 Electron Tubes 
3672 Printed Circuit Boards 
3675 Electronic Capacitors 
3676 Electronic Resistors 
3677 Electronic Coils, Transformers, and Inductors 
3678 Electronic Connectors 
3679 Other Electronic Components 
Semiconductors 
3674 Semiconductors and Related Devices 
Industrial Electronics 
3821 Laboratory Apparatus 
3822 Environmental Controls 
3823 Process Control Instruments 
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3824 Fluid Meters and Counting Devices 
3825 Instruments to Measure Electricity 
3826 Laboratory Analytical Instruments 
3829 Other Measuring and Controlling Devices 
Photonics 
3827 Optical Instruments and Lenses 
3861 Photographic Equipment and Lenses 
Defense Electronics 
3812 Search and Navigation Systems, Instruments, and Equipment 
Electromedical Equipment 
3844 X-Ray Apparatus and Tubes and Related Irradiation Apparatus 
3845 Electromedical and Electrotherapeutic Apparatus 
COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 
4812 Radiotelephone Communications 
4813 Telephone Communications 
4822 Telegraph and Other Message Communications 
4841 Cable and Other Pay Television Services 
4899 Other Communications Services 
SOFTWARE AND COMPUTER-RELATED SERVICES 
Software Services 
7371 Computer Programming Services 
7372 Prepackaged Software 
7373 Computer Integrated Systems Design 
Data Processing and Information Services 
7374 Computer Processing and Data Preparation 
7375 Information Retrieval Services 
7376 Computer Facilities Management Services 
Rental, Maintenance, and Other Computer-Related Services 
7377 Computer Rental and Leasing 
7378 Computer Maintenance and Repair 
7379 Other Computer-Related Services 
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APPENDIX C 
Technology Industry Classification 
 
First, I identified all targets in the cross-border M&A database with high-technology 
codes. Accordingly, I classified cross-border M&As with these targets as high-
technology cross-border M&As. As high-technology codes are not assigned to all targets 
in the cross-border M&A database, these high-technology codes are the partial solution 
to identify high-technology targets and cross-border M&As.  
Second, I relied on Zahra, Ireland, & Hitt (2000) and American Electronic 
Association (AeA) high-technology industry classification to recognize additional high-
technology targets. As such, cross-border M&As with these targets were added. 
 Zahra, et al. (2000) included the following 12 high-technology industries: 
biotechnology, computer software, factory automation, telecommunication, 
environmental technologies, medical and surgical equipment, pharmaceuticals, specialty 
chemicals, aerospace, test measurements, advanced materials, and semiconductors. 
AeA’s definition of high-technology industries consist of SIC codes that fall into two 
broad categories—high-tech manufacturing (SIC codes: 357, 365, 366, 367, 381,382, 
384 and 386) and high-tech services which include communication services (SIC codes: 
481, 482, 484 and 489), and software and computer-related services (SIC code: 737). 
SIC codes and industry names of AeA high-technology industries in this work can be 
found in Appendix B.  
Third, I identified targets that were not classified as high-technology ones but have 
technology components. These industries include all non-high technology industries 
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except agriculture (SIC codes: 0100, 0200, 0700, 0800, 0900), Food (SIC codes: 2000, 
2100), Services (SIC codes: 4300, 5500, 5600,5700, 6000, 6100, 6200, 6300, 6400, 6500, 
6700, 7000, 7200, 8300,8400, 8600, 8800, 8900,9100, 9200, 9300,9400, 9500, 9600, 
9700, 9900), Wholesale (SIC codes: 5000, 5100), and Retail (SIC codes: 5200, 5300, 
5400).  
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APPENDIX D 
Global Event Studya-- Cumulative Average Abnormal Return (CAAR) in 
Multi-countries Settings
 
 The normal return is defined as that expected if the event did not take place. An 
abnormal return is calculated as the difference between the observed return for a publicly 
traded firm and the normal return for the same firm. As the observed return for a 
publicly trade firm operating in both domestic and foreign markets is significantly 
affected by (1) local market return index; (2) global market return index; and (3) foreign 
currency exchange rates, the global market model is developed as follows: 
 
 Rb ijt = α i  + β i Rb mjt   + γ i R wmt  +  δ i X jt + ε ijt     (1)
 
where R ijt  is firm i’s stock return in the local market j on day t, R mjt   is the local 
market  index return on day t, R wmt  is the world market index return on day t, and X jt is 
the change in the foreign currency exchange rates in country j on day t. α i , β i ,  γ i  and  
δ i are firm-specific parameters, and  ε ijt is a random-error term with E [ε ijt] = 0 and Var 
[ε ijt] = σij2 .
 
After estimating Equation (1), the daily excess return of firm i in country j at day t is 
thus estimated by: 
 
AR ijt = R ijt – (a i  + b i R mjt   + g i R wmt  +  d i X jt )        (2) 
 
where AR ijt are the daily abnormal returns for firm i in country j on day t, and a i , b 
i , g i  and  d I are the firm-specific OLS parameter estimates from Equation 1. It is 
assumed that α ,β , γ  and δ are stable and are calculated during an arbitrary estimation 
period. As such, abnormal returns derived from the world market model are adjusted for 
domestic market movements, global market movements, and changes in foreign 
currency exchange rates.  
 
The cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each firm i in country j, CAR i,j is 
formed by summing individual excess returns over time as follows: 
 
                                                                   l 
                          CAR   = ∑ AR ijt                    (3)  i,j,k,1
                                                                  t=k 
where CAR i,j,k,l  is for the period from t = k days until t = l days. 
 
The cumulative average abnormal return (CAAR) over the event time from k days until l 
days is 
calculated by: 
 
           
                                                                                    N 
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                  CAAR k,l = (1/N) ∑ CAR i,j,k,l                          (4) 
i=1 
 
a  I followed Park (2004)’s global event study guidance. 
b Due to lack of synchronism in stock market trading hours, I lagged firm stock and local 
market return by 1 day for acquirers from Australia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, Singapore, and Thailand, etc. For missing data due to country specific events 
such as national holidays, I used only the available data, removing the missing period 
and the succeeding day from the analysis. 
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APPENDIX E 
Countries in the Final Sample 
 
Argentina 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
China 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Hong Kong 
India 
Ireland-Rep 
Israel 
Italy 
Japan 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Poland 
South Africa 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Taiwan 
United 
Kingdom 
United States 
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APPENDIX F 
Level-1 Variables in Home Countriesa
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Home Number of  ROA  Slack Relatedness Acquirer's Methods of CAR -19,0,+1 Tobin's Q2
Country cross-border host country Payment 
M&As M&A Experience
Australia 121 0.065 0.160 2.793 0.711 0.240 1.279 1.573
Austria 20 0.026 0.097 2.300 1.600 0.050 -0.715 1.102
Canada 467 0.060 0.219 2.959 1.672 0.291 0.425 1.613
Finland 90 0.095 0.258 2.867 2.089 0.178 0.915 1.840
France 295 0.065 0.294 2.956 1.542 0.163 -2.003 1.596
Germany 285 0.050 0.233 2.611 1.288 0.165 -1.028 1.356
Hong Kong 46 0.016 0.085 2.348 0.848 0.261 -0.241 1.467
Ireland 111 0.081 0.270 2.874 4.306 0.432 -1.070 1.414
Israel 20 0.068 0.167 3.250 0.500 0.550 1.135 1.495
Japan 113 0.045 0.249 2.265 1.929 0.115 -0.566 1.339
Netherlands 235 0.098 0.411 2.804 2.511 0.170 -0.078 1.565
New Zealand 21 0.094 0.310 3.000 0.810 0.333 -0.285 1.659
South Korea 20 0.063 0.318 3.450 0.250 0.000 -0.697 1.215
Sweden 184 0.070 0.215 2.978 1.255 0.201 0.668 1.611
switzerland 182 0.072 0.233 2.681 1.346 0.203 0.787 1.708
UK 1195 0.092 0.295 2.802 1.341 0.581 -0.337 1.743
US 2736 0.093 0.280 2.958 0.565 0.221 -0.986 1.872
a all variables are means 
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APPENDIX G 
Level-2 Variables in Home Countriesa 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Home Number of Cultural Host Host Host Host Institutional Economic Regulatory 
Country cross- distance country country country country distance distance distance 
border regulatory economic political physical 
M&As institution institution institution infrastructure 
Australia 121 1.372 -1.212 1.308 0.598 0.309 2.161 1.708 0.343
Austria 20 1.269 -0.661 0.970 0.682 0.020 1.328 1.165 0.162
Canada 467 0.974 -1.043 2.807 0.644 0.543 3.067 2.643 0.339
Finland 90 1.794 -0.909 1.187 0.675 0.042 1.722 1.452 0.335
France 295 1.936 -1.030 1.399 0.467 0.181 1.647 1.082 0.811
Germany 285 1.964 -0.922 0.897 0.498 0.065 1.347 0.951 0.455
Hong Kong 46 3.626 1.550 1.548 -2.527 3.120 5.487 1.788 3.637
Ireland 111 1.785 -1.206 0.967 0.311 -0.140 1.572 1.332 0.225
Israel 20 1.257 -1.079 3.148 0.687 0.761 4.144 3.573 0.844
Japan 113 2.388 -1.107 2.721 0.579 0.061 2.780 2.516 0.953
Netherlands 235 2.174 -0.874 1.243 0.490 -0.173 2.529 1.629 0.442
New Zealand 21 2.283 -1.019 -0.192 0.881 -0.186 0.540 0.267 0.356
South Korea 20 3.144 1.808 2.425 -2.286 6.412 7.386 2.294 2.048
Sweden 184 2.383 -0.822 0.991 0.613 0.053 1.558 1.251 0.377
switzerland 182 1.858 -0.856 1.517 0.573 0.072 2.014 1.587 0.333
UK 1195 1.458 -0.884 1.423 0.578 0.026 1.812 1.410 0.398
US 2736 1.717 -0.651 0.335 0.475 -0.035 2.915 2.521 0.580
a all variables are means 
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